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Editor’s Introduction
We are very pleased to enter our third year of publication. The editors hope that you
found the first two volumes of Genocide Studies and Prevention stimulating and
innovative. Our purpose has been to publish the most important, relevant, and
interesting material related to the study and prevention of genocide. We will endeavor
to maintain what we think has been a successful effort as we enter our third volume
year.
Accordingly, GSP 3:1 is a general issue with an eclectic array of articles covering
important and controversial topics in genocide studies.
The lead article, ‘‘The Three ‘Switches’ of Identity Construction in Genocide: The
Nazi Final Solution and the Cambodian Killing Fields’’ by Maureen Hiebert, is an
addition to some of the theoretical concepts most integral to the study of genocide.
Hiebert argues that ‘‘elites decide to commit genocide, and not some less catastrophic
policy of repression or violence, when three conceptual ‘switches’ concerning
the identity, interests, and future actions of the victim group are ‘turned on’ by the
perpetrators.’’ These are closely related to some of the traditional conceptualizations of
earlier genocide scholars. For example, the first ‘‘switch’’ involves ‘‘the victim group’’
losing its ‘‘status within the political community and [being] constructed as outsiders
to whom rights and obligations are no longer owed.’’ This is really another version of
the famous idea Helen Fein first discussed in her pioneering work Understanding
Genocide when she coined the term ‘‘the universe of moral obligation’’ and noted that
victim groups are often defined as being outside that universe. They are then viewed,
as Hiebert notes, as ‘‘dangerous enemies’’ and finally as subhumans ‘‘who can be
killed without compunction.’’ Hiebert’s ‘‘switches’’ are very close to the process of
dehumanization that has been a consistent component of many theories concerning the
genocidal process; in the end, her view of the process also involves a trigger related to
economic and political crises.
The second article in this issue, ‘‘Value Hierarchies of Holocaust Rescuers and
Resistance Fighters,’’ is an empirical examination comparing participants in armed
resistance movements with individuals who rescued Jews from the Nazi Holocaust.
Using quantitative measures and thematic content analysis, Peter Suedfeld and
Stefanie de Best compare forty-seven members of resistance movements and fifty
Holocaust rescuers. Finding both differences and similarities, they also examine the
implications of their research for the study of altruism in extreme circumstances.
As there are few such empirical examinations, this study forms an important building
block in the continuing research on helping behavior.
In the third contribution, ‘‘Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan: A Comparison
of Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Two Situations of Occupation,’’ Tove
Skutnabb-Kangas and Desmond Fernandes compare what they call ‘‘linguistic human
rights.’’ Using this term to refer to the right to study the language of the culture of a
person’s birth, they accuse Turkey of committing ‘‘linguistic and cultural genocide
(according to definition of genocide in Articles 2b and 2e in the UNCG) in relation to the
Kurdish nation/minority.’’ The authors examine the different educational outcomes in
Turkey and Iraq and discuss some of the reasons for the differences and similarities.
Herb Hirsch, ‘‘Editor’s Introduction,’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 3, 1 (April 2008): 1–3.
! 2008 Genocide Studies and Prevention. doi: 10.3138/gsp.3.1.1
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As a result of this comparison, this is a controversial and interesting analysis with
important political and educational consequences.
Robert McCormick’s ‘‘The United States’ Response to Genocide in the Independent
State of Croatia, 1941–1945,’’ examines an incident of genocide that has received little
scholarly attention. Focusing on the role of the United States in the genocide
engineered in Croatia by Ante Pavelić and his Ustaše Party, McCormick points out
that the atrocities received public scrutiny but were largely ignored by US policy
makers, a phenomenon he attributes to the concern that public commentary might
‘‘foster violence in the United States that would weaken the domestic war effort,
especially in heavy industry where Yugoslav immigrants tended to work.’’ McCormick
concludes that genocide was committed in Croatia while American authorities decided
to remain silent and engaged in ‘‘exceedingly pragmatic decisions designed to maintain
a peaceful and productive war effort.’’
The last full-length article in the issue examines various aspects of the Holocaust
as they were ‘‘prefigured’’ by the Armenian Genocide. As one of the pre-eminent
scholars of Armenian history, Vahakn Dadrian is in a particularly advantageous
position from which to make such a comparison. He intends, as he notes, to examine
‘‘the common body of knowledge by exploring in more detail the comparative aspects of
the two genocides. Such an attempt does not preclude some of the very important other
aspects separating the two, nor does it discount the distinct pre-eminence of the
Holocaust in the overall picture of genocide studies . . .’’ In short, Dadrian is interested
in the comparative study of genocide in order to provide insights into the causes and
eventual prevention of the crime.
GSP 3:1 also gives us an opportunity to offer readers both a review essay and a
research note. The review essay, by Taner Akçam, is an extended engagement with a
book that has generated great concern among genocide scholars. Since Gunter Lewy
published The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide in 2004,
the book has generated discussion and controversy. Lewy’s main thesis is that because,
as he asserts, significant numbers of Armenians openly fought the Turks, Armenians
were themselves to blame for any violence that befell them. Akçam systematically and
critically sets out Lewy’s arguments and just as systematically and critically
demonstrates how each is flawed, concluding that Lewy’s ‘‘premises, assessments,
and conclusions are based on an incomplete study of the material and [that] he is not in
command of the subject matter.’’ There is little doubt that Akçam’s very comprehensive
review will not satisfy those who continue to deny the fact that the massacre of the
Armenians was, in fact, a ‘‘genocide,’’ nor will it persuade them of the questionable
scholarship of Lewy’s book. The fact that there is a pervasive political dimension to this
debate is reinforced continually and is no way more evident than in the recent warning
(delivered on 9 October 2007) from the government of Turkey to the United States
that, if the US Congress passes a bill recognizing as ‘‘genocide’’ the Ottoman empire’s
killing of Armenians, the bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey
will suffer. Therefore, a scholarly disposition and critical analysis of Lewy’s book, such
as Akçam’s, is essential to bring the discussion back to a semblance of rationality.
Finally, we offer our first ‘‘research note.’’ Research notes, as we see them, are
shorter pieces in which interesting, controversial, and ongoing research is discussed in
a format shorter than article length. The present contribution, ‘‘Fear Not, For You
Have Brothers in Greece’’ by Hikmet Karčić, examines a virtually unknown aspect of
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. It is a little-known fact that, during the
aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, volunteers from many
2
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Orthodox countries fought in the Army of the Republika Srpska. These volunteers
included, according to the author, Ukrainians, Romanians, Greeks, and Russians.
Karčić points out that this topic is ‘‘important’’ and ‘‘controversial’’ and ‘‘has been little
investigated’’; his research note explores the role of Greece and Greek fighters and
attempts to put them in the historical perspective of the conflict.
We, the editors, hope that this third volume will continue our record of publishing
high-quality, interesting, and controversial research as we strive to stimulate further
interest in studying and preventing genocide.
Herb Hirsch
GSP Co-editor
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The Three "Switches" of Identity
Construction in Genocide: The Nazi Final
Solution and the Cambodian Killing Fields
Maureen S. Hiebert
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies & Department of Political
Science, University of Calgary
If we want to understand why political elites choose to commit genocide, we need to
inquire into how elite perpetrators reconstruct the collective identity of the victim
group such that genocide becomes the only possible policy option. This article
argues that elites decide to commit genocide, and not some other less catastrophic
policy of repression or violence, when three conceptual ‘‘switches’’ concerning the
identity, interests, and future actions of the victim group are ‘‘turned on’’ by the
perpetrators. First, members of the victim group lose their (often marginal) status
within the political community and are constructed as outsiders, to whom rights
and obligations are no longer owed. Next, they come to be seen as dangerous
enemies whose continued physical presence is seen to pose an overwhelming threat
to the political community. This second mortal-threat conception consists of three
mortal-threat ‘‘motifs’’: the struggle between the perpetrator and victims as an epic
battle; the victims as the controlling force behind, or controlled by, powerful
threatening external forces; and the victims as carriers of deadly biological
contagion. Finally, the victims are viewed as subhumans who can be killed without
compunction. The process of identity reconstruction as a whole is underpinned by a
pre-genocide history of exclusionary and authoritarian intergroup norms and
practices, and of authoritarian approaches to conflict management, and is
triggered by serious economic, political, or security crises.
Keywords: genocide, identity, constructivism, Holocaust, Cambodian genocide

Introduction
For genocide scholars, the overriding research question is, Why does something so
terrible as genocide happen (and continue to happen)? Given the enormous scope of the
question and the problems associated with grand theorizing in the social sciences,1 one
way to at least partially answer this larger question is to attempt to answer several
smaller ones: What are the underlying conditions that lead to genocide? Why are
certain groups identified as targets? Why do bystanders allow the killing to occur? Why
do the perpetrators do what they do? and so on. This article deals with another smaller
but central question: Why do political elites choose a policy of genocide instead of some
other less catastrophic and irrevocable policy?
As several genocide scholars have noted, the genocides of the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries have often been preceded by serious destabilizing security,
economic, or political crises with which the eventual victims of genocide come to be
negatively identified.2 If we want to know why genocide against a specific group or
groups becomes the policy option of political elites in the wake of crisis, we need to
think through carefully the way in which genocidal political elites and the dominant
Maureen S. Hiebert, ‘‘The Three "Switches" of Identity Construction in Genocide: The Nazi Final
Solution and the Cambodian Killing Fields.’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 3, 1 (April 2008):
5–29. ! 2008 Genocide Studies and Prevention. doi: 10.3138/gsp.3.1.5
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society reconceptualize the victim group’s identity, interests, and potential actions as a
response to crises. I argue here that elite conceptions of the victim group that
culminate in genocide go beyond identifying the victim group as being to blame for
specific crises (the scapegoat theory) or as a general threat to the future well-being of
the political community. If the collective identity-construction process stops at this
point, the policy response is likely to be anything from the arrest and repression of the
group’s cultural, political, or economic elite to restrictions on members’ economic,
political, or cultural activities. More seriously, elites may choose to use violence to
encourage flight or to terrorize the group into submission, or they may use large-scale
population-control measures such as physical segregation, internal deportation, or
expulsion, as well as retributive massacres. State-sponsored violence, terror, forced
population movements, and, of course, mass killing are, to be sure, often part of the
genocidal process itself. But in genocide they are specific policies designed to achieve
the larger policy goal of physically liquidating all or a part of the victim group; they are
not stand-alone policies believed by elites to be sufficient to counter the real and
perceived threats posed by a specific group.
The central claim being made here is that the reconstruction of the identity,
interests, and future actions of the victim group that leads to specifically genocidal
policies consists of a more precise formulation of the threat the victim group is believed
to pose. Fundamental to the reconceptualization process is the emergent belief that the
victim group imperils the dominant community through the mere fact of its continued
physical existence. Because the existence of the victim group is perceived to be the
ultimate source of the threat menacing the political community, the physical liquidation
of the victim group is understood by political elites (and accepted by the dominant
society) as the only way to protect society, truly and definitively, from a pernicious and
threatening ‘‘enemy within.’’ Without this specific reconceptualization process, the
response to crises would be other, less catastrophic forms of state violence, repression, or
conflict in which the victim group is stripped of real material power but not of the lives of
the members of the group.
To understand how political elites arrive at this specific reconceptualization of
the victim group, I begin by unpacking the mutually reinforcing and constitutive
relationship between structures and elite agency and then show how this relationship
influences the process by which elite political actors choose to initiate and execute
genocide. The article then examines what are called, in this study, the three
conceptual ‘‘switches’’ regarding the victim group—as foreigners, as mortal threats,
and as subhumans—that must be ‘‘turned on’’ in order for genocide to happen. The
final section provides a brief illustration of the argument with reference to two
relatively dissimilar cases of genocide: the Nazis’ Final Solution against the Jews of
Europe (a ‘‘racial’’/ethnic genocide) and the Cambodian genocide (a political/revolutionary genocide).3

Genocide as a ‘‘Rational Choice’’
On the face of it, genocide as a response to a crisis and a perceived threat to society is
not only evil but irrational. Reasonable human beings would rightly ask why the Nazis,
the Khmer Rouge, the Young Turks, or the Hutu Power regime chose to destroy
whole groups of people in response to real and perceived threats, to exterminate men,
women, and children simply because of who they were. It is an act that seems to rest
on entirely irrational prejudices, fears, and suspicions. But, as Helen Fein suggests,
genocide is, from the perspective of the perpetrators, an apparently ‘‘rational choice’’—a
6
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‘‘goal-oriented act [that] is rationally instrumental to their ends.’’4 Genocide is a rational
choice not because of the ideas or perceptions upon which it is based but because of the
decision-making process that leads to its perpetration.
In a recent example of an attempt to explain genocide as a rational, goal-oriented
strategic policy, Benjamin Valentino contends that elites commit genocide in order to
realize radical policy goals. In pursuit of these wider policy goals, perpetrator elites
employ exterminatory policies against a target group to force its members to do
something they would otherwise not do that is required for the realization of these
policies—for example, to submit to a radical new way of life, to give up their homes and
possessions, to cease supporting political and military opposition groups—or to counter
threats posed by a group. This decision, for Valentino, is made only when leaders have
concluded that other options for achieving their ends, including less violent forms of
repression or limited concessions to victim groups, are ineffective or impractical.5
Valentino further suggests that what he calls ‘‘ethnic mass killing’’6 takes place when
elites believe that the victims ‘‘pose a threat that can be countered only by physically
removing [them] from society.’’7
Leaving aside Valentino’s assertion that genocide is a means to a strategic end
rather than a policy goal in and of itself (a position that has been the subject of much
debate among genocide scholars for some time), his argument concerning conceptions
of threat and the decision to commit genocide is convincing, but it does not go far
enough. Neither the general perception of threat attributed to the victim group nor the
failure of less drastic policies directed at specific groups to realize other policy goals is,
on its own, enough to explain why genocide specifically is the policy response of radical
political elites, rather than other forms of violence and repression. We need to go
further and inquire into how elites construct the identities of their victims such that
genocide becomes the only policy option.
Another possible approach to explaining why and how political elites make the
rational but horrible choice to commit genocide is rational choice theory. As an
exclusively agency-oriented explanation of political behavior, rational choice theory
argues that actors choose between sets of goals; that goals are ‘‘ordered by purposive
actors’’; that the possible choices that actors might make are only those known to the
chooser; that actors try to choose the best means to their ends; that means themselves
are chosen through a process of calculating ‘‘subjective expected utility’’; and that
‘‘intentions can be inferred from behaviour.’’8 Significantly for the present study,
rational choice theory does not inquire into how actors arrive at their intentions or
goals. Rational choice theorist William H. Riker argues that linking intentions to
prevailing social norms or structures is an ‘‘unnecessary convolution that complicates
but does not eliminate the rational choice model,’’ because social norms ‘‘are
themselves creations of actors for some purpose,’’ elements that actors choose from
to frame their intentions and make their choices.9
Using a rational choice approach, we might argue that genocide (the observed
behavior of a state or comparable authority) is simply based on the intention to respond
to a crisis or set of crises and to meet a threat posed to the political community. But
without examining how genocidal elites arrive at this intention, and what precisely
underpins it, we have no way of knowing why genocide, and not some other, less horrific
form of repression or violence, is the response to crisis. All that rational choice theory
can tell us is that intentions are connected to goals and that purposive actors act to
achieve their goals, based on a set of expected utility calculations that genocidal elites
may follow in making the choice to commit genocide.10 Riker’s understanding of social
7
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norms or structures as simply the outcome of previous choices by actors misses the
possibility that agents’ actions consciously shape social norms and structures only part
of the time—that is, that actors do not stand apart from ideational or material structures
and simply pick and choose which elements of structure, such as norms, beliefs, and
practices, will influence their intentions and goals. Missing in rational choice
explanations is the mutually constitutive nature of structure and agency and, therefore,
the crucial ideational content that informs a choice to commit genocide as opposed to
some other act.
The missing content can be filled in by examining the interrelationship between
structure and agency—specifically, how the mutually constitutive relationship
between structure and agency affects how genocidal elites come to reconstruct the
interests, identity, and future actions of the victim group.

A Constructivist Explanation
As several genocide scholars have pointed out, modern genocides are motivated in part
by ideas. Robert Melson argues, for example, that revolutionary ideologies and the
revolutions they inspire call for the radical restructuring of society and the exclusion
of whole groups of people who are defined either as outside the new revolutionary order
or as fundamental threats to it.11 Similarly, Eric Weitz suggests that genocidal
ideologies are founded on modern exclusionary conceptions, such as nation, race, social
Darwinism, eugenics, hygiene, and imperialism, that have been combined in lethal
ways by genocidal elites to create ideologies that variously espouse the superiority
of specific races, the need for ethnically homogenous nation-states, the imperative
of protecting one’s own race from contamination by other races, and, in the case of
communism, the overthrow of exploitative economic systems and the socioeconomic
groups that dominate these systems.12 As Alex Alvarez also shows, such ideologies are
used by genocidal elites to manipulate state institutions and ordinary people alike to
target specific groups for elimination.13
Arguments that emphasize ideology are important, because they help identify why
genocidal regimes pinpoint certain groups as either superfluous or dangerous and in
need of removal from the new revolutionary order. But what ideology on its own cannot
explain is why genocide becomes the policy, rather than economic marginalization,
physical segregation, or expulsion. Weitz, for example, lays out in great detail the
origins of Nazi racist ideology but, in his treatment of the Holocaust, does not explain
why the same ideology singled out the Jews for complete extermination while the Poles
were slated for perpetual servitude. In short, the same ideology produced two
difference policy outcomes for two separate groups.
While acknowledging the importance of ideology in the overall genocidal process,
we need to examine the importance of ideas—particularly shared cultural and political
norms, beliefs, and historical practices—in a slightly different way if we want to
understand how it is that elites come to choose genocide as a policy option. Specifically,
we need to concentrate on how genocidal elites come to construct the identities of their
victims and how this identity construction is influence by pre-genocide norms, beliefs,
and practices. How elites construct the identities of groups in society determines
whether genocide or some other form of repression or violence becomes the policy of the
state. To be sure, the motivations to commit genocide for mid-level officials and frontline killers, although influenced by elite conceptions of the victim group and by the
same set of shared exclusionary norms and practices that inspire elite actors, are not
identical to those of senior decision makers. Christopher Browning’s research into the
8
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evolution of the Nazi Final Solution, for example, shows that ‘‘desk killers’’ of various
ranks were driven by a variety of imperatives, from bureaucratic infighting to career
advancement,14 while social psychologist James Waller argues that the ordinary
people who actually do the killing do so because of the all-too-human socialpsychological tendency to acquiesce to authority and the perceived requirements of
group solidarity, to allow killing to become routinized over time, and to see members of
out-groups as competitors or threats.15
Drawing on constructivist social theory, international relations theorist Alexander
Wendt argues, in his self-described meta-theory of collective identity construction, that
the subjective understanding of a group’s identity is influenced not only by formal
political and economic organizational arrangements, and by the material distribution
of power capabilities between collective actors, but also by knowledge and practices.16
Wendt suggests that material and ideational structures broadly construed, not just
political ideologies, shape conceptions of identities and interests, as well as behavior,
not only among members of one’s own group but with respect to other groups.
Collective identities are thus constructed and reconstructed according to collective
understandings of the ‘‘self ’’ and ‘‘other.’’ Meanwhile, conceptions of the ‘‘reality’’ of
intergroup relations are also socially constructed, such that new sets of mutual
understandings, expectations, knowledge, and perceived interests regarding different
groups can either change or solidify over time and thus, in turn, can change or solidify
certain intergroup relationships and actions.17
For Wendt, the structure of social consciousness—what he terms the ‘‘distribution
of ideas or knowledge’’—is shared among actors in the form of norms, rules, or
institutions. Social and ideational structures constitute identities and interests,
helping actors to, for example, find common solutions to problems, define expectations
of behavior, and identify what constitutes a threat.18 I argue here that in genocide, the
‘‘distribution of ideas’’ is composed of formalized rules and practices of exclusionary
and unequal group interaction, exclusionary norms concerning conceptions of the
community, and authoritarian methods of conflict management that exist prior to the
genocide. These pre-genocide practices, norms, and ideas, in turn, serve as the lens
through which the meaning of crises is interpreted, namely, as the responsibility of
the victim group, such that the victim group is believed to pose a general threat to the
political community in the future. Exclusionary practices and norms also function as
the material and ideational foundation upon which rests political elites’ further
reconstruction of the collective interests, identities, and behavioral expectations of the
victim group as a mortal threat to the continued survival of the race, revolution, or
nation.
As for how the ‘‘rational choice’’ to commit genocide is made, we must inquire into
how preferences are constituted, because, as Wendt tells us, ‘‘we want what we want
because of how we think about it.’’19 Motivations, desires, or interests should be seen
as ‘‘schemas,’’ ‘‘scripts,’’ ‘‘frames,’’ or ‘‘representations,’’ which are knowledge
structures that make possible ‘‘the identification of objects and events.’’20 How elites
think about a crisis and specific groups in society and how they come to reframe the
identity, interests, and future actions of the victim group are part of a pattern of
symbolic interaction in which collective actors relate to one another on the basis of the
meaning they have given to one another and to the specific acts they perform. These
meanings themselves stem from how the broader situation is understood, which, in
turn, is itself ‘‘embedded in culture.’’21 Actors revise their definitions of the situation as
they learn more about each other through continued social interaction. In situations in
9
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which power capabilities are uneven—as is clearly the case between the perpetrators
and the victims of genocide—‘‘social acts . . . tend to evolve in the direction favored by
the more powerful.’’22
Wendt argues that, like individual actors, collective actors engage in ‘‘perspective
taking’’ (i.e., cognitively standing in the others’ shoes) to further define each other’s
identity and interests. Through a process of shared interaction, Ego shapes a
conception of Alter that may or may not be objectively correct. Incorrect interpretations of the identity and interests of Alter are not, however, the result of incomplete
information about Alter or of misinterpretations of the ‘‘facts’’ about Alter, as rational
choice theory would suggest. Instead, emerging perceptions of Alter, no matter what
they are, are not passive perceptions of something that exists independent of Ego
but actively and over time constitutive of Alter’s role vis-à-vis Ego. Through her
representational practices Ego is saying to Alter, ‘‘you are an X, and I will act toward
you as if you were an X.’’ To that extent who Alter is, in this interaction, depends on who
Ego thinks Alter is . . . Role-identities are the meanings that actors attribute to
themselves when seeing themselves as an object, that is, from the perspective of the
Other. To that extent who Ego is, in this interaction, is not independent of who Ego
thinks Alter thinks Ego is . . . These self-understandings are in one sense inside Ego’s
own head, but they only become meaningful in virtue of Alter confirming them, which is
to say in virtue of social relations.23

Playing the role of Wendt’s ‘‘Ego,’’ genocidal political elites take the perspective of
‘‘Alter’’—that is, the victim group—such that the latter is believed to see in the state
and the dominant society a community that will be or is already covertly under the
group’s control, and/or a vulnerable society that can be exploited and ruined, to the
victim group’s advantage. Perpetrator elites, in effect, say to the victim group, ‘‘Your
continued existence is a mortal threat to our continued survival, and we expect you to
act as such a threat, and we will act toward you as if you were a mortal threat.’’ For
genocidal elites, the victim group’s identity is that of a mortal threat, because elites
think the group is a mortal threat.
This ‘‘perspective’’ is not, of course, the real perspective of the victim group but a
socially constructed one, based on perceptions rooted in pre-genocide exclusionary
norms and practices and in the interpretation of crisis. When political elites
contemplate genocide in the wake of crises, they do not, of course, begin a brandnew process of social interaction with the victim group. Rather, the process of symbolic
interaction through perspective taking is a continuation of the social interaction
between elites and the dominant society, on the one hand, and the eventual victim
group, on the other, that has been going on for years but is now pursued in a more
urgent and malevolent fashion.
The conceptual possibility of coming to see the victim group’s existence as a mortal
threat is grounded in widely held and entrenched pre-genocide norms and practices
marked by an unequal and exclusionary relationship between the victim group and
rest of society; in the tendency for groups in society to engage in informal sectarian
associational arrangements; in a conception of the political community that views the
victim group as outside or marginal to ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘authentic’’ membership in the
community; and in a state with a history of seeing societal conflicts—including those
involving the victim group—as serious threats to the stability of the state and society
that must be countered with repression, exclusion, and possibly force. Crises serve to
animate the worst existing conceptions of the victim group as well as to create an
extremist context in which political elites search for a way to understand the situation
10
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they are in, to bring the crisis or crises to a conclusion, and to prevent such crises in the
future.24 Turning to an already suspect group, elites engage in a renewed process of
interaction through perspective taking with the eventual victims of genocide. Drawing
on existing conceptions of the group and a recent history of disruptive crises, elites
read into the identity, interests, and future actions of the victim group a new and more
powerful threat to the community that can be solved only through deadly ‘‘final
solutions’’ to what are presented as perennial, and now urgent and deadly, ‘‘problems.’’
By comparison, in non-genocidal situations, either the response to crises includes no
reconceptualization of the identity and future behavior of groups in society, or the
reconceptualization process does not involve seeing the continued physical presence of a
specific group as an overwhelming threat. In the former situation, crises are
accompanied by a conceptualization process in which different groups within the
political community continue to be seen as full members of that community, with
commonly held rights and obligations vis-à-vis each other and the state and shared goals
for the future. Cooperation or, at least, accommodation in the face of internal or external
crises, whether economic, political, or military/security, is the result. The political
community, while in some instances still heterogeneous, is nonetheless conceived of by
elites and by members of society as a whole as one political community to which all
members of society still belong. Here the collective self is conceptualized as inclusive,
such that there is no other; a collective self thus confronts crisis as a unified whole.
Unlike genocidal situations, such cases are characterized by intersubjective understandings of society based on an existing political culture of tolerance and inclusiveness.
In instances where non-genocidal state violence, repression, or intergroup conflict is
the result of crises—for example, the Spanish Civil War—membership in the political
community may become contested at the same time that there is an absence of common
goals within the larger political community. The groups involved, whether they be
ethnically, religiously, linguistically, economically, or politically defined, see each other
as competitors for economic, political, military/security, territorial, or social goods in the
present and possibly even as threats to group gains in the future. While the important
element of threat and fear for the future also occurs in genocide, non-genocidal conflict
situations produce intergroup conflict because the threat posed by competing groups is
perceived to be mutual and is derived from actually existing power capabilities, not from
the mere fact of a group’s physical existence. Conflict between groups or state-sponsored
repression is pursued in order to weaken a competitor group, to acquire the group’s
capabilities, or to subordinate or even repress members of the group so that one’s own
group or the state may reap the benefits of having acquired the adversary’s power
capabilities (e.g., territory, economic and political power) for present and future gain
and protection.
Like cases of genocide, situations of mutual conflict are marked by a conceptualization of the collective self and other in which a relatively strict boundary is drawn
between the competing groups. Intergroup conflict is also frequently underpinned by
exclusionary and authoritarian norms and practices. But such situations differ from
genocide in that each group does objectively maintain some kind of real power
capability and that the contest itself is, for the most part, over real things and,
therefore, is not a purely constructed one.

Constructing Victims: The ‘‘Three Switches’’ of Genocide
The collective identity reconceptualization process that leads to genocide involves three
discernible yet often overlapping switches that must be turned on in order for genocide
11
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to occur. What sets this process apart from situations of mutual conflict and from the
exercise of non-genocidal state violence is the conceptualization of the victim group as a
powerful and dangerous ‘‘enemy within’’ whose overwhelming power is believed to
derive from their physical existence. The three switches are (1) the identification of the
victim group as outside or foreign to the political community; (2) the identification of
the victim group as an almost superhumanly powerful, dangerous ‘‘enemy within’’
whose continued existence threatens the very survival of the political community; and
(3) the paradoxical identification of the victim group as subhuman.
The first switch in the process revolves around the definition of who lies within and
outside the political community or what Helen Fein calls the universe of reciprocal
obligations.25 The function of this conceptualization is to delineate clearly to whom
political, economic, and social rights and obligations are owed, including citizenship,
constitutionally recognized political rights, socioeconomic support, and participation in
the economy. Those who are conceptualized to lie outside the political community are
deemed not to be entitled to such obligations and are, therefore, reconceptualized from
marginalized insiders to non-members or ‘‘foreigners.’’ A strict boundary is drawn
between ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them,’’ or the collective ‘‘self ’’ and the alien ‘‘other.’’ This boundary
is similar to that drawn between competitor groups in situations of intergroup conflict
but goes much further, in that membership in the political community is no longer
contested by competing groups, as is the case, for example, in civil wars. Rather, the
victim group is unilaterally stripped of membership, first conceptually and then
practically, by the state and the dominant society. No longer part of the community,
the victim group is effectively removed from society, and thus from protection by their
(former) fellow citizens against a hostile state.
The second switch in the genocidal conceptual process is the one that is entirely
unique to genocide. The now ‘‘foreign’’ victim group is further reconceptualized as a
powerful enemy bent on the destruction of the dominant group. Crucially, the source of
this power and threat is believed to reside, ultimately, with the physical presence of
the victim group. The continued existence of the victim group thus portends great
danger for the very survival of the wider community and produces, as Daniel Chirot
and Clark McCauley note, an intense ‘‘fear of extermination.’’26 The history and future
of the political community are reconstructed as an epic battle between a virtuous ‘‘us’’
and an alien, subversive, inherently threatening ‘‘enemy within.’’ Claims regarding
the supposed economic, political, or other manifestations of the victim group’s power
are regularly asserted, but the actual resources or power capabilities possessed by the
victim group are dwarfed by those held by the perpetrator state and the dominant
society. Objectively, the victim group does not pose a credible threat to the dominant
society. Because it is believed that the victim group derives its overwhelming power
from the members’ physical existence, and not from substantive power capabilities,
conflict, or repression—in which real power capabilities could potentially be removed
from a threatening group—is not enough; to neutralize the perceived threat posed by
the victim group, its members must be physically eliminated in order to rid the group
of the true source of its power. As psychologist Robert Jay Lifton concludes in his
study of Nazi doctors at Auschwitz, ‘‘where the threat is so absolute and so
ultimate. . . genocide becomes not only appropriate but an urgent necessity.’’27 Lifton
continues, ‘‘thus perceived as an absolute threat to the continuous life of one’s own
people, the victim group is seen as the bearer of death and therefore the embodiment of
evil. More than merely nonhuman or heathen, it is dangerously anti-man and antiGod. Its disease takes the form of infecting others with death taint and deadly
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weakness . . . Only genocide, total elimination of the disease will protect one from that
weakness.’’ Because the victim group ‘‘threatens one’s own people with extinction . . . one must absolutely extinguish him first.’’28
More specifically, the second-switch conception of the victim group is grounded in,
and expressed as, three mortal-threat ‘‘motifs’’ in which the very survival of the
political community is perceived by political elites to be at stake. The first motif is that
of ‘‘epic struggle,’’ in which elite perpetrators believe that they are engaged in a battle
to the death—a ‘‘race war’’ or ‘‘class conflict,’’ for example—with their victims. Victory
requires the physical liquidation of the threatening victim group, whose own victory is
thought to result in the destruction of the race, nation, or revolution. The second threat
motif is that of pernicious foreign ideological or national influence or invasion. For
some perpetrators, this conception involves linking the extermination of the victim
group with the need to save the political community from threatening external actors
who are believed to be under the victim group’s control. For other perpetrators,
‘‘internal enemies’’ are targeted because of their supposed links to expansionist or
powerful external actors. Finally, the third threat motif is expressed as a disease
metaphor. According to this perception, the victims must be physically eliminated
because their continued existence is believed to expose the perpetrators and the wider
society to lethal contagions. Perceived as ‘‘microbes,’’ ‘‘bacteria,’’ or ‘‘cancer,’’ members
of the victim group are to be killed through violent processes of ‘‘purification,’’
‘‘cleansing,’’ and the surgical ‘‘cutting out’’ of diseased parts.
The dehumanization of the foreigner-cum-dangerous-enemy-within is the final
switch of the genocidal reconceptualization process. This conceptualization of the
victim group is not the motivation for genocide, as much of the existing genocide
literature suggests, but, instead, provides an understanding of the victim group that is
necessary in order for the actual extermination to take place. The dehumanization of
the victim group is not enough to lead to genocide, because to see members of a
particular group as subhuman is not to impute to them the capacity or the power to
constitute an overwhelming mortal threat. The Nazis, for example, regarded Poles and
other Slavs as Untermenschen, as less-than-human beings to be repressed and
transformed into slave laborers for the Third Reich and the new German East. Here
only the third switch was turned on. Jews, on the other hand, were regarded as mortal
threats who, because of the very fact of their existence, had to be exterminated.
Victims of genocide are nonetheless dehumanized by being equated with
‘‘animals,’’ ‘‘vermin,’’ or ‘‘pests,’’ so that the actual act of exterminating whole groups
of people becomes intellectually comprehensible and psychologically tolerable for
perpetrators and bystanders alike. Whereas the mortal-threat conceptualization (the
second switch) provides the motivation and rationale for genocide, dehumanizing the
victim group makes the actual genocide psychologically palatable and, therefore,
makes its perpetration possible. As Herbert Kelman argues, dehumanization in a
genocidal context is one of the processes by which the ‘‘usual moral inhibitions against
violence become weakened.’’ Such an understanding of the target group creates a
situation in which ‘‘moral principles no longer apply to the victim,’’ thus facilitating
smooth and efficient killing, as moral restrictions are more easily overcome.29

The Nazis’ Final Solution and the Cambodian Killing Fields
What follows is a necessarily brief analysis of the three switches with reference to the
Final Solution and the Cambodian Killing Fields. Rather than a chronological
narrative of each genocide or a detailed examination of the available historical
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evidence regarding exactly when and how the decision to commit genocide was
made, the discussion will focus on a few key illustrations of how elite perpetrators
reconceptualized the identity of their victims in such a way that they came to consider
genocide the only acceptable policy option.

The First Switch
The first conceptual switch for Germany’s Jews was turned on by Adolf Hitler and his
victorious National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) shortly after they came
to power in January 1933. Central to the Nazi conception of German Jews at this time
was the idea that Jews were inherently foreign and that a strict boundary must be
drawn between the alien, corrupting ‘‘Jew’’ and the German, or ‘‘Aryan,’’ majority.
Hitler saw conceptually and practically stripping German Jews of their ‘‘Germanness’’
as key to achieving the völkisch ideal of a strong, homogeneous, and united Germany
free of destructive Jewish influence. Looking back on the first years of Nazi leadership,
Hitler made plain this conception of German Jews, urging in his closing speech at the
Nuremberg Parteitag on 12 September 1938 that the removal of German Jews from all
facets of German society must continue, ‘‘because National Socialism desires to
establish a true community of the people . . . Because we are National Socialists we can
never suffer an alien race which has nothing to do with us to claim the leadership of
our working people.’’30 More than a year earlier, Hitler similarly argued, in a speech
before the Reichstag on 30 January 1937, that ‘‘we refuse to permit an alien race any
influence upon our political, spiritual, or cultural life or to allow an alien any
privileged position in the economic sphere.’’31
Throughout the 1930s, the Nazi regime implemented measures that successively
stripped Jews of their legal and economic rights as well as their place within German
culture and society. But it was the enactment of the Reich Citizenship Laws of
15 September 1935 that drew the most explicit line between Jews and Germans,
unilaterally stripping Jews of their legal status as citizens and thereby definitively
removing them, legally and conceptually, from the German political community.
Paragraph 2 established the criterion for full citizenship: ‘‘a Reich citizen is a subject
of the State who is of German or related blood’’; ‘‘the Reich citizen is sole bearer
of full political rights in accordance with the Law.’’32 In the First Decree to the
Reich Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935, paragraph 4 explicitly disenfranchised
Jews: ‘‘A Jew cannot be a Reich citizen. He has no voting right in political matters.’’
Departing from Judaism’s definition of Jewishness as based on matrilineal descent and
embracing instead a racial definition, the decree defined a Jew as ‘‘a person descended
from at least three Jewish grandparents who are full Jews by race.’’33
The legal and, more importantly, conceptual framing of the identity of Jews as
separate from German and other national identities was not lost on at least some Jews
at the time. Reading newspaper reports of the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws
from his vantage point in Vienna, the highly secularized and assimilated future deathcamp survivor Jean Amery (then named Hans Mayer) was immediately struck by the
new separate racial identity conferred on him by the Nazi regime. Amery wrote after
the war that he ‘‘needed only to skim them and already I could perceive that they
applied to me. Society, concretized in the National representatives of the German
people, had just made me formally and beyond any question a Jew.’’34 Amery writes
that as the Holocaust unfolded he experienced, prior to his deportation and even later
in Auschwitz, ‘‘the social reality of the wall of rejection that arose before us
everywhere.’’35
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Summing up the Nazi regime’s steady removal of Jews from German society in the
1930s, Holocaust historian Saul Friedlander suggests that the Nazis doggedly
overcame the challenge of separating out a previously assimilated minority:
Among the main obstacles faced by the regime in its attempt to eliminate the Jews from
Germany was the fact that the victims had been part and parcel of every field of activity
in German society. In consequence, if direct violence was not [yet] possible, the system
had to elaborate ever new administrative or legal measures in order to undo, stage by
stage, step by step, the existing ties between society and the Jews.36

With the turn toward deportation and concentration during the first years of the war,
the Nazi leadership still kept the first conceptual switch on concerning the collective
identity of the Jews—even as it moved closer and closer to turning on the second
conceptual switch, which would lead from 1941 onward to the annihilation of
European Jewry. In the summer of 1941, for example, Joseph Goebbels emphasized
the necessity of maintaining the unequal legal and conceptual status of the Jews
through their continued removal from Nazi Germany. In a bid to head off criticism of
the requirement that German Jews wear the Judenstern (the yellow star), Goebbels, as
propaganda minister and Gauleiter of Berlin, argued forcefully that ‘‘the Jews had no
right to claim equality with us’’ because ‘‘they are Jews who have no right to a voice in
the community.’’37
In the case of Cambodia, the first-switch dynamic differs in a number of respects
from the reconceptualization of German Jews as foreign or alien to German society.
The Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia involved the first-switch reconceptualization of
not one but several different groups of people at different times for the duration of
Khmer Rouge rule. As well, the first-switch conceptualization of the victim groups in
Cambodia occurred virtually simultaneously with the second conceptual switch, which
further defined these same groups as not only alien to the revolution but also
inherently threatening and dangerous. Further, while the victims of the Khmer Rouge
were targeted for destruction by means both direct (execution) and indirect
(malnutrition, lack of medical care, abuse, etc.), the act of physical separation of the
victims did not occur as it did in the Holocaust.
The first-switch reconceptualization of the identity of the various victim groups
as outside revolutionary Cambodian society revolved around the Khmer Rouge’s
own particularly rigid Marxist understanding of Cambodian society as historically
and presently divided into antagonistic classes. In the quest for a homogeneous,
united, ‘‘collective’’ revolutionary community, classes, ethnic groups, and, eventually,
individual cadres and their associates and families deemed suspect were to be
overcome and, as Alex Hinton argues, ‘‘excluded from the revolutionary community of
equals.’’38
Using personal histories to categorize Cambodians into revolutionary and
reactionary classes served to conceptually and practically divide the society of
Democratic Kampuchea into three distinct and separate groups, each with differing
levels of membership, or non-membership, in the new revolutionary community.
The ‘‘new people,’’ mostly urbanites from what were labeled Classes I and II, were nonmembers of revolutionary Cambodia. A 1978 party publication identified the poor
peasants as the foundation of the revolution and therefore deserving of the designation
‘‘full rights members,’’ while ‘‘reactionaries,’’ whose status varied according to the
degree to which they were perceived to be naturally hostile to the revolution, were
further broken down into three sub-groups: ‘‘those who can be drawn to the
revolution’’; ‘‘neutralists, who do not oppose the revolution’’; and, in language that
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clearly demonstrates the third-switch conception of the victim group as non-human,
‘‘the savage ones who cannot be reeducated.’’ All leadership cadres were instructed to
‘‘select and assign by dividing into separate categories full rights, probationary and
depositee members,’’ with the latter understood to be the ‘‘new people’’ deported
from the cities. The purpose of this exercise was to ‘‘clearly distinguish the good from
the bad.’’39
Just as the Nazis maintained an essentialist understanding of Jews as a ‘‘race’’
that could never be German, the Khmer Rouge made plain its similarly rigid
conception of the counterrevolutionary identity of the ‘‘new people’’ and other suspect
groups. Members of suspect classes were defined by, and could not overcome, their
counterrevolutionary identity. The previous possession of property was said, in a 1976
special issue of the party publication Tung Pradevat (‘‘Revolutionary Flags’’), to
‘‘obstruct the understanding and the absorption of the Socialist Revolution. No matter
how we explain it, the struggle cannot break it out.’’40 Even though these classes had
been defeated with the advent of Democratic Kampuchea, ‘‘their specific traits and
contradictions (tamna) still exist . . . in consciousness, in standpoint,’’ and, more
threateningly, in ‘‘class rage.’’ Capitalists, feudal landlords, and petit-bourgeois
intellectuals, therefore, still maintained the ‘‘essence of class.’’ This essence was ‘‘the
class standpoint, class character (nissay), sentiments, [and] habits’’ that ‘‘remind[ed] it
of the desire to oppress.’’ The article concludes by reinforcing the static nature of
counter revolutionary class identity, suggesting that, quite simply, ‘‘[a] number of
them [vea, literally ‘‘things’’] cannot be corrected,’’ since they ‘‘continuously seek
occasions to oppose the revolution.’’41

The Second Switch
The Epic-Battle Motif
At the heart of much of Nazi ideology were the belief that the world is divided into
superior and degenerate races, the need to protect the purity of a people’s ‘‘blood,’’ and
the idea of race wars. This belief applied particularly to the perceived epic struggle
between Jews and Aryans. In Mein Kampf, Hitler argued that ‘‘the mightiest
counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew.’’42 Behind this assertion is a more
general understanding that ‘‘history itself represents the progression of a people’s
struggle for survival,’’ in which ‘‘life is a never ending battle against death.’’43 If a
successful struggle for the preservation of the blood and culture of the German people
is not waged against the Jews,
then the Jews can move in, in every form, and this master of international poison
concoction and racial debasement will not rest until he has completely uprooted and
thereby corrupted such a people. The end, then, is the loss of a certain uniform racial
value and thus the final decay . . . every existing racial value of a people [will become]
ineffective—if not downright endangered.’’44

Drawing on these foundational ideas, both Hitler and those of his subordinates
most closely involved in the decision, taken in mid-1941, to exterminate Europe’s Jews
began to describe the Jews as mortal enemies who must be destroyed if the Reich and
the German people were to be saved. In a leading article titled ‘‘The Jews are Guilty!’’
published in the Nazi journal Das Reich on 16 November 1941, Goebbels invoked the
epic struggle motif, proclaiming that ‘‘the Jews are receiving a penalty that is certainly
hard, but more than deserved . . . and is now gradually experiencing the destruction it
planned for us, and would have carried out without a second thought if it had
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possessed the ability.’’45 ‘‘Every Jew is our enemy in this historic struggle,’’ he warned
his readers, whether those Jews lived in the ghettos of Europe or on Wall Street: ‘‘All
Jews by virtue of their birth and their race are part of an international conspiracy
against National Socialist Germany. They want defeat and annihilation, and do all in
their power to bring it about.’’46
In 1942 and 1943, once the genocide was underway, Hitler himself repeatedly
referred to his ‘‘prophecy,’’ articulated in what has come to be known as his ‘‘threat
speech’’ of 30 January 1939, in which he forecast the destruction of European Jewry
should the Jews ‘‘succeed’’ in plunging Europe once again into war. But in restating his
prophecy, Hitler noticeably changed its language to directly connect the Jews not with
starting a new European-wide war that would lead to the ‘‘Bolshevization’’ of Europe,
as Hitler had originally warned in January 1939,47 but with the destruction of the
‘‘Aryan race.’’ Thus, on the ninth anniversary of the Nazi seizure of power, Hitler
proclaimed, in his address at the Berlin Sportpalast on 30 January 1942,
that the war can only end either with the extermination of the Aryan peoples or the
disappearance of Jewry from Europe . . . [Th]at this [war] will not come to an end as the
Jews imagine, with the extermination of the European-Aryan peoples, but that the result
of this war will be the annihilation (Vernichtung) of Jewry. For the first time the old
Jewish law will now be applied: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth . . . And the hour will
come when the most evil world-enemy of all time will have played out its role, at least for
a thousand years.48

Like Hitler and Goebbels, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler similarly argued, in
an infamous speech before an assembly of SS officers in Posen in October 1943, the
dangers of leaving any Jews alive in Germany and, by extension, in Europe. Seeking to
assure his men that their role in the extermination program was a just and noble
cause, Himmler stressed that the SS ‘‘had the moral right, we had the duty toward our
people, to destroy the people that wanted to destroy us.’’49
In the Cambodian case, the epic-struggle motif revolved not around race (apart
from the Vietnamese) but around the conception of an unending lethal struggle
between antagonistic classes. Building and protecting the revolution involved a
constant battle to confront inevitable class contradictions and the hidden class
‘‘enemies within’’ they produced—enemies whose goal it was to destroy Democratic
Kampuchea, the Communist Party, and the revolution.
Senior Khmer Rouge leaders believed that the recent history of the party was that
of a ‘‘party led by the working class’’ steeped in ‘‘the contradictions in Kampuchean
society,’’ as ‘‘Brother Number Two,’’ Nuon Chea, told a Communist Party delegation
from Denmark in July 1978. In pre-revolutionary times, the party fought ‘‘external
contradictions’’ between the Cambodian nation and ‘‘US imperialism’’ while simultaneously battling ‘‘internal contradictions . . . between, on the one hand the working
class and the capitalists and on the other the poor peasants and the feudal class.’’50
Among the ‘‘new people’’—or ‘‘new peasants,’’ as the article ‘‘Sharpen the
Consciousness’’ calls them—there still existed ‘‘life and death contradictions.’’51
Making explicit reference to the enduring nature of class struggle between
revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces and, therefore, the continuous threat of
internal class enemies to the revolution, a Communist Party document from 3–7 June
1976 notes that while the revolution had defeated many enemies, there will still be
many more in the future: ‘‘the enemy will carry out activities against us, against our
revolution, in various forms. This is the continuous non-stop struggle between
revolution and counter-revolution.’’ The document then projects this as a permanent
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state of affairs: ‘‘there will be enemies in ten years, twenty years, thirty years into the
future . . . the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution will continue.’’
Noting that not all but some contradictions are created by enemies, the document
concludes that ‘‘we cannot escape them.’’52 While the party conceded that ‘‘it is possible
that some compositions [i.e., classes] can correct themselves . . . many cannot.’’ Even ‘‘if
these people die,’’ the revolution will not be safe, since ‘‘they will have instructed their
children to keep struggling against communists.’’53
The enduring nature of the threat posed by ongoing class contradictions was
further reinforced in a party study session in 1976, during which the participants were
told that the party
must remain vigilant against internal class enemies because our socialist revolutionary
direction is an uncompromising, bitter, life-and-death combat between classes, both
indirect and most thorough, between the property-less class under the leadership
of the Party and the life-and-death enemy who comprises the various exploiting
classes . . . which hide themselves in our revolutionary ranks, in the army, and in the
ranks of our Party.54

The Foreign-Threat Motif
The mortal threat posed by Jews as the ultimate leaders of rapacious Bolshevism
further solidified the conception of Jews as an all-powerful, inherently dangerous,
threatening, and foreign force. Illogically, the Jews were also conceptualized as international capitalists who covertly controlled the Western Allies, secretly pushing Great
Britain and the United States to fight another war with Germany. But it was the
threat of ‘‘Jewish Bolshevism,’’ which surfaced repeatedly in Nazi discourse from the
1920s onward, that contributed to the perception that Jews were a threat like no other,
since Nazism and Bolshevism were seen as two competing Weltanschauungen.
In his original ‘‘threat speech’’ at the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, Hitler
emphasized the Jews’ dangerous capacity for the devious manipulation of international capital and Western governments, to the point of being capable of starting a new
world war that, in Hitler’s view, would lead, rather nonsensically and paradoxically, to
the ‘‘Bolshevization’’ of the world. This overwhelming power and threat posed by the
Jews, would, however, be defeated in the most thorough way possible:
If the international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in plunging
the nations once more into world war, then the result will not be the bolshevization of
the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in
Europe!55

The link between Jews and the threat posed by Soviet Bolshevism was drawn
even tighter with the launching of Operation Barbarossa (the invasion of the Soviet
Union) and the advent of the genocidal Einsatzgruppen and Sonderkommandos,
tasked first with the shooting to death of ‘‘commissars’’ and ‘‘Jewish men’’—the
latter described as the ‘‘intellectual reservoir of Bolshevism’’ by SD chief Reinhardt
Heydrich. At a meeting at the headquarters of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (the
Reich’s main security office, or RSHA) on 17 June 1941, Heydrich told the assembled
Einsatzgruppen, Einsatzkommandos, Sonderkommandos, and other top police officers
that ‘‘this reservoir must be destroyed.’’56 For Goebbels, meanwhile, the war was the
product of an unholy alliance between ‘‘Bolshevik Jews’’ in Moscow and the ‘‘Jewish
plutocrats’’ in London and Washington.57
During the latter years of the war Goebbels justified the war of extermination in
the East, against so-called Jewish Bolshevism, and the Final Solution by explicitly
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tying the survival of the Third Reich to the destruction of the Jews. Goebbels peddled
his own particular version of the world Jewish conspiracy theory by arguing that the
Allies menacing the Reich from both west and east were operating under the control of
world Jewry, bent on the extermination of the German people:
They organized the enemy’s war economy and encourage plans to exterminate and
destroy the Axis powers. England and the USA recruit from among them bloodthirsty
and vengeful agitators and political lunatics and they are the source of the terror
commissars of the GPU [the Soviet secret police].58

Near the end of the war, Goebbels went even further, accusing Soviet and Western
Allied soldiers of being mercenaries of the Jews.59
Like the Nazis, the Khmer Rouge leadership perceived the revolution to be in
mortal danger, heightened by the foreign-threat motif; in this case, however,
Democratic Kampuchea’s many hidden enemies were believed to be stalking horses
for foreign influence and invasion whom the party considered, as one document put it,
‘‘running dog agents burrowing within ourselves,’’ ‘‘international agents,’’ or simply
‘‘enemy agents.’’60
A radio broadcast on 10 May 1978 named Vietnam and its internal agents
explicitly as a mortally threatening enemy that must be neutralized in order to
save the ‘‘Cambodian race.’’ After calling for the ‘‘purification’’ (a common euphemism,
at the time, for mass killing) of the armed forces, the Communist Party, and the
masses, the broadcast went on to state that the struggle against internal and external
Vietnamese-inspired enemies was vital ‘‘in order to continue fighting the enemies in
defense of Cambodian territory and the Cambodian race, for if we do not do so, our
race will disappear. Do we want to see the end of the Cambodian race? If we do not to
defend our territory, we shall lose it, and then our race will also disappear.’’ Should
the Vietnamese invade, the broadcast predicted, ‘‘we shall lose our territory and our
race will be completely swallowed up.’’61
In a Khmer Rouge document titled ‘‘The Last Plan,’’ parts of the ‘‘evidence’’62
gathered by the party refined the supposed role of Vietnam and those purportedly
working covertly for Vietnam inside DK and the party. The Vietnamese communists in
Hanoi were said to be the ‘‘implementers’’ of a plot to take over the country and destroy
the party. Inside Cambodia, secret ‘‘CIA agents’’ and ‘‘Vietnamese expansionists’’
allegedly cooperated to implement this ‘‘scheme in constant contact with the
outside.’’63 Until the plan was ‘‘uncovered,’’ cadres involved in its implementation
had worked for years to create internal divisions in order to weaken all parts of the
party. The ultimate goal of the ‘‘men who were hiding inside’’ was to ‘‘join hands to
smash all sides thus winning the power forever, particularly definitely abolishing
communism.’’64
According to the Khmer Rouge, Democratic Kampuchea’s alleged enemies were not
all doing the bidding of the Vietnamese. In his confession-through-torture before
execution, senior moderate cadre Hu Nim ‘‘confessed’’ to being recruited as a CIA
member to conduct subversive activities within the party as early as 1957. His task
was ‘‘to bring outsiders inside the Communist Party of Kampuchea in order to destroy
it from within’’ and ‘‘to change the line of the [party] . . . and the revolutionary
movement’’ toward ‘‘revisionism,’’ because ‘‘revisionism is the way toward capitalism
anyway.’’65
Without discussing when it would have happened or under what circumstances,
Nuon Chea suggested in 1978 that some cadres had been imprisoned by the offending
foreign powers and, like the Manchurian Candidate, tortured and turned into enemy
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agents who were unwittingly accepted back into the party—but ‘‘we now realized they
had become agents of the enemy.’’ Although a ‘‘plot’’ by the United States to take over
DK Cambodia with the help of the Vietnamese and the KGB six months after
liberation was apparently foiled, Nuon Chea asserted that the Khmer Rouge must
‘‘apprehend the people who have infiltrated our party. We know the current plan
involves not only Vietnamese agents, but has something to do with US imperialism
and the KGB. All of them!’’66
The Biological-Contagion Motif
The final mortal-threat conception, the motif of biological contagion, identified Jews as
a deadly, opportunistic infectious agent that threatened the purity of German blood
and society with disease and death. The future health and strength of the Aryan or
Nordic race could be ensured only through the destruction of what threatened it most:
the Jews.
From the early 1920s onward, Hitler’s public discourse about the Jews was riddled
with references to the Jews as a ‘‘plague’’ and ‘‘a harmful bacillus.’’67 Mein Kampf
likens the Jews to
the typical parasite, a sponger who like a noxious bacillus keeps spreading as soon as a
favorable medium invites him [in]. And the effect of his existence is also like that of
spongers: wherever he appears, the host people dies out after a shorter or longer
period.68

Other Nazi leaders evinced the same perception of Jews as a lethal contagion. Just
after the invasion of Poland, Goebbels is reported to have commented to his officials
that he believed the Jews ‘‘represented an international infection, and that it will fight
against the state of order until it controls them.’’ During the ‘‘abnormal times in the life
of a nation at war,’’ Goebbels was ‘‘convinced that we cannot allow Jewry, as a seat of
infection, to exist any longer.’’ He argued that there ‘‘can be no more discussion in
Germany of the necessity of removing Jewry as a seat of infection. The vast majority of
the German nation want a total solution to the Jewish question.’’69
For the Nazi leadership, therefore, the Jews were a deadly pestilence that had to
be physically removed from the European body politic. Goebbels thus invoked the
specter of deadly disease and the metaphorical medical procedures required for dealing
effectively with the threat posed by the Jews: ‘‘Our task here is surgical . . . drastic
incisions or some day Europe will perish of the Jewish disease.’’70 On 23 July 1941,
Hitler similarly referred to the Jews, in a conversation with Croatian Marshal
Kvaternik, as ‘‘a centre of pestilence for humanity.’’ Without giving any details, Hitler
assured Kvaternik that all Jews were going to be removed from Europe and warned
that any state that retained Jews would invariably become a new source of infection
and decomposition.71
For the Khmer Rouge, the motif of biological contagion was invoked repeatedly as
the revolution’s internal enemies were labeled ‘‘microbes’’ or sources of contamination
or poison, ‘‘burrowing within the revolution’’ to destroy it from the inside out.
One Communist Party report called for ‘‘continuous measures’’ to be taken so that
‘‘enemies will not be able to advance, using venom and poison.’’72 Using almost
identical language, a 1977 Central Committee document emphasizes that ‘‘[b]y
screening traitorous elements and bad elements, the party enjoys relief from [the]
pain and abscess [and] venom’’ caused by internal party enemies.73 Switching to a
related hygiene metaphor, cadres were reminded at a study session in 1976 to
remain vigilant against enemies but were told that the party had already taken
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effective measures: ‘‘We have been scrubbed clean [another euphemism for mass
murder] and nurtured in political standpoint, consciousness, and organization.’’74
The most explicit formulation of the victims-as-disease threat motif was
articulated by Pol Pot in the threatening end of his 1977 ‘‘microbes’’ speech, which,
in effect, signaled the genocidal intraparty purge to come:
While we are engaged in a socialist revolution, there is a sickness inside the Party, born
in the time when we waged a people’s and a democratic revolution. We cannot locate it
precisely. The illness must emerge to be examined. Because the heat of the people’s
revolution and the democratic revolution were insufficient at the level of the people’s
struggle and at the level of class struggle among all layers of the national democratic
revolution, we search for the microbes within the Party without success. They are
buried.75

Echoing Goebbels’ reference to surgical cuts to eliminate poisonous European
Jewry, the Khmer Rouge, according to one survivor,
justified destruction of ‘‘diseased elements’’ of the old society. . . . We were told
repeatedly that in order to save the country, it was essential to destroy all contaminated
parts. . . . It was essential to cut deep, even to destroy a few good people rather than
chance one ‘‘diseased’’ person escaping eradication.76

The conception of the enemy as an unseen but ever-present disease infecting the
party and the revolution contributed greatly to the constructed nature of the victims of
the Cambodian genocide. Since the enemy was unseen but present, it could take
almost any form, even appearing to be loyal to the cause or of proper class background,
yet be on the inside a source of counter-revolutionary contagion. The fluid nature of the
construction of the victims’ collective identity led the genocide—at first inflicted on
elements of the old regime, on ethnic minorities, and on clearly defined class enemies
such as the ‘‘new people’’—to turn inward and become a genocidal internal party
purge.

The Third Switch
Holocaust survivors have noted that low-level perpetrators in the ghettos and the
camps saw Jews not as human but as animals, or even less than that.77 The public
dehumanization of Jews began soon after the Nazis came to power. Boasting of the
alleged success of the boycott of local Jewish businesses, a participant at a conference
for German civil servants told his audience that Jews should not be surprised by the
boycott, since ‘‘when you, Jew, regard us as a beast, do not expect us to treat you like a
human being.’’78 Heydrich, a central figure in the planning and perpetration of the
genocide until his assassination in 1942, characterized Jews to his fellow SS officers
in January 1939 as ‘‘the eternal subhumans.’’79 In a tour of newly occupied Poland in
September 1939, Himmler, Heydrich’s superior, later recounted to other SS officers
how he had summoned a few of the ‘‘criminal specimens’’ to show colleagues traveling
with him a sick elderly Jewish man’s bone structure, calling the old man, and all
Ostjuden (eastern Jews), ‘‘vermin.’’80 After a similar junket to the Lodz ghetto in the
General Government, Goebbels reportedly told Hitler of his visit: ‘‘It’s indescribable.
Those are no longer human beings. They are animals.’’81 The following year Himmler
told an audience in Krakow that ‘‘anti-Semitism is exactly the same as delousing.
Getting rid of lice is not a question of ideology. It is a matter of cleanliness.’’82
The advent of the death camps and the industrialized killing of Jews in gas
chambers was, in part, a means of relieving the psychological burden on the low-level
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perpetrators of killing their victims face to face. But the death camps also served as
a means by which the victims could be completely dehumanized before their deaths,
making their killing by gassing, medical experimentation, starvation, abuse, or disease
a psychologically acceptable task.83 For some death-camp commanders, the dehumanization of Jewish prisoners through humiliation was necessary in order for the
low-level perpetrators to operate the industrial machinery of death. When asked by
a post-war interviewer, ‘‘If they were going to kill them anyway what was the point of
all the humiliation, why all the cruelty?’’ the Kommandant of Treblinka, Franz Stangl,
replied, ‘‘To condition those who actually had to carry out the policies. To make it
possible for them to do what they did.’’84 In a statement that seems to reveal that
Stangl’s approach worked on at least some frontline perpetrators, Order Policeman
Alois Hafele, a guard at the Chelmno death camp, told a superior in 1943 that he had
become used to the killing: ‘‘Little men or little women, it was all the same, just like
stepping on a beetle.’’ As Hafele spoke, he reportedly made a scraping motion with his
foot on the floor.85
The victims in the camps were also keenly aware of their own dehumanization.
In his painful recollections of the Muselmänner86 who haunted his memories years
after his liberation from Auschwitz, Primo Levi describes the completely dehumanized
state in which these ‘‘drowned’’ men existed:
Their life is short, but their number is endless; they, the Muselmänner, the drowned,
form the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, continually renewed and always
identical, of non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead within
them, already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates
to call their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too tired to
understand.87

In Cambodia the refrain ‘‘to keep you is no gain, to kill you is no loss,’’ constantly
repeated by the Khmer Rouge to the regime’s victims, clearly indicated the degree to
which individual human life had become devalued and easy to extinguish. In his
analysis of the orientation Khmer Rouge cadres adopted toward the urban populations
of Phnom Penh and other cities, David Chandler suggests that the dehumanization of
the ‘‘new people’’ was almost immediate. The rural cadres who took over and emptied
the cities saw urban dwellers as ‘‘enemies,’’ to be ‘‘treated as they deserved. Overnight
they became ‘new people’ or ‘April 17 people’—less than human, without privileges or
rights.’’88
In everyday discourse, the victims of the Khmer Rouge were addressed by the
dehumanizing vulgar noun vea (‘‘it’’ or ‘‘thing,’’ normally used for inanimate objects
and for animals). Ethnic minority victims of the genocide were similarly addressed; the
Vietnamese were frequently referred to by the pejorative yuon (‘‘savage’’). Such modes
of discourse dehumanized those deemed to be non-members of the revolution and, as
Hinton argues, helped legitimize—and, one could add, facilitate—violence against the
victims.89
The dehumanization of victims in the service of death in Cambodia reached its
nadir at the Tuol Sleng torture and execution facility, located in a former high school in
Phnom Penh. Articulating the party leadership’s conception of their enemies as
subhuman, former senior party cadre Hu Nim was tortured into proclaiming, in his
extracted confession, ‘‘I am not a human being. I am an animal.’’90 Recalling the
appallingly brutal torture he and other inmates endured at Tuol Sleng, survivor Vann
Nath said in an interview after the genocide that the prisoners were treated as if they
were ‘‘worth less than an animal to them . . . They didn’t treat us like people.’’91
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The ability to treat perceived enemies as subhuman was learned early by
many Khmer Rouge cadres, even before the victory in 1975. Many of these cadres
were recruited at a very young age from the nomadic hill tribes of the remote northeastern provinces of Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri, where isolated Khmer Rouge camps
were located during the latter Sihanouk years at the beginning of the civil war. By
exploiting these impoverished, illiterate youths’ resentment of prosperous city dwellers
and the fact that they had no stake in the pre-revolutionary system, the Khmer Rouge
leadership, as Karl Jackson suggests, ‘‘sought out those from the bottom rung of
society—those who were so envious of persons with more wealth that they would
willingly strike them down.’’92 The teenage cadres were taken from their families,
treated brutally by their superiors, and then given what the Communist Party said
was the great honor of becoming Oppakar Phdach Kar Robas Pak, literally ‘‘the
dictatorial instrument of the Party.’’
In this element of the third switch, then, we see a contrast with the Nazi final
solution. In Cambodia, both dehumanizing discourse and the dehumanization of the
perpetrators facilitated killing through execution, abuse, and neglect of the regime’s
victims. In the Nazi case, the explicitly dehumanizing discourse directed at the Jewish
victims was also present, while the projection of the dehumanized state of the low-level
perpetrators onto the victims was not. In fact, the SS, which bore the primary
responsibility for executing the genocide on the ground, was billed by Himmler as an
elite corps of the most racially pure Aryans in the Reich, the ‘‘hardest of the hard men,’’
who had been given the bloody but noble task of riding the Reich and Europe of the
subhuman Jewish race.

Conclusion
The preceding discussion of the importance of collective identity reconstruction and elite
decision making can help us to fill in a piece of the larger ‘‘why genocide’’ puzzle raised at
the beginning of this essay in three ways. First, it focuses our analysis on a small but key
group of actors in the genocidal process, without whom genocide would not be possible. It
is, after all, these elite actors who make the decision to commit genocide. In order to
understand why elite perpetrators choose genocide as a policy option, we need to go
beyond considering general precursors, triggers, and general conceptions of blame,
threat, and dehumanization attached to the victim group. To complete the picture, we
need to account for how elite perpetrators conceptualize the identity of the victim group
such that genocide comes to be seen as the only possible policy response.
Second, an emphasis on collective identity construction is useful because it also
allows us to further explore the answer to the ‘‘smaller’’ questions noted above. The
relationship between structure (both ideational and material) and collective identity
reconstruction by elite and societal actors (the latter of which is not examined here but
is of central importance) points to the significance of the precursors to genocide and
how they directly influence the genocidal decision-making process. As is outlined only
briefly in this article, pre-genocide norms and practices that include unequal and
exclusionary relationships between the eventual victim group and the rest of society,
exclusionary conceptions of who constitutes the genuine membership of the political
community, and authoritarian and sometimes violent methods of conflict management
by the state directly influence how, in the wake of crises, elite actors reconceptualize
(and how the dominant society comes to accept) the identity of the victim group as a
mortal threat and why specific groups are targeted for genocide while others are not.
As for the perpetrators and why they do what they do, identifying the three conceptual
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switches of genocide allows us to differentiate the motivation for genocide—the second
mortal-threat conception of the victim group that leads elite perpetrators to chose a
policy of genocide—from the dehumanization of the victim group that allows both elite
and frontline perpetrators to actually carry out the extermination of objectively
innocent and powerless human beings.
Finally, the case-study comparison suggests that the collective identity
reconceptualization process that underpins the decision to commit genocide is
common across relatively dissimilar cases and that, therefore, this process is likely
common to most genocides in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The model
offered here is not a predictive social-science theory. Rather, it tries to offer some
insight into mutually constitutive relationship between ideational structures (norms)
and material structures (practices and crises), on the one hand, and the genocidal
process of reconceptualizing the victim group, on the other, as the foundation for elite
decision making. The emphasis, then, is on a set of general structures and processes
that get at the underlying logic of genocide and thus can tell us, albeit only partly, why
something so terrible as genocide happens.
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Value Hierarchies of Holocaust Rescuers
and Resistance Fighters
Peter Suedfeld and Stefanie de Best
The University of British Columbia
There has been considerable theorizing and research on the motivations of
individuals who rescued Jews from the Nazi Holocaust. Participants in armed
resistance movements, the other major form of active opposition within Nazidominated Europe, have attracted less scientific attention. The study reported here
compared members of these two groups using a quantitative measure applied to
their own post-war memoirs and interviews. Thematic content analysis was used to
score the relative strengths of eleven major value categories in materials produced
by forty-seven members of resistance movements and fifty Holocaust rescuers.
Benevolence, Universalism, and Spirituality were significantly higher among
rescuers than among resistance fighters, with the opposite pattern for Security.
There were some gender differences, but no differences based on country of
residence. Comparisons with Schwartz’s international norm group results are also
presented, and the implications of this research with respect to altruism in extreme
circumstances are discussed.
Keywords: Holocaust, rescuers, resisters, values

Background
Despite considerable effort to predict, prevent, ameliorate, or stop genocides, ethnic
cleansing, and other forms of ethnopolitical violence, and despite the oft-repeated postHolocaust refrain, ‘‘Never again,’’ such events have occurred with dismal frequency
since 1945. Furthermore, several such events are occurring at any given moment
somewhere in the world, many times in countries ignored by the international mass
media. It may be that the only effective way to stop them once they begin is through
massive armed intervention.
Nevertheless, courageous individuals and groups can at least reduce their impact,
thwart their goals, and hinder their progress. Among such people are the individuals
who, at great personal risk, rescued Jews from Nazi persecution during World War II;
such ‘‘righteous among the nations’’ constitute the most prototypical examples of
altruistic behavior. Samuel Oliner and Pearl Oliner characterize a behavior as
altruistic when it (1) is directed toward helping another, (2) involves a high risk or
sacrifice to the actor, (3) is not accompanied by any external reward, and (4) is
voluntary.1 These criteria for altruistic behavior were certainly met by Holocaust
rescuers during World War II. Holocaust rescuers acted to help Jews, despite great
risks to themselves and their families, by sheltering Jews in their own homes,
providing false documents, or smuggling Jews to safer locations.2
These behaviors were dramatically different from those of the vast majority.
Although precise figures cannot be established, only a tiny percentage of nonJews living under German domination engaged in rescue activity.3 Many more were
collaborators in the persecution, although the majority consisted of bystanders,
who engaged neither in directly hurting nor in directly helping the oppressed.
Peter Suedfeld and Stefanie de Best, ‘‘Value Hierarchies of Holocaust Rescuers and Resistance
Fighters.’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 3, 1 (April 2008): 31–42. ! 2008 Genocide Studies
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The passivity of this majority is understandable: quite aside from their own feelings
about Jews, the material and psychological gains they may have accrued as a result of
the persecution, and the pressures of conformity, most people were understandably
reluctant to put their own lives and their family’s lives into very serious danger by
sheltering others, often total strangers. To do this, as rescuers did, took unusual
courage and altruism.
Social scientists have been interested in the situational and dispositional factors
that impelled these rescuers to take lethal chances. Most such research has used
interview techniques; much less use has been made of standard psychometric
instruments. Rescuers are characterized by a greater capacity for extensivity than
non-rescuers. Extensivity is defined by the leading researchers in this area as a trait
combining a strong sense of responsibility for others and greater attachment to them,
heightened empathy for the pain and suffering of others, and a high internal locus of
control.4 Holocaust rescuers have also been consistently described as feeling greater
inclusiveness—‘‘a tendency to feel connected to diverse peoples and groups’’5—and as
feeling shared humanity with all people.6 It has been suggested that this broad
identification with others, even strangers from a somewhat different cultural and
religious background, is the key feature distinguishing the altruistic Holocaust rescuer
from bystanders.7
In addition, a psychometric study has found that Holocaust rescuers show
differences from bystanders on seven personality variables associated with altruistic
behavior: internal locus of control, autonomy, risk taking, social responsibility,
empathic concern, and altruistic moral reasoning. Even half a century after the end
of World War II, measures of these characteristics distinguished reliably between
rescuers and bystanders.8 Note, however, that using a bystander comparison group, as
most researchers have done,9 introduces a confounding factor: some bystanders, who
may have felt just as much responsibility, empathy, and altruistic morality as rescuers,
may have refrained from action because of conformity, fear, risk aversion, or general
passivity in the face of overwhelming legal and military force.
There was, however, another form of active opposition to the Nazi program:
participation in armed guerrilla warfare against German troops and their allies, which
occurred to some degree in many occupied countries. Members of underground
resistance organizations forged documents, transported illegal goods, gathered and
transmitted intelligence, bombed railway tracks, assassinated German officers and
Nazi collaborators, and participated in ambushes and other types of armed combat.
Partisan fighters were usually organized in quasi-military fashion, with a chain of
command and methods of receiving mission assignments from their own higher
headquarters and sometimes from Britain or other nations at war with the Axis powers.
These nations also sent arms, ammunition, radio equipment, and military advisors to
partisan organizations, usually by submarine or parachute.
Surprisingly, members of resistance organizations have attracted much less
attention from social scientists than have rescuers. There is nothing in the scientific
literature to match the extensive studies of the personalities and motivations of those
who saved Jewish lives by hiding those in danger. This seems an important omission in
our understanding of non-compliant, nonconformist, risk-taking behavior in the face of
serious barriers and life-threatening risks. Clearly, resistance was significantly
different both from rescue and from fighting in a national army; such activity
deserves more systematic study by psychologists and cognate professionals than it has
so far received.
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The study reported here applied an unobtrusive and non-reactive technique,
previously used in research on (among others) Holocaust survivors and political
leaders, to provide new information about rescuers and the much less studied, but
equally interesting, category of anti-Nazi risk takers: partisans, individuals who joined
underground resistance movements in Nazi-ruled countries.
It is likely that the decision to engage in either rescuing or resistance behavior
was influenced by a number of complex, interacting situational and personality factors.
For example, religious and political leaders were able to rally individuals, and even
communities, to adhere to precepts contrary to those enforced by the Nazis and
their collaborators; in other cases, fortuitous encounters with desperate refugees
(or aversive encounters with arrogant Nazis) moved bystanders to become active,
despite their fear and reluctance. What Holocaust rescuers and partisans had in
common was that, unlike most of their compatriots, they took action against the Nazis,
despite extreme risks. One might also argue that both types of action fit some of the
criteria for altruistic behavior—clearly in the case of rescuers, and in a less traditional
way among partisans, for whom direct assistance to individual victims was not the
central goal but who voluntarily fought for their compatriots’ liberation.
Hostility toward the Nazis did not necessarily imply pro-Jewish attitudes. There
were partisan units, especially in Eastern Europe, who shared the Nazis’ antiSemitism even while they fought the German military. Such groups (e.g., the
Narodowe Sily Zbrojne or NSZ, a Polish underground organization) sometimes
combined battle against the German occupation with the mass murder of Jews,
which, in the case of the NSZ, extended to killing returning Holocaust survivors after
the end of the war.10
At the same time, there were also partisan organizations that welcomed Jewish
fighters and fighting units into their ranks and tried to help such units by supplying
them with arms when that was possible.11 And although many, perhaps most, rescuers
acted in revulsion against the persecution of the Jews, others were quite anti-Semitic.
Some exploited and abused the refugees they were hiding; others, while benevolent to
those particular Jews, treated them as exceptions to a general rule that Jews were
undesirables whose presence in the country was unwanted.12
It is also important to note that rescue operations and armed resistance were not
mutually exclusive. Some partisan groups also engaged in rescuing and hiding Jews;13
some rescuers, on occasion, used violence to liberate or safeguard their charges.
But, although there are such ‘‘fuzzy boundary’’ examples, on the whole it seems
reasonable to expect that predominant aspects of the two groups would show some
differences between those who risked their lives primarily to hide and shelter the
defenseless and persecuted and those who risked theirs by armed attacks against the
troops and military supplies of the invaders.
Resistance fighters are a particularly appropriate comparison group because they
exclude those bystanders—mentioned previously—who may have been altruistically
inclined but, because of fear or other factors, did not actually engage in anti-Nazi
behaviors. Thus we can compare two groups, both with strongly oppositionist attitudes
toward the Nazis, and both with the courage to risk their lives in order to thwart Nazi
goals, but with distinctly different choices as to their actions: one peaceful, the other
violent. No previous study has attempted a systematic comparison between these two
groups.
In order to study these differences, we applied one kind of thematic content
analysis14 to archival materials generated by rescuers and resistors after the war.
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Thematic content analyses allow for the measurement of objective, nomothetic
features from idiographic, qualitative sources; they make possible such standard
research procedures as random sampling of materials, assessment of inter-scorer and
test–retest reliability, and application of measures of statistical significance and
power. Scoring systems exist for a wide variety of cognitive, emotional, motivational,
and personality variables.15
In the study reported here, thematic content analysis was performed on memoirs
written by and interviews with Holocaust rescuers and members of resistance groups.
The variable chosen for measurement was the ordering of values in the individual’s
value hierarchy, values being the desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in
importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives. Currently the most
widely used scoring system is that of Shalom Schwartz,16 which covers seventy-five
specific values subsumed under ten major categories: Power, Achievement, Hedonism,
Stimulation, Self-Direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and
Security. Schwartz intended the ten motivationally distinct types of values to include
all the core values recognized in cultures around the world,17 and they have, indeed,
reliably shown general recognition (although differing patterns of salience) across
cultures and genders.18 Although we used Schwartz’s taxonomy, the reminiscences of
many Holocaust survivors and the literature on rescuers led us to add another
category, Spirituality, scored on the basis of references to God, religious tenets, or
supernatural entities and considered non-universal by Schwartz.
Schwartz has argued that personal values can lead individuals to act altruistically
in situations where such behavior contradicts their own narrow interests, explaining
individual acts of heroism in extreme situations such as the Holocaust. The current
study explores whether the two different kinds of heroic behavior discussed above are
associated with different patterns of individual values.
Similarities and differences between the value hierarchies of Holocaust rescuers
and those of resistance fighters were evaluated by comparing the mean value ratings
of each group on the categories developed by Schwartz. We expected to find that
Holocaust rescuers emphasize Universalism, a value category that includes the values
‘‘social justice’’ and ‘‘equality.’’ This hypothesis is based on earlier reports that rescuers
are strongly inclusive and have a sense of a common humanity among diverse groups
of peoples.19 We also predicted that rescuers would value Benevolence, a category that
includes the values ‘‘helpful’’ and ‘‘responsible,’’ more than resistance members would.
This hypothesis is in accordance with findings that rescuers feel strongly responsible
for others20 and had been taught adherence to an ethic of caring from an early age.21
Last, we expected that partisan fighters would place greater emphasis on Security
than Holocaust rescuers. The Security category includes the values of Patriotism and
National Security, which seem central to resistance activities but not necessarily to
rescues.
We also looked for differences in value hierarchies related to gender and country of
residence. Scholars using qualitative methods have not reported systematic differences
among Holocaust rescuers based on sociocultural or demographic factors,22 and
quantitative studies have not analyzed gender-related personality variables among
rescuers;23 it was possible that such effects might be revealed by the analysis of value
hierarchies.
Although our primary focus was on comparing rescuers and partisans, we were
also interested in comparing the value hierarchies of both groups with the pan-cultural
norms published by Schwartz and Bardi.24 One would expect that self-selected groups
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engaged in such unusual and dangerous activity might have a value profile quite
different from universal norms.

Method
Procedure
Each subject was categorized on the basis of his or her role during World War II, as
either a rescuer of Holocaust victims or a member of a fighting resistance group. Other
independent variables considered were gender (male or female), religious affiliation,
and country of residence during the war.
The dependent variables were the mean ratings of each of the eleven value
categories.

Subjects
The ninety-seven subjects of this study were either rescuers of potential victims of Nazi
persecution or members of a fighting resistance organization during World War II.
Table 1 presents distributions of the sample across countries of residence.

Data Sources
The narratives were obtained from several sources. Ten personal narratives were
published memoirs written by the rescuer or resister; eight unpublished memoirs were
obtained from the Imperial War Museum in London. A number of personal narratives
came from published collections of interviews with Holocaust rescuers, conducted in the
native language of the subject and later translated into English. Twenty-nine such
interviews were conducted by Gay Block and Malka Drucker,25 eight by Mark
Klempner,26 and two by Kristen Renwick Monroe.27 Sixteen interviews were obtained
from an archive collected forty to fifty years after the war on behalf of the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum,28 nineteen from the European Resistance Archive,29 and
an additional five from the Imperial War Museum. All memoirs and interviews were
published or collected between 1945 and 2006.

Table 1. Countries of residence at the outbreak of World War II.
Group

Austria
Belgium
Channel Islands
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Slovenia

Rescuers

Resisters

0
6
0
2
2
5
5
2
0
17
0
11
0

3
2
6
0
0
8
3
0
6
3
1
12
3
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An effort was made to balance the different types of data sources included in each
subject category. Five memoirs (mean number of pages ¼ 79.4) and forty-five
interviews (mean number of extracts ¼ 22.7) were used to obtain the rescuer data;
thirteen memoirs (mean number of pages ¼ 89.7) and thirty-four interviews (mean
number of extracts ¼ 31.2) were used to obtain the resister data. There were no
significant differences in the number of pages per book (t(16) ¼ "0.23, p40.05) or
extracts per interview (t(77) ¼ "1.28, p40.05) between subject categories.

Scoring
The narratives were scored by a trained scorer using a values scoring sheet as a
scoring manual. Fifty-five of the values were taken from Schwartz’s list. Two of
Schwartz’s values, ‘‘moderate’’ and ‘‘broad-minded,’’ were excluded because they did
not seem relevant, and eighteen values that do seem relevant were added: hard work,
perseverance, competitiveness, humor, boredom, self-doubt, dissension, anger,
detachment, assertiveness, respect for others, patriotism, isolation, safety, discovering
one’s true self, religious membership, solitude, and belief in God. Each of these values
was assigned to one of the eleven overarching value categories proposed by Schwartz.
Whenever a value was explicitly mentioned or implied in a personal narrative, it
was recorded on the scoring sheet. Values mentioned in each of the eleven value
categories were then summed and divided by the number of pages in the memoir, or
the number of extracts in an interview, and expressed as a percentage that was then
used in the statistical analysis. To test for scoring reliability, a second trained scorer
independently scored every tenth scored passage, using the same guidelines. Interscorer reliability was r ¼ 0.85 or higher for every value. A between-groups analysis
of variance (ANOVA) was performed to analyze differences in the value hierarchies of
rescuers and resistance members. To analyze differences in the value hierarchies
of rescuers and partisans, each value category was rank-ordered according to the
frequency of its appearance in the particular narrative. Mean rank order was then
calculated for each value category.
Because there were unequal numbers of subjects in the gender and nationality
groups, homogeneity of variance could not be assumed. Therefore, these variables were
analyzed using Welch’s t-test with an alpha level of p ¼ 0.05. All data were analyzed
using SPSS.

Results
The value hierarchies of rescuers and partisans showed several differences (see
Table 2). As predicted, rescuers placed higher emphasis on the categories Benevolence
and Universalism; also as predicted, partisans placed greater emphasis on Security.
An unanticipated difference emerged as well: rescuers placed significantly greater
emphasis on Spirituality. There were no significant differences in the remaining value
categories.
Table 3 shows the value hierarchy rankings of rescuers, those of resisters, and the
pan-cultural norms reported by Schwartz and Bardi.30 Some of the rankings show
major differences between the pan-cultural norms and one or both of the anti-Nazi
activist groups.
Women in our study endorsed all value categories except Power and Achievement
more strongly than men did (see Table 4). None of these differences was statistically
significant.
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Table 2. Mean value ratings
Group
Value Category

Rescuers Mean (SD)

Resisters Mean (SD)

F(1, 96)

p

Power
Achievement
Hedonism
Stimulation
Self-direction
Universalism
Benevolence
Tradition
Conformity
Security
Spirituality

0.12
0.12
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.22
0.36
0.01
0.08
0.28
0.13

0.13
0.16
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.23
0.01
0.07
0.39
0.04

0.13
2.24
0.35
1.64
0.30
5.76
9.11
0.06
0.44
4.73
14.87

ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
0.02
0.00
ns
ns
0.03
0.00

(0.11)
(0.14)
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.15)
(0.20)
(0.23)
(0.03)
(0.09)
(0.22)
(0.16)

(0.11)
(0.13)
(0.16)
(0.12)
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.20)
(0.02)
(0.08)
(0.27)
(0.06)

Table 3. Value hierarchies: Rank orders

Value Category

Pan-cultural Norm

Current Study
Rescuers
Resisters

Benevolence
Self-direction
Universalism
Security
Conformity
Achievement
Hedonism
Tradition
Stimulation
Power
Spirituality

1
2.5
2.5
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not ranked

1
7
3
2
10
6
8
11
9
5
4

2
7
4
1
9
3
8
11
6
5
10

Table 4. Value ranks by gender
Group
Value Category

Men

Women

Benevolence
Self-direction
Universalism
Security
Conformity
Achievement
Hedonism
Tradition
Stimulation
Power
Spirituality

2
7
3
1
10
4
8
11
6
5
9

2
5
3
1
10
6
4
11
7
8
9
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Differences in value hierarchies depending on the survivors’ place of residence
shortly before the outbreak of the war showed no statistically significant differences.

Discussion
Limitations
Before discussing the results and their implications, it is appropriate to acknowledge
the limitations of this study. Perhaps the most important of these has to do with
sampling. Our sample sizes are relatively small, and the sample is restricted to those
rescuers and fighters who have written their memoirs, or with whom interviews have
been recorded. Such individuals may be more likely than other former anti-Nazi
activists to be comfortable in written and oral expression, to be educated, to live in
easily accessible communities, and to have maintained good mental and physical
health.
Former partisans who participated in interviews with the US Holocaust Memorial
Museum seem likely to be sympathetic to Jews, which was not true of all resistance
groups; as we have pointed out, some actually combined fighting the Germans with
murdering Jewish refugees or would-be volunteers whom they encountered.31 For
these reasons, it is possible that our sample of resisters is more sympathetic to Jews,
and therefore more similar to rescuers (who, we hypothesize, were generally not antiSemites), than the entire population of underground fighters. A more representative
resistance sample might have shown more pronounced differences from rescuers.
Finally, the materials used were published or collected at varying times after the
war. Although value hierarchies are theoretically quite stable over time, it is possible
that the results would have been somewhat different if the participants could have
been interviewed closer to the end of the war. Regrettably, both rescue and resistance
are still needed. They are occurring in various locations around the world, so that
gathering such data is feasible.

Findings and Implications
Let us now turn to what we found. The data support the hypothesis that Universalism
and Benevolence dominate the value hierarchies of Holocaust rescuers. Both values
would be expected, intuitively as well as on the basis of earlier research, to be high
among people who risked their own lives to save others on the basis of a perception of
shared humanity. Benevolence values also provide the internalized motivational basis
for cooperative and supportive social behaviors (e.g., working for the welfare of others;
being genuine and sincere; being a close, supportive friend; and valuing emotional
intimacy32), such as those necessary to live with a Jewish refugee hidden in one’s
home. Although Benevolence is also consistently rated as the most important value
pan-culturally,33 it would be interesting to assess its ranking in a sample of
perpetrators or bystanders in post-Holocaust situations of ethnic or religious
persecution.
Universalism is particularly relevant to the behaviors of Holocaust rescuers, as it is
functionally most important when individuals must relate to, and feel concern for the
welfare of, individuals with whom they do not readily identify34—in this case, Jewish
targets of persecution, who were culturally and religiously different from their nonJewish rescuers. Of the eleven value categories, Universalism, which includes values
such as ‘‘equality’’ and ‘‘social justice,’’ best approximates the concept of inclusiveness
and the perception of a common bond among all mankind—qualities that previous
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researchers have frequently cited as the key feature distinguishing Holocaust rescuers
from bystanders.35
However, neither Benevolence nor Universalism was dominant among people who
took up arms to combat foreign invaders of their homeland. Universalism, in
particular, could hardly be expected among a group that engaged in combat, sabotage,
and assassination against an occupying foreign army. Thus, the lower ranking of this
value among partisans, as compared to both rescuers and the pan-cultural norm, is not
surprising.
Resistance fighters, possibly motivated more by political and patriotic values than
by altruism as traditionally defined, were predicted to, and did, rank Security
significantly higher than rescuers did. Security (controlling impulses and avoiding
risks) was, in fact, high among the members of both groups, implying that their
activism was influenced by recognition of the dangers and demands of opposing Nazi
dominance. The behavioral expression of that opposition presumably differed because
of the divergent importance of other values, personality characteristics, and
situational factors.
The difference between rescuers and resistance members in the ranking of
Spirituality was unexpected. Spirituality has not been identified as a primary
motivator in previous research on rescuers, although individual rescuers have
mentioned religious tenets or the personal influence of clergy. Our finding of
differences in Spirituality reflects different levels of religious affiliation in our
sample: 54% of the rescuers but only 21% of the resisters claimed membership in a
religion. No religious affiliation was mentioned by 26% of rescuers and 49% of
resisters, while 20% of rescuers and 30% of resisters indicated that they were atheists.
By way of comparison, Oliner and Oliner report that although only 15% of rescuers
they studied cited religion as a primary motivator for rescue, levels of religious belief in
their samples of rescuers and bystanders were similar (73% of rescuers and 71% of
bystanders categorized themselves as very or somewhat religious).36
Of course, holding spiritual values as important is not the same as being religious,
and regarding oneself as religious does not necessarily equate with saying that one
is a member of a religion. But the correlation is probably fairly high. The contrast
between both samples of rescuers and Oliner and Oliner’s bystanders, on the one hand,
and our resisters, on the other, is striking.
The role of this category of values needs further investigation. It may be that
religious affiliation cannot be taken as a proxy for deeper religious beliefs, or perhaps
aspects of Spirituality other than those relating to religion are more relevant to the
decision to save the persecuted. The low level of religious affiliation among resisters
may also be related to the prominence of Communists and other extreme leftists in
some resistance movements.
Both resisters and rescuers ranked Power more highly than the pan-cultural norm
group. Power, which emphasizes control over people and resources, should indeed
be more important to individuals who are willing to risk severe punishment in pursuit
of their values than to those who conform to the dictates of authority even when those
dictates violate the moral and legal rules in force only a short time earlier. Similarly,
the low ranking of Conformity among both rescuers and partisans makes sense.
In a seeming paradox, both anti-Nazi groups ranked Self-Direction much lower than
did the pan-cultural norm groups. The reasons for this are not clear; it may be that both
groups considered their behavior to have been guided by moral, religious, political, or
patriotic norms rather than merely by their own autonomous will (one frequently cited
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comment by rescuers has been, ‘‘I had no choice but to help’’). It is also possible that
many people involved in anti-Nazi activities viewed themselves as part of a larger
whole, rather than as individuals acting of their own volition. However, although almost
all partisan units were organized in quasi-military fashion, many rescuers (especially in
the later years of the war) did act alone, without a network of supporters or
collaborators.37
The finding that value hierarchies did not differ as a function of country of
residence indicates that rescuers and resisters were motivated by similar values
regardless of the specific national culture to which they belonged. In other words,
across Europe, the same values were associated with the same kinds of anti-Nazi
behaviors. This is an interesting specific example for unusual subgroups of the general
finding that there is high consistency across cultures concerning which values are the
most and least important.38 It also has implications for identifying potential rescuers
and resisters in other genocides, regardless of where they may occur.
Existing data on gender differences in value hierarchies resemble the present
trends. A study of men and women in seventy-three cultural groups showed that men
rank power and achievement (among other values) more highly than women do, with
the opposite pattern for benevolence and self-direction, but also that the differences
are small. In general, men tend to emphasize ‘‘self-enhancement values,’’ such as
power and achievement, which underlie the pursuit of one’s own interests; women tend
to emphasize the opposite, ‘‘self-transcendence values’’ such as universalism and
benevolence, which emphasize concern for the welfare of others.39 This also appears to
be the pattern, albeit a weak one, in our data.
It had been shown previously that among Holocaust rescuers, women and men
report different motivational patterns: for women, the emphasis was on their
relationship with the person they were helping, while men more often cite ‘‘a sense
of justice and personal power in overcoming evil forces.’’40 Both the higher ranking of
Power and Achievement by men and the higher ranking of Benevolence and
Universalism by women in our study are consistent with this interpretation.
However, as in the large international study cited above, these differences in our
study are small; in fact, they are trends that do not reach the level of statistical
reliability.
A study by Shalom Schwartz, Lilach Sagiv, and Klaus Boehnke41 showed that
certain values are associated with micro-worry (concern about self and its extensions),
while others are associated with macro-worry (concern about society and the world).
In particular, high priority for values such as Benevolence and Universalism was
correlated with high macro-worry and low micro-worry, while priority for values such
as Power and Achievement was correlated with the opposite pattern. The findings from
the current study, viewed in conjunction with the results of Schwartz et al., suggest
that Holocaust rescuers show a greater focus on wider society and worldly concerns
than resistance members, although both groups were well aware of the need for control
(Power). Again, this finding is consistent with previous research suggesting that
Holocaust rescuers are characterized by a view of a shared humanity,42 including all
individuals in the same group as themselves and thereby making the concerns of
others and of society in general more relevant to themselves as well.
Besides adducing the confirmation of quantitative data analyses to earlier
impressionistic conclusions, our findings shed new light on the motivational
characteristics of members of different components of the anti-Nazi resistance. They
also point to the importance of stable personality factors, such as values, in the response
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to tyranny and persecution, contrary to theories that claim the dominance of situational
variables.43 A fuller understanding of these factors could enable democratic societies to
foster the qualities that enhance both humanitarian and armed resistance to future
genocidal regimes.
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This article describes, compares, and analyzes two educational situations for
Kurds from the point of view of linguistic human rights, using prodigious
exemplification. In Turkey, Kurdish-medium schools are not allowed, and
Kurdish children do not even have the right to study their mother tongue as
a subject in school. In addition to physical genocide through low-intensity
warfare, including unacceptable living conditions, Turkey continues to commit
linguistic and cultural genocide (according to definitions of genocide in articles
2(b) and 2(e) in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide) in relation to the Kurdish nation/minority. Under the US-led
occupation in Iraq, Kurdish children in (northern Iraqi) South Kurdistan
are educated mainly through the medium of Kurdish and learn several foreign
or second languages at school; minorities have their own schools in their
own languages. We are especially interested in understanding how similar
background motives on the part of Turkey’s and Iraq’s ‘‘partners’’ (mainly the
United States) can result in such different educational outcomes. Thus we
discuss some of the possible ethno-sociological, historical, economic, military, and
political reasons for the differences and similarities, especially analyzing
the seemingly contradictory US policy vis-à-vis the Kurds (including Kurdish
language rights in education) in terms of three main causal factors: the US
wish to secure oil, energy, and water deliveries in a new situation of uncertainties,
through Turkey and from Iraqi Kurdistan; to secure support from Turkey
in restructuring the Middle East; and to secure new arms deals.
Keywords: genocide, Kurd, Turkey, Iraq, educational language rights

Introduction
Kurds, some 25 to 35 million people, have been said to be the world’s largest people
without a state. In Turkey, even speaking Kurdish in public places has been forbidden
until recently. Kurdish-medium schools are not allowed; Kurdish children do not
even have the right to study their mother tongue as a subject in Turkish schools.
In theory, courses in the Kurdish language can be taught to teenagers and adults, but
in practice the obstacles and conditions have been so many, and so bureaucratically
and legally demanding, that almost no such courses are offered. Kurds are under
Turkish occupation. In addition to physical genocide through a low-intensity warfare
Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Desmond Fernandes, ‘‘Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan:
A Comparison of Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Two Situations of Occupation.’’
Genocide Studies and Prevention 3, 1 (April 2008): 43–73. ! 2008 Genocide Studies and
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that includes unacceptable living conditions,1 Turkey continues to commit linguistic
and cultural genocide (according to definitions of genocide in articles 2(b) and 2(e) of the
UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide) in relation
to the Kurdish nation/minority.2
Under the US-led occupation in Iraq, Kurdish children in (northern Iraqi) South
Kurdistan, which has its own regional government,3 are educated mainly through the
medium of Kurdish and learn several foreign or second languages at school. Minorities
(Turkmens, Assyrians, etc.) have their own schools in their own languages. In 2006,
Abdul-Aziz Taib, then minister of education in the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG), said that every child in the world has the right to be educated through the
medium of his or her mother tongue(s).4
This article describes, compares, and analyzes these two educational situations,
including some of the possible ethno-sociological, historical, economic, military,
and political causes for their differences and similarities, from the point of view of
linguistic human rights. The approach needs to be multidisciplinary in order to
do justice to the enormous complexity of the issues. This is challenging in a short
article; interested readers should refer to our other writings on the topic.5 We are
especially interested in understanding how similar background motives in Turkey’s
and Iraq’s ‘‘partners’’ (e.g., the United States) can result in such different educational
outcomes. It is also interesting, at least in terms of educational policy, to see a rare
positive example in which the earlier oppressed (Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan) do not

Table 1. Estimates of numbers of Kurds
State

Source: Kemal Burkay

Source: Wikipedia

Turkey
Iraq
Iran
Syria
Total

18–20 million
5 million
8–10 million
1.5 million
32.5–36.5 million

14–21 milliona
4–6 millionb
4.8–6.6 millionc
0.9–2.6 milliond
23.7–36.2 million

Sources: Kemal Burkay, ‘‘The Kurdish Question—Its History and Present Situation,’’
http://members.aol.com/KHilfsvere/Kurds.html (accessed 9 January 2008); Kemal Burkay is
the general secretary of the Kurdistan Socialist Party. ‘‘Kurdish People,’’ Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_people (accessed 9 January 2008).
a
These figures are based on Kurds’ forming 20% of the population of Turkey: from
70,400,000 ! 20% to 74,709,000 ! 20%. The World Factbook, s.v. ‘‘Turkey’’ (Langley, VA:
Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tu.html
(accessed 22 January 2007); World Gazetter, ed. Stefan Helders, s.v. ‘‘World’’ (Leverkusen,
Germany: Stefan Helders, 2006), www.world-gazetteer.com/wg.php (accessed 22 January 2007).
We use Wikipedia as a source here because it gives a good summary and its references can be
checked.
b
Estimate based on 26,783,383 ! 15% (¼ 4,017,450) to 26,783,383 ! 20% (¼ 5,357,000). World
Factbook, s.v. ‘‘Iraq’’; Encyclopedia of the Orient, ed. Tore Kjeilen, s.v., ‘‘Iraq: Religions and
Peoples’’ (N.p.: Lexorient, 2006), http://lexicorient.com/e.o/iraq_4.htm (accessed 9 January 2008).
c
Estimate based on 68,688,433 ! 7%. World Factbook, s.v. ‘‘Iran’’; Encyclopedia of the Orient, s.v.
‘‘Iran: Religions and Peoples,’’ http://lexicorient.com/e.o/iran_4.htm (accessed 9 January 2008).
d
Estimate based on 18,881,361 ! 5% (¼ 944,000) to 18,881,361 ! 15% (¼ 2,832,000). World
Factbook, s.v. ‘‘Syria’’; Encyclopedia of the Orient, s.v. ‘‘Syria: Peoples. Languages. Religions.’’
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turn into (linguistic) oppressors of others when they gain some power to control their
own destiny.
Exact figures for the number of Kurds in the world are not available, because
most states where they live have not wanted and still do not want to know. Kurds
have not been included in any census as Kurds, and questions about ethnicity
and mother tongue have not been asked. In addition, respondents fear reprisals
for self-identifying as Kurds, and Middle Eastern authorities prefer to minimize
numbers of Kurds.6 However, many Kurdologists concur with David McDowall’s
estimate that there were at least 22.6 million Kurds worldwide around 1990, and
with the estimate that 20% to 25% of the population of Turkey is Kurdish.7 Various
sources estimate the number of Kurds in Turkey at a minimum of 15 million,8
and some posit 20% of the population of Turkey, but figures up to 30 million have
been used.
Millions of Kurds have been killed since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk came to power
in 1923, and at least 3 million Kurds are internally displaced in Turkey today.
The number of Kurds in diaspora has been estimated as follows:9 Germany,
500,000–600,000; Afghanistan, 200,000; Azerbaijan, 150,000; Lebanon, 80,000;
Armenia, 42,139; Turkmenistan, 40,000; United Kingdom, 25,000;10 Israel,
100,000;11 Sweden, 30,000;12 Georgia, 34,000–60,000.13 This list, which excludes
several countries with sizable numbers of Kurds (e.g., Australia, Canada, Denmark,
the United States), adds up to a total of some 1.231 to 1.357 million. Thus, the total
number of Kurds in diaspora might be around 1.5 million.
Educational linguistic human rights, especially the right to first-language-medium
education, are among the most important rights for all indigenous peoples and
minorities. Without them, a minority/people whose children attend school usually
cannot reproduce itself as a minority/people. It cannot integrate but is forced to
assimilate. Next we describe the educational situation in two parts of Kurdistan in
relation to these rights.

The Kurdish Language-in-Education Situation in (Turkish) Northwest
Kurdistan and (Iraqi) South Kurdistan
Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Turkey
The situation in Northwest Kurdistan (Turkey) is easily described: Kurdish-medium
schools are not allowed in Turkey, nor do Kurdish children have the right to study
their mother tongue as a subject in school. Courses in the Kurdish language can in
theory be offered for teenagers and adults, but the obstacles and conditions imposed
have been such that, at the time of writing, virtually no such courses existed. The
conditions imposed on private schools manifestly discourage Kurdish-language
education or courses: ‘‘Sixteen conditions were outlined in the memo on the
authorization of Kurdish tuition on a private basis . . . For the head of the teachers’
union in Diyarbakir, . . . Kurdish courses had been permitted’’ de jure, ‘‘but . . . under
these conditions they were, in fact, ‘simply impossible’ ’’ for appropriate teaching.14
According to Mariam Benitez and David Lawson, ‘‘the Turkish Government has
repeatedly linked Kurdish language and culture to separatism and terrorism.’’15
The following examples from 2002 through 2007 are drawn mostly from court cases
in which the Kurdish language and expressions in support of Kurdish culture/
language were either overtly prohibited or prohibited on the basis of being labeled
‘‘terrorist activities’’ under the vague definition of terrorism in various articles of the
Turkish Penal Code.
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The first two instances took place during the summer of 2002:
On 14th August 2002, a hearing took place in Number Four court of the state security
courts in Istanbul against twelve teachers and functionaries from the trade union
Egitim-Sen. They were accused of giving talks at various trade union congresses
between 2–13th February on the right to native [i.e., Kurdish] language tuition and
had, therefore, given support to the [‘terrorist’] PKK . . . The defendants deny the
charges.16
A case has begun before the state security court in Diyarbakir against 27 children aged
between 11–18, because they had demanded the right to native [Kurdish] language
tuition . . . The state prosecutor . . . accuse[d] the children and adolescents of ‘‘aiding a
terrorist organization’’ through their demands, and has called for prison terms of
3 years and 9 months.17

Also in 2002, students’ petitions calling for the right to merely receive optional
instruction in the Kurdish language were incriminated
on grounds of being instrumental to the [‘‘terrorist’’] PKK’s efforts to establish itself as a
political organisation. State Prosecutors were briefed by the Ministry of the Interior in
January, 2002, to bring charges of ‘‘membership in a terrorist organisation’’ punishable
with 12 years imprisonment against any students or parents who lodge[d] petitions
demanding optional Kurdish lessons. By 23 January 2002, a total of 85 students and
more than 30 parents ha[d] been imprisoned and over 1,000 people (among them some
juveniles) detained for [merely] having demanded optional first language education in
Kurdish.18

Even today, as Turkey is engaged in the EU accession process, ‘‘programs in
Kurdish for children on radio or TV’’ remain ‘‘prohibited,’’ according to Jon Rud.19
‘‘Local media groups who seek [to] broadcast programs in languages and dialects other
than Turkish [i.e., Kurdish] . . . will [need to] present . . . an affidavit’’ clarifying their
intentions and behavior, ‘‘stating that they will not broadcast . . . programs with the
aim of teaching that language.’’20
Teachers who have sought simply to learn the Kurdish language, in preparation
for a time when they might be allowed to teach it in schools, have also been targeted:
‘‘12 people of whom 11 were teachers,’’ we are told,
were allegedly tortured while being detained by police after having been arrested in
Kiziltepe for learning Kurdish together. The 12 people, 11 of whom were members of the
teachers[’] trade union Egitim-Sen, were arrested in an apartment . . . in Mardin on
May 7th. A magistrate had issued warrants for their arrest. The Mardin branch of
Egitim-Sen said in a written statement that . . . ‘‘Our colleagues were subjected to
various methods of torture; they were sprayed with high-pressure water, they had
plastic bags pulled over their heads, they were forced to sing marching songs and to do
the goose-step, they were brutally beaten, left for 3 days without food or water, they
were stripped naked, had their testicles crushed and were verbally abused.’’ One of the
teachers . . . was not spared the torture despite being pregnant. Because of her poor
condition she was taken to Diyarbakir’s Medical Faculty on the evening of her
detention. According to the statement, her condition remains serious. EgitimSen . . . pointed out that there was a complete disregard for legal procedures following
the arrests. Despite complaints from their lawyers, between 25–30 police were involved
in the questioning.21

In April 2004 it was reported that a ‘‘case against the members of KESK
Music Group . . . who were charged with having sung in Kurdish during a festival
organized by teachers’ union Egitim-Sen in Diyarbakir in 2002, was restarted on
2nd April [2004].’’22
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A 2004 European Commission report confirms that
in March 2004 . . . RTUK ordered the closure for 30 days of ART TV, a local television
channel broadcasting from Diyarbakir, on the grounds that it had violated ‘‘the
principle of the indivisibility of the state’’ when, in August 2003, it broadcast two
Kurdish love songs.23

Similarly,
RTUK issued a warning to one TV channel which had shown a music program with
songs in Kurdish. This was based on a provision which prohibits programs that are
‘‘in breach of the general principles of the Constitution . . . national security . . .’’24

In 2006 the Swedish news agency TT reported that
on the 25th of August, 2006 the Turkish authorities in Istanbul have seized 1,208
Kurdish versions of the books about Pippi Långstrump (Pippi Longstocking), the worldfamous fictional children’s character. They were sent on the 7th of August from Sweden
by an organization that runs an education project for Kurds. The books had been sent
for delivery to libraries in five Kurdish villages. As it is well known, Astrid Lindgren’s
books about Pippi Longstocking have been translated into 85 languages and published
in more than 100 countries.25

As Richard Boudreaux writes,
Kurds who dominate the [southeastern] region in numbers insist on the right to hear
broadcasts and study in their own language and to give their children
[Kurdish] . . . names . . . Turkey’s rulers resist these demands as subversive . . . .
Military police have swept through Kurdish towns and villages, checking birth
certificates of infants and toddlers. Citing a constitutional clause that children must be
named ‘‘in a manner appropriate to our national culture, moral principles and customs,’’
the Interior Ministry has quietly instructed prosecutors to annul hundreds of children’s
Kurdish names and replace them with Turkish equivalents. At least 39 families
resisting the orders have been taken to court, according to the bar association in
Diyarbakir . . . Some of them have been threatened with prosecution for ‘‘separatist
propaganda,’’ which carries a three-year prison term.26

In June 2007, ‘‘Turkey’s highest administrative court, the Council of State
ruled . . . to dismiss Abdullah Demirbas, Mayor of the Sur district of Diyarbakır because
the municipality voted for the provision of services in languages other than Turkish.’’27
For the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP), this action ‘‘represents the latest
example of the central government’s inflexible and intolerant stance on linguistic
rights’’:
The recent court ruling against the mayor and council stemmed from a complaint
lodged by the Interior Ministry. The board of judges voted unanimously in favor of
dismissing Demirbas and the local council . . . The Diyarbakır chief prosecutor further
demanded that Demirbas and Diyarbakır metropolitan mayor Osman Baydemir both be
sentenced to a prison term of three and a half years. Twenty-one other defendants in
the court case are also facing jail terms of three and a half years each. These
prosecutions are currently pending.28

The Turkish Daily News confirms that
the country’s top administrative court . . . dismissed the mayor . . . and disbanded the
municipal assembly over deciding to provide their services in Kurdish, Assyrian and
English languages in addition to Turkish . . . It argued that the municipality’s decision
violated the constitution and Turkish law . . . The constitution states that no language
apart from Turkish can be used in public services.29
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A 2006 report by the ‘‘pro-Kurdish’’ Democratic Society Party (DTP), published
with the DTP’s permission in a blog run by an investigative journalist, also confirms
the following legal actions targeted at Kurdish interests:
#

#

#

#
#

#
#
#
#

#
#

#

On March 20, 2006, a case was filed against Mayor Demirbas on the grounds of
‘‘making propaganda to promote the aims of the terrorist organization PKK’’ due to
his speech titled, ‘‘Municipal Services and Local Governments in the Light of
Multilingualism,’’ which was delivered at the European Social Forum in January
2006. Although the content of the speech, very well summarized by its title, did not
include any single direct or indirect reference to the PKK, as was also later affirmed
by the court, the very fact that the speech aimed to explore the relations between
multilingualism and local democracy and that it was delivered by a DTP Mayor was
enough to render it as a form of ‘‘PKK propaganda’’ in the eyes of central
government authorities. Mayor Demirbas was acquitted from all charges on
September 19, 2006. [The] public prosecutor’s consequent appeal to the Supreme
Court is still in process.
On February 7, 2007, following the release of the Kurdish translation of Ubuntu, a
free software program available in 167 languages, with the support of Sur
Municipality, an investigation was launched against Mayor Demirbas and three
municipal administrators on charges of ‘‘misuse of municipal resources.’’
On October 10, 2006, [the] Ministry of [the] Interior launched an investigation
against Mayor Demirbas due to the children’s games and handicrafts book published
by the Sur Municipality. The children’s book, which was written in both Turkish and
Kurdish, was published on the occasion of Teacher’s Day.
In March 2006 an investigation was launched against Mayor Demirbas due to his
use [of] Kurdish in his speeches during a wedding ceremony in Diyarbakir.
On April 19, 2007, Osman Baydemir, Mayor of Diyarbakir Metropolitan
Municipality, will appear before the court on charges of violating the law that
obliges state agencies, civic groups and private institutions to use Turkish letters.
Mayor Baydemir risks 6 to 12 months of imprisonment for using the Kurdish letter
‘‘w’’ in his greetings cards of New Year’s Day . . . .
On March 5, 2007, [the] Ministry of [the] Interior sent inspectors to Diyarbakir for a
preliminary investigation against Democratic Society Party mayors due to the
Newroz invitation cards published in Kurdish and sent to the officials in Turkey.
In March 2007, a preliminary investigation was launched against Mayor Baydemir
due to the publication of public brochures on health and cleanliness in Kurdish and
Turkish for local people.
In March 2007, a preliminary investigation was launched against Mayor Baydemir
due to the baby names’ book published in Kurdish.
On January 17, 2007, an investigation was launched against Mayor Osman
Baydemir due to the invitation cards sent to the officials in Turkey. The invitation
cards, which were written in both Turkish and Kurdish, were sent on the occasion of
the 6th Culture and Arts Festival in Diyarbakir.
On January 12, 2007, a preliminary investigation was launched against Mayor
Osman Baydemir due to the website of Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality, which
is in Turkish, Kurdish and English.
With an investigation filed on July 8, 2006, [the] Viransehir Mayor . . . was indicted
on charges of ‘‘misuse of municipal resources’’ due to publication of bulletins about
municipal services both in Turkish and Kurdish. Mayor Cin stated that Kurdish was
the mother tongue of the majority of . . . Viransehir’s population (app. 120[,]000),
thus, in publishing bulletins also in Kurdish, the municipality aimed to better
communicate municipal services to the public. . . .
On October 20, 2006, a preliminary investigation was launched against [the]
Kayapinar Mayor . . . due to the provision ‘‘Municipalities take the necessary
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#

#

precautions to teach their personnel Kurdish in order for them to better communicate
with the public’’ [that was] stated in the collective agreement between the
municipalities and the Union of Municipal and Local Governments Services Workers.
Kayapinar Municipal Council’s efforts to give culturally significant Kurdish names to
the parks and streets of Diyarbakir were obstructed by the Diyarbakir Governorship
because these names were said to either include letters that did not exist in the
Turkish alphabet (e.g. ‘‘w’’) or showed parallelism with socially discriminating,
separatist discourses. The court case filed by the Kayapinar City Council against the
Diyarbakir Governorship is still in process.
There are investigations against Diyarbakir Metropolitan, Kiziltepe, Sur and Silvan
Municipalities opened solely for the use of Kurdish language in public speeches.30

Clearly, the linguistic human rights situation remains precarious. The chair of
Turkey’s Human Rights Foundation (TIHV) has said that
other than 14 articles that needed to be changed in the current Turkish Penal Code,
various laws such as the Anti-Terror Law, the Law to Protect Atatürk, the Press Law and
the RTUK [Radio and Television Higher Board] Code restricted freedom of expression.
[He] said that in order for freedom of expression to settle in Turkey, the soul and essence
of all of these laws needed to be changed . . . ‘‘Unless this happens,’’ he said, ‘‘there will be
no meaning in the amendments. And whether or not the cases opened and heard under
these articles lead to an acquittal, they still mean intimidation through justice.’’31

Martin Scheinin, UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, has also concluded
that Turkey’s anti-terrorism bill (now passed into law) ‘‘introduces ‘improper
restrictions on freedom of expression . . . This danger is exacerbated by the very
broad definition of terrorism’ that is being used ‘and the very long and wide list of
terrorist offences.’ ’’32 The article that has been criticized most intensely in
negotiations over Turkey’s EU membership is art. 301, which criminalizes the act of
‘‘public denigration’’ of ‘‘Turkishness,’’ the Republic of Turkey, the Grand National
Assembly, the judicial institutions of the state, the military, or security.
It is clear that many of these laws constrain educational and linguistic human
rights, and, in the US-backed war against ‘‘PKK terrorists,’’33 it is already apparent
that one line of reasoning being used ‘‘in Turkish legal practice is,’’ indeed, ‘‘guilt by
association.’’ ’34 An example of this reasoning in relation to education:
1. The terrorist organisation the PKK is making propaganda for the right to use the
Kurdish language, including in education.
2. Consequently, anyone who advocates the right to use the Kurdish language is guilty
of supporting (‘‘aiding and abetting,’’ Article 169 of the Turkish Penal Code) a terrorist
organisation.35

Even if many legal changes have been accepted (at least on paper), it is valid to
conclude that Turkey is not yet even approaching international standards of human
rights, either in education or in other aspects of linguistic rights. The situation has
deteriorated since 2004. Although many other countries participate in linguistic and
cultural genocide in relation to minorities, Turkey is unfortunately one of the worst
offenders in the world, in several ways the worst.

Kurdish Educational Language Policy in South Kurdistan (Northern Iraq)
In South Kurdistan (northern Iraq), where Kurds form a large majority of the
population of 5.5 million, they are in a completely different situation. The area of South
Kurdistan (approximately 80,000 km2, about 18% of the total area of Iraq), comprises
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the governorates of Arbil, Sulaimania, Dohuk, Kirkuk, and parts of Dyala and Nineva.
Two-thirds of the 5 million Kurds in Iraq live in the first three.36 These governorates
are under the administration of the KRG;37 the others are still administered by Iraq.
During Saddam Hussein’s regime, all education in South Kurdistan—where it
existed at all—was delivered in Arabic. Kurds have themselves had administrative
control over education since 1991, when the ‘‘safe haven’’ (no-fly zone) was created.
The new constitution of Iraq (dating from 15 October 2005) states, in article 4,
First: The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of
Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as
Turkmen, Syriac, and Armenian, in government educational institutions in accordance
with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational
institutions, is guaranteed.38

According to the Kurdistan Democratic Party,
The Educational Ladder in Iraqi Kurdistan consists of 2 years pre-school education
for the 4–5 years age group (not compulsory); 6 years compulsory primary education for
6–11 years; 6 years of secondary education of 2 cycles of 3 years each and higher
education of 2–6 years.39

All education, including university education, is free to students. Katarina
Tomasevski, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education,
in her report The State of the Right to Education Worldwide, examines education in
170 countries, determining to what extent education is free or fee-based. In more than
half of these countries, fees are charged even for primary education.40 The global
pattern of poverty-based exclusion from primary school is part of the global strategies
for ‘‘no poverty reduction.’’ Education is often priced out of the reach of the poor.
The trend has been a transition from free and compulsory education to a market-based
model in which the costs of even primary education have been transferred from government to family budgets. Against this background, South Kurdistan is remarkable.
For Kurdish children in Kurdistan today, Kurdish is the medium of education in
all subjects. They also learn English as an obligatory subject in primary school.41
Assyrian-, Turkmen-, and Arabic-speaking children in Kurdistan are taught through
Assyrian/Syriac, Turkmen, and Arabic and learn Kurdish and English as second or
foreign languages. These minorities have their own departments in the Ministry of
Education, each with its own director general. Meetings with some of these officials
gave the impression that they are very satisfied with the current position of the
minority groups in education, by comparison with earlier periods.42 There are also
critical voices, however.43
Assyrian/Syriac, Armenian, Chaldean, Turkmen, and Arabic are taught as mother
tongues. All these languages are also taught as elective subjects to those who want to
learn them, while English and Kurdish (for non-Kurdish speakers) are obligatory as
second or foreign languages. As mentioned above, the former minister of education,
Abdul-Aziz Taib, formulated his conviction this way: ‘‘Every child in the world has the
right to education through the medium of their mother tongue.’’44
Thus, in (Iraqi) Kurdistan, basic linguistic human rights45 are respected, both for
Kurdish children (an earlier minority) and for most minority children:
1. Their mother tongues are accepted and respected.
2. They learn their mother tongues fully, as the mother tongue is the main
language of instruction.
3. They are not forced to shift languages.
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4. They learn an official language.46
5. They can profit from education.
But, while signs of prosperity are palpable across Kurdistan, there are also signs of
corruption, nepotism, patriarchal structures and attitudes, and, in general, poor
governance. Also, as in the rest of Iraq, shortages of electricity and gasoline cause
considerable hardship to large segments of the population. Furthermore, there is the
issue of poverty. Despite rapid economic growth generated by local and foreign
investments, many families still live below the poverty line. All this influences
children’s health, including food availability and intake.
The material quality of schools, teaching materials, and so on remains poor.
Teacher training is traditional, and often authoritarian and inadequate, despite good
intentions. Teaching through the medium of languages that have seldom or never been
used in schools requires time, effort, and training, and no training in language
planning is yet available. Both corpus planning and acquisition planning are badly
needed. There is also a risk that inappropriate advice from American and British
publishers and other bodies will be accepted, both by necessity and through a lack of
awareness of various aspects of languages-in-education research and experience
elsewhere. Nevertheless, good intentions and motivation are palpable. For example,
children’s literature, including periodicals published for children, are very much in
evidence.

A Comparison of the Two Situations in Terms of Linguistic Human Rights
in Education
All Kurdish children in Turkey are taught subtractively, in submersion (sink-or-swim)
programs. Turkish is the language of instruction; children receive no education using
Kurdish as the language of instruction, nor is Kurdish even taught as a subject.
Subtractive teaching through the medium of a dominant language (i.e., using the
dominant language as the language of instruction) replaces the children’s mother
tongue, subtracting from their linguistic repertoire. This is the situation for Kurds in
Turkey.
Additive teaching through the medium of the mother tongue, with good teaching of
the dominant language as a second language, adds to children’s linguistic repertoire
and makes them high-level bilinguals or multilinguals; they learn both their own
language and other languages well. This is the situation for minorities in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Kurdish children, a minority at the level of the Iraqi state, also have a
positive situation in terms of learning their mother tongue, whereas their situation
with respect to learning other languages remains unclear at the moment.
What does subtractive teaching do? It leads to forced assimilation. It is, in effect,
genocidal, according to the definitions of genocide in art. 2 of the UN Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG):
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
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(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.47

The education offered to Kurdish children in Turkey is specifically a form of
genocide according to arts. 2(e), ‘‘forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group,’’ and 2(b), ‘‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.’’48
In this section we give a few examples, drawn from other parts of the world, of how
education can contribute to genocide according to these two definitions. Pirjo Janulf’s
longitudinal large-scale study of ninth-grade Finnish children in Sweden, published in
1998, is one. These children received all their education through the medium of
Swedish; no Finnish-medium classes were available at that point. After fifteen years,
Janulf went back to as many of her original Finnish subjects in Sweden as she could
find; she discovered that not one of them spoke any Finnish to their own children.49
Although they themselves may not have forgotten their Finnish completely, their
children were certainly forcibly transferred to the majority group, at least
linguistically. This is what Turkish education attempts to do to Kurdish children.
A 1998 Canadian report on Inuit children whose education has been through the
medium of English states that ‘‘teenagers cannot converse fluently with their
grandparents.’’50 The same is true for many Kurdish children in Turkey.
Assimilationist education is genocidal because it forcibly transfers children from
their own group to another group, linguistically and culturally.
Edward Williams’ 1995 study in Zambia and Malawi observed and tested some
1,500 students in first through seventh grades. The Zambian students received all
their education in English from day one, whereas the Malawian children were taught
in local languages, very often their mother tongues, for their first four years of school,
with English as a separate subject, and switched over to English-medium teaching
beginning in the fifth grade. Large numbers of Zambian pupils ‘‘have very weak or
zero reading competence in two languages,’’ Williams states, whereas the Malawian
children had slightly better test results even in the English language than the
Zambian students. In addition, they learned to read and write their own languages.
Williams’ conclusion is that ‘‘there is a clear risk that the policy of using English as a
vehicular language may contribute to stunting, rather than promoting, academic and
cognitive growth.’’51 This is ‘‘causing serious mental harm’’ in the Genocide
Convention’s sense. Education of many Kurdish children in Turkey is also very
likely to stunt rather than promote their cognitive and academic growth.
Another Canadian report on Inuit children in English-medium education,
published in 1985, tells of Canadian Inuit ‘‘students who are neither fluent nor
literate in either language’’ and ‘‘presents statistics showing that the students ‘end up
at only Grade Four level of achievement after nine years of schooling.’ ’’52 According to
Mick Mallon and Alexina Kublu, ‘‘a significant number of young people are not fully
fluent in their languages,’’ and many Inuit students ‘‘remain apathetic, often with
minimal skills in both languages.’’53 The same is likely true for many Kurdish children
in Turkey.
Clearly, this subtractive, dominant-language-only-medium submersion model of
education can cause serious mental harm to students from indigenous, minority,
or dominated groups. It attempts, often successfully, to transfer them forcibly to
another linguistic group. This is linguistic genocide.
To qualify as genocide, an act must be intentional. Have states acted with an intent
to ‘‘forcibly transfer children of the group to another group’’ and to ‘‘cause serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group?’’ Yes—unfortunately, they have.
52

Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan

As our earlier examples show, Turkey has certainly had, and still has, the intent
to destroy the Kurdish language and identity. This intent has been and still is openly
expressed in countless documents.54
Dominant-language-only submersion programs ‘‘are widely attested as the least
effective educationally for minority language students’’55 and it is this model Turkey
is using for Kurdish children. The negative results of subtractive teaching were
already known at the end of the nineteenth century. States and educational
authorities, including churches, have long been aware of this.56 Research results
about how indigenous and minority education should be organized have been available
for at least fifty years, since the publication of the UNESCO expert group’s book The
Use of Vernacular Languages in Education in 1953. If states, despite this evidence and
despite very positive results from properly conducted additive teaching, continue
to offer subtractive education, with no alternatives, knowing that the results are likely
to be negative and thus to ‘‘transfer children’’ and ‘‘cause serious mental harm,’’ this
course of action must be seen as intentional.
What should Turkey do instead? We know from research that the longer
indigenous and minority children in a low-status position have their own language
as the main medium of teaching, the better they also do in the dominant language,
provided, of course, that they are well taught in that language, preferably by bilingual
teachers. If the Turkish state wants Kurdish children to learn Turkish well, the best
way to accomplish this goal would be to use Kurdish as the main language of
instruction and to teach Turkish as a subject, using teachers bilingual in Turkish and
Kurdish. Schools in Turkey should minimally aim at competence in three languages:
1. for all, the mother tongue (Arabic, Armenian, Kurdish, Turkish, etc.);
2. for all minorities, the dominant state language (Turkish); for native Turkish
speakers, a domestic minority language; and
3. for all, English (or some other major international language).
This type of education toward trilingualism is the aim of the system in (Iraqi)
South Kurdistan, although they are still far from reaching it for all children. This
model can be compared with the Indian three-language formula, with successes and
failures.57

Analyzing the ‘‘Contradiction’’
How can we understand the fact that the United States (with its coalition partners)
supports and participates in enacting genocide (including linguistic and cultural
genocide through in education) in Turkey while at the same time, first through the
‘‘safe haven’’ policy and now through occupation, partially enables respect for linguistic
rights in education in Iraqi Kurdistan? In this section we analyze the seemingly
contradictory US policy vis-à-vis the Kurds, including Kurdish language rights in
education, with reference to three main goals:58
1. to secure oil, energy, and water deliveries, in a new situation of uncertainty,
through Turkey and from Iraqi Kurdistan;
2. to secure support from Turkey in restructuring the Middle East; and
3. to secure new arms deals.
Before analyzing possible causes, however, we present some additional facts of the
physical genocide and criticism of it in Turkey, of US involvement in it from the 1980s
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to 2007, and of the ideological prerequisites for enforced assimilation that have existed,
and continue to exist, in both the United States and in Turkey.

USA Involvement in Turkey: Actions, Intentions, Prerequisites
At least some 4,000 Kurdish villages have been bombed, depopulated, and destroyed.59
More than three million Kurds are internally displaced; tens of thousands of Kurds—
women, men, and children—have been killed, raped, tortured, and genocidally
subjected to ‘‘debasement’’ and ‘‘mental harm.’’60 Noam Chomsky has observed that
there was no ‘‘looking away’’ in the case of Turkey and the Kurds: Washington ‘‘looked
right there,’’ as did its allies, saw what was happening, and acted decisively to intensify
the atrocities [against Kurds], particularly during the Clinton years. The US did not
‘‘fail to protect the Kurds’’ or ‘‘tolerate’’ the abuses they suffered anymore than Russia
‘‘fails to protect’’ the people of Grozny or ‘‘tolerates’’ their suffering.61

He continues,
The new generation of ‘‘humanitarian’’ western leaders drew the line by consciously
putting as many guns as possible into the hands of the killers and torturers—not just
guns, but jet planes, tanks, helicopter gunships, all the most advanced instruments of
terror—sometimes in secret, because arms were sent in violation of congressional
legislation. At no point was there any defensive purpose, nor any relation to the Cold
War . . . In the case of the Kurds [in Turkey], helping them would interfere with US
power interests. Accordingly, we cannot help them but must rather join in perpetrating
atrocities against them.62

A disturbing testimony from a death-squad killer named Murat Ipek, if true, further
suggests that US forces were directly involved in the training and coordination of some
of the genocidal death squads: ‘‘An American . . . controlled and instructed the contrateams.’’63 It has also been established that Huseyin Kocadag, chief of the Special
Forces in Hakkari and deputy chief of police in Diyarbekir, who has been identified as
‘‘one of the most bloody enemies of the (Kurdish) people (and) who organised the units
of the ‘‘head-hunters’’ in Kurdistan . . . was trained at a CIA school in the US.’’ 64 The
US administration and American intelligence agencies were also actively involved in
facilitating the illegal capture and abduction of Abdullah Öcalan (chair of the PKK) in
Kenya in 1999.65
Key concerns about human rights were raised in a 1993 UK Parliamentary Human
Rights Group report:
The depopulation of the Kurdish region is, we believe, part of a deliberate strategy
aimed not merely at eliminating a few thousand [PKK] guerrillas, but to extinguish the
separate identity of the Kurdish people . . . In Britain, as elsewhere, the question of
Turkish Kurdistan is often presented as one of a reasonably democratic government
seeking to cope with an intractable problem of terrorism. We believe that the reality is
one of military terrorists aiming to extinguish the identity of a people, and we were
much alarmed by the parallel drawn with the Armenian holocaust of 1915–1916.66

The charge of genocide was clearly made by prominent organizations and
individuals. For the international organization Article 19, the situation was all too
apparent by 1997:
We believe there is now ample evidence to indict the Turkish Government of gross
violations of human rights which constitute infringements of . . . the UN Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, amongst other treaties to which Turkey is
a party.67
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For Karen Parker, a lawyer and analyst in international and humanitarian law,
Turkey’s actions [by 1999] clearly [met] the international law test for genocide: killing
and causing serious bodily harm, inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part (ethnic cleansing and other acts) . . . I am
convinced that Turkey qualifies as a racist regime vis-à-vis the Kurdish people . . . The
ethnic cleansing scheme, taking place in the context of the war, is both genocide and a
war crime.68

And according to Vijay Prasad, ‘‘the anti-Marxist and anti-communist flavour of
Euro-America [has] enabled the Turks to continue a genocidal campaign to liquidate
the Kurdish people.’’ 69
In the post-9/11 period, under the cover of the global ‘‘War on Terror,’’ the
US government has continued to support the Turkish state in a highly questionable
‘‘anti-terrorism’’ offensive against Kurdish civilians, human-rights activists, peace
campaigners, and ‘‘PKK militants’’ in the region.70 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), US Special Forces, and
other agencies have all extended ‘‘anti-terrorism’’-related ‘‘assistance.’’71 Questionable
US International Military Education Training (IMET) courses with Turkish forces
have continued even as the US embassy in Ankara has confirmed that
General Joseph W. Ralston (USAF, retired) has been appointed as Special Envoy for
Countering the PKK. General Ralston will have responsibility for coordinating US
engagement with the Government of Turkey and the Government of Iraq to eliminate
the terrorist threat of the PKK and other terrorist groups operating in northern Iraq
and across the Turkey–Iraq border.72

In September 2006, General Ralston confirmed that
the United States would take tangible measures on the PKK, . . . adding that all
measures would be taken for an influential fighting . . . He ruled out the possibility of
meeting with [the] PKK . . . ‘‘. . . I never meet a terrorist organization. We want to get rid
of them.’’73

Nancy McEldowney, representing the US embassy at a September 11 commemoration service in Ankara in 2005, stated in her address that there was no difference
between al-Qaeda and the PKK, or between Abdullah Öcalan and Osama Bin Laden.
‘‘Turkey and the United States’ joint battle will continue,’’ she said. ‘‘There will be
no areas for them to retreat where Turkey and the US cannot go. Together we shall
hunt the terrorists and destroy them.’’74
In this metaphor of ‘‘hunt’’ and ‘‘battle,’’ which treats a minority’s refusal to
assimilate as an ideological challenge, the similarities between Turkey and the United
States are striking. In the same way that the United States killed off or forcibly
assimilated most of its indigenous peoples in order to profit from their land, water, and
material resources, Turkey wants to eliminate the Kurds as a nation. In the same way
that the United States does not tolerate other languages and cultures, seeing them as
‘‘un-American’’ and a threat to ‘‘Americanness,’’ Turkey sees other languages and
cultures as a threat to the integrity of the state and to its ‘‘Turkishness.’’ When the
United States aggressively supports the Turkish state’s war against ‘‘PKK terrorists’’
(i.e., all Kurdish people who politically acknowledge aspects of their ‘‘Kurdishness’’),
the Turkish ideologies of genocide vis-à-vis the Kurds fit the physically genocidal
(against indigenous peoples) and culturally and linguistically genocidal assimilationist
(against immigrants) policies of the historical and present-day United States
extremely well. Change ‘‘immigrant’’ to ‘‘Kurdish,’’ ‘‘American’’ to ‘‘Turkish,’’ and
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‘‘English’’ to ‘‘Turkish’’ in the following statement, made by former US president
Theodore Roosevelt in a 1919 letter to the president of the American Defense League,
and we have the ideology that has prevailed in Turkey since 1923:
In the first place, we should insist that if the immigrant who comes here in good faith
becomes an American and assimilates himself to us, he shall be treated on an exact
equality with everyone else, for it is an outrage to discriminate against any such man
because of creed, or birthplace, or origin. But this is predicated upon the person’s
becoming in every facet an American, and nothing but an American . . . There can be no
divided allegiance here. Any man who says he is an American, but something else also,
isn’t an American at all. We have room for but one flag, the American flag . . . We have
room for but one language here, and that is the English language . . . and we have room
for but one sole loyalty and that is a loyalty to the American people.75

Below we give a few examples of expressions of similar Turkish assimilationist
ideologies, and of the policies and practices that put in place to realize the goals of the
Kemalist state:
On March 3, 1924, . . . a decree banned all Kurdish schools, organizations, and
publications, as well as religious fraternities and medressehs, which were the last
source of education for most Kurds. Deportations of Kurds to the west [occurred] after
the Sheikh Said rebellion was crushed in 1925. The purpose was to dilute the Kurdish
population in order to facilitate its assimilation . . . Law No. 2510 in June 1934 sought
further to disperse the Kurdish population to areas where it would constitute no more
than 5 percent of the total. It was even suggested that Kurdish children be sent to
boarding schools where they would speak exclusively in Turkish.76

On 4 May 1925, Turkish prime minister Ismet Inonu said,
Nationalism is our only factor of cohesion. Before the Turkish majority, other elements
have no kind of influence. At any price, we must turkify the inhabitants of our land, and
we will annihilate those who oppose Turks or ‘‘le Turquisme.’’77
They were all Turks, [Mustafa Kemal Atatürk] told them, and for decades after his
death that’s how the Kurds were officially described—‘‘Mountain Turks’’ who would be
assimilated over time into ‘‘civilised society.’’ Often, it was done by overwhelming force:
military officers who led the campaign against the PKK in the 1980’s and 1990’s had
plenty of historical parallels to emulate.78

And according to Mahmut Esat Bozhurt, Turkey’s minister of justice, ‘‘Only the
Turkish nation is entitled to claim ethnic and national rights in this country. No other
element has any such right.79
Ismail Besikci writes,
In 1960, Mehmet Sherif Firat’s book, Dogu Illeri ve Varto Tarihi was reprinted and
distributed. This was another one of the books which claimed that there were no such
people as Kurds, who were really Turks, and that Kurdish was a dialect of Turkish.
Originally written in 1948, the 1960 reprint was widely distributed free of charge by the
Ministry of Education to universities, professors, student associations, journalists,
writers and school libraries. During this same period, numerous articles appeared,
stating that the Kurds were Turks. Language experts bent over backwards trying to
prove that Kurdish was a variant of Turkish. University professors lent all their efforts
to the task. Numerous seminars and conferences were held.80

Further, as Michael Gunter reports,
During the 1960’s, Turkish President Cemal Gursel lauded [this] book written by Sherif
Firat . . . and helped to popularize the phrase ‘‘spit in the face of he who calls you a Kurd’’
as a way to make the word ‘‘Kurd’’ an insult. At the same time, Law No. 1587 furthered
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the process of changing Kurdish names, ‘‘which hurt public opinion and are not suitable
for our national culture, moral values, traditions and customs,’’ into Turkish names.81

Even as recently as 2002, an indictment against twenty-four students who had
requested that Kurdish language classes be offered as elective courses at their
university, submitted to the Security Court in the state of Van, claimed that
Teacher M. Serif Firat, in his work [mentioned above] . . . has advocated and proved that
the Kurds are of Turkish origin . . . The Turks and the Kurds . . . share the same
language . . . Although this is the case today the separatist movement and its
collaborators are endeavoring to create a separate language and a separate
people . . . The demand for Kurdish education is not possible as regards the provisions
of our Constitution. Our Constitution does not permit education in Kurdish. Article 3 of
the Constitution states: The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an
indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish . . . Article 4 states . . . [that] the provision of
Article 3 may not be amended, nor may their amendment be proposed. The final
paragraph of Article 42 states: No language other than Turkish may be taught as
mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training and education and the
rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in a foreign language
shall be determined by law.82

According to Besikci,
The chief vehicles for assimilation have been the mass media and educational
institutions. Every possible avenue has been tried to increase the influence of
Turkish teaching in Kurdistan. From the early 1960s on, Regional Boarding Schools
(Bolge Yatili Ilkokullar) began to be constructed in various regions of Kurdistan.
Children who had reached primary school age were brought from their homes to study
in an environment away from their families and villages. Such environments were
conducive to assimilation because the children were permeated with Turkish language
and ideology and had no contact with their native Kurdish culture whatsoever . . .
The schools were kept under strict discipline. During the regimes of 12 March and
12 September, military officers were appointed as headmasters. The aim of all these
measures was to ensure the full severance of individuals from their Kurdish
environment. Following the coup of 12 September 1980, assimilation was once again
placed on the agenda . . . The literary courses which were commenced . . . were meant for
the assimilation of Kurds . . . Coskun Kirca writes that ‘‘the separatists eager for
independence, or the dreamers of autonomy, will be damned into seeing that no one has
any other choice other than becoming a Turk or being absorbed into Turkhood.’’83

Gérard Chaliand reports that ‘‘in 1966, Emin Bozarslan published an ABC for the
Kurdish children of Turkey: the book was immediately banned.’’84
As documented in a 1990 report by Helsinki Watch,
In May 1989, the National Security Council launched a campaign denying the existence
of a distinct Kurdish nation and a Kurdish language. Pamphlets were issued and
distributed to schools in the south-east, claiming that Kurdish is not a distinct
language, but a dialect of Turkish.85

Professor Dr. Orhan Turkdogan has claimed that ‘‘there is no such thing as the
Kurdish people or nation.’’86 According to the late Alparslan Turkes, general secretary
of the National Action Party, ‘‘Turkey is not a cultural mosaic, everyone in Turkey is a
Turk.’’87 Speaking of the Kurdish language, Oltan Sungurlu, Turkey’s minister of
justice, is quoted as saying, ‘‘What language is that? I do not know of such a
language.’’88
Alpaslan Pehlivanli, chairman of the Justice Committee in the Turkish parliament, argued that
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if the word ‘‘language’’ now in the bill [aimed at repealing Law 2932 in order to legalize
the use of Kurdish ‘‘in a rather limited way’’] stays in, we will have admitted that the
Kurds are a nation . . . If it passes this way, tomorrow there will be cafes where Kurdish
folk songs are sung, theatres where Kurdish films will be shown, and coffee houses
where Kurdish is spoken. If this is not separatism, then what is?89

Similarly, Gunter writes,
Justifying its refusal to grant any concessions, the Turkish military argued that:
‘‘. . . Even pursuing language rights for the Kurds in Turkey . . . is to be regarded as
serving the PKK’s [‘terrorist’] interests. Period.’’90

And in 1995,
General Ahmet Corekci, the vice chief of staff, . . . [argued] that demands for Kurdish
language and education rights were part of the ‘‘salami tactic . . . the more slices we cut
the more they will take.’’91

As Chris Morris reports,
In 2001 a Turkish court banned the Batman city council from using Kurdish words as
street names . . . The highest administrative court in the land ruled that the names . . .
could . . . lead to an ‘‘erosion of cultural values’’ . . . Even newborn children have not been
immune. In 2002 parents . . . found themselves being warned that giving a child a
Kurdish name would be ‘‘interpreted as terrorist propaganda.’’ Children should be
named, as Interior Ministry directive warned, ‘‘in a manner appropriate to our national
culture, moral principles and customs’’ . . . In March 2005 the Environment and Forestry
Ministry in Ankara proudly announced that it was changing the Latin names of some
indigenous animals to eliminate references to Kurdistan and Armenia.92

Morris has perceptively concluded that ‘‘since the formation of the republic,
Turkey has grudgingly accepted a narrow definition of non-Muslim religious
minorities, but it’s never been prepared to accept linguistic or ethnic ones (sorry, all
you Kurds).’’93 This explains why educational language policy remains linguistically
genocidal in its nature and scope. The example he cites is instructive:
When a report calling for radical change in mentality was written by an advisory group
within the Prime Ministry, there was uproar. ‘‘The citizens the state should fear the
least,’’ argued the discredited report, ‘‘are the ones who have been granted their rights.’’
If that means diluting the idea of Turkishness, though, it is still too much for most
people in power. The AKP government hastily disowned the recommendations, a senior
general growled with displeasure, and a copy of the report was torn up at a news
conference which had been called to publicise it.94

In light of these examples of actions, intentions, and ideological prerequisites that
the USA and Turkey seem, to a large extent, to share, we go back to the ‘‘Whys,’’ the
three causal factors that are part of an explanation of the United States’ (and its
coalition partners’) direct or indirect support of the different language-in-education
models in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan.

Oil, Energy, and Water
The first ‘‘why’’ linked to the United States, and to its coalition partner the
United Kingdom, has to do with securing the delivery of oil, energy, and water.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which began operating in 2006, is a key
US-backed initiative aimed at cutting out Russian influence in the exploitation
of Caucasus-linked oil. Turkey has developed the critical link in the project that key
US–UK oil giants (Unocal, ConocoPhillips, Amerada Hess, British Petroleum) are
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involved in: ‘‘The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline is being developed by a consortium
of oil companies led by British oil giant BP.’’95 Thus Turkey is a key pivot state whose
cooperation is necessary to facilitate this US/UK-backed mega-project:
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline . . . transports crude oil 1,776 km from the Azeri–
Chirag–Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Total length
in . . . Turkey is 1076 km . . . Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan is a politically driven project to create a
pipeline that does not transit any of the territory of the post-soviet states that do not
have warm relations with the west.96

Turkey also figures centrally in US neoconservative and Israeli state plans aimed
at securing critical control of, and access to, other key oil, energy, and water resources
in the region.97 According to a report in the Jerusalem Post, in May 2006 Turkey and
Israel were clearly
negotiating the construction of a multi-million-dollar energy and water project . . . The
new Turkish–Israeli proposal under discussion would see the transfer of water,
electricity, natural gas and oil to Israel via four underwater pipelines. ‘‘The whole
premise is based on the assumption that Turkey is becoming a major hub for energy in
the region,’’ said Gabby Levy, the Director of International Relations at the National
Infrastructure Ministry. The water would be earmarked for Israel as well as for the
Palestinian territories and Jordan.98

In this situation, US administrations, in seeking to realize their geostrategic and
economic aims, have agreed to support the anti-Kurdish ideological position of the
Turkish state under the cover of the ‘‘War on Terror.’’
Why has there been a different response to the situation of the Kurds in northern
Iraq? The United States’ relations with ‘‘friendly’’ Middle East states that are sure to
provide future oil delivery have been, and continue to be, unpredictable. This is part of
the explanation for the relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) can and will be a reliable source, especially given the recent new
discoveries of oil. Since South Kurdistan is in an extremely vulnerable situation,
surrounded as it is by Turkey, Iran, and Syria, none of which wish their Kurdish
minorities to present demands for more autonomy, friendly relations with the United
States are vital for the KRG. Such relations may also include future military
cooperation, air bases, and/or a commitment to assist the US and Turkish governments
in their war against the ‘‘terrorist PKK.’’99 In return, the United States must accept,
among other things, the strong position of Kurdish in Kurdistan.
But tensions exist. In the past, at the request of Turkey, the US government has
allowed significant Turkish military incursions and bombing raids to take place in
northern Iraq. William Hartung, in 1995, confirmed that
the Turkish government’s March 1995 invasion of Northern Iraq mark[ed] the latest
chapter in its quest for a military solution to the Kurdish question. A Turkish
government spokesperson proudly described the cross-border raid by 35,000 troops as
‘‘the biggest military operation in the history of the Turkish Republic.’’ . . . Turkish
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller cleared the operation with President Clinton by telephone
before sending her military forces into Iraq . . . President Clinton and the Pentagon also
ordered U.S. military personnel in Northern Iraq to ‘‘stand down’’ from enforcing the no
fly zone against Turkish aircraft for the duration of Turkey’s intervention.100

In 1991, ‘‘under pressure from the United States and Turkey, Iraqi Kurds had
agreed to fight the PKK.’’101 Since then, US administrations have continued to provide
clearance for further Turkish military ‘‘incursions’’ and bombing raids (which have
taken civilian lives) against PKK ‘‘forces.’’ Today, however, the KRG is opposed to any
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major Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq that takes place without its
permission. The KRG expects support from the US government in this matter, even as
certain military and political circles in Turkey are pressing for US support for their
own plans. Some fear that the KRG’s educational policy is dependent upon a US
government stance that will prevent any major Turkish military occupation force from
settling and determining policy for the region.

Restructuring the Middle East
It is vital for the United States to secure Turkey’s support in the US restructuring of
the Middle East and other regions. Some of the relevant issues are as follows:
# Turkey is a key NATO ally.
# Turkey has provided crucial military assistance to the United States in many
of its questionable recent interventions. For example, Turkish F-16s (purchased
from the United States) were used in US/NATO-linked bombing missions in
Serbia.102
# Turkey was one of the countries that recently sent troops to Afghanistan, and
there have been proposals to send Turkish ‘‘peacekeeping forces’’ into Lebanon.
It also promises to assist the United States in several potential future conflicts
elsewhere in its capacity as a member of NATO.
# Turkey is geostrategically a ‘‘pivot state’’ for the United States and Israel, and
thus a key US ally, especially with the neoconservatives in power.
The aims of CIA Director Porter Goss’s visit to Ankara in December 2005 possibly
included, according to some analysts, securing:
# support for US policy against Iran’s nuclear activities
# support for US policy to prevent Iran’s support for ‘‘terrorist organizations’’
# air bases for US operations against Iran and Syria

In return, the United States has had to commit, once again, to aggressive support
of the Turkish state in its war against ‘‘PKK terrorists’’ in the southeast of the country
in particular (i.e., in Northwest Kurdistan). In Iraqi South Kurdistan, however,
because of the need to secure the stabilizing support of the KRG in a country where US
forces are increasingly stretched by the occupation and where the KRG promises to
keep the oil-rich area secure for Western exploitation, the US government has, thus
far, not sought to act against the educational policies being promoted there.103

Arms
The actions, intentions, and methods of the United States have had their most concrete
expression in connection with arms, including gifts of arms to Turkey, often through
NATO; training of Turkish forces; and participation in Turkey’s genocidal actions
against Kurds. But the world’s largest manufacturer and seller of arms obviously
‘‘needs’’ markets for its arms, and is manufacturing these markets as intensively as it
manufactures the weapons themselves.
In 1992 and 1993, the Pentagon quietly facilitated a mammoth military shipment
to Turkey at no cost. According to the UN arms registry, the US government turned
over 1,509 tanks, fifty-four fighter planes, and twenty-eight heavily armed attack
helicopters to Turkey. The weapons were slated for reduction after the Cold War under
a 1990 treaty on conventional forces in Europe; instead of scrapping them, however,
the United States simply gave them away. There was no congressional oversight of or
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public debate about the transfer, nor was there much question about the purpose of
this unprecedented arms shipment. As Jane’s Defence Weekly revealed as early as
1993,
‘‘a high proportion of defense equipment supplied to Turkey is being used in operations
against the PKK’’ . . . Military assistance to Turkey has even included the use
of American soldiers . . . Hartung estimates US taxpayers . . . paid ‘‘tens of millions of
dollars’’ to train Turkish forces to fight the Kurds.104

In October 2006, the New York Times described how the Pentagon continues to
run this
little-publicized giveaway and tag sale program to clean out its overstuffed attics and
closets, bulging with the greatest weapons buildup since the Reagan era. The Pentagon
also uses the Excess Defense Articles program, as it is called, to reward government
friends and allies across the globe. There are deals galore, available free to the right
customer or for cents on the dollar of their original cost. There are lots of deal hunters,
but access is by invitation only, and only for governments.105

This is a good way of getting the ‘‘friendly governments’’ hooked on continuing to buy
the arms that they first got for free, or at massive price reductions. The list of such
governments includes Turkey, now a very good customer.
In terms of arms provision, Lockheed Martin’s F-16 fighter jets were ‘‘needed’’
during Turkey’s genocidal war in the 1990s because of their usefulness in obliterating
Kurdish settlements and in killing and terrifying Kurdish civilians:
It is widely known that the Turkish military . . . used Lockheed Martin F-16’s to assist
with the obliteration of Kurdish villages in North Kurdistan during the 1990’s Dirty
War, with the facts well-documented by human rights groups. In 1995, Human Rights
Watch documented arms sales to Turkey, along with related violations of the laws of
war by that state. Included among the many gross abuses that Turkey . . . perpetrated
against the Kurdish people, the F-16 fighter jet figure[d] prominently.106

The arms trade and the training of Turkish forces by Americans (and Israelis)
was ongoing as of 2006:107
The Pentagon has notified Congress [that] it plans to allow Turkey [within the
context of its ‘‘defense’’ needs] to buy 30 [more] F-16 fighter jets and related equipment,
a $2.9 billion deal that would provide new work for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co.’s
Fort Worth assembly plant.108

Lockheed Martin is the world’s largest arms manufacturer. ‘‘This proposed sale’’ in
2006, the US Defence Agency has claimed, ‘‘will enhance the Turkish Air Force’s
ability to defend Turkey’’—no doubt against the internal Kurdish ‘‘threat’’ in the
southeast, and the external one in southern Kurdistan/northern Iraq—‘‘while
patrolling the nation’s extensive coastline and borders against future threats and to
contribute to the Global War on Terrorism and NATO operations.’’109 General Joseph
W. Ralston, the US government’s special envoy responsible for countering the
‘‘terrorist’’ PKK and coordinating ‘‘actions’’ and ‘‘eliminationist strategies’’ with the
Turkish and Iraqi states, happens to be ‘‘a member of the Board of Directors of
Lockheed Martin, the same corporation whose deal for the sale of 30 F-16’s [to Turkey]
sits in the venerable halls of Congress at this very moment.’’110
Indeed,
Ralston’s appointment came at a time when Turkey was finalizing the sale of the
$2.9 billion 30 Lockheed Martin F-16 aircraft, and as Turkey was due to make a
decision on the $10 billion purchase of the new Lockheed Martin F-35 JSF aircraft.
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The sale for the F-16’s was approved by Congress in mid-October [2006], and Turkey’s
decision in favor of the F-35 JSF was announced on October 25, shortly after Ralston’s
recent stay in Ankara, ostensibly to counter the PKK.111

Without a US-backed ‘‘War on Terror’’ in this region against Kurds and the PKK,
and with a meaningful PKK-linked peace initiative making headway, as George W.
Bush, the neoconservatives, and US arms traders and death-dealers well know,
billions of dollars’ worth of weapons deals with Turkey stand to be lost. And we couldn’t
have that, could we?
It looks like Lockheed Martin is going to guarantee the failure of the PKK ceasefire,
because of a conflict of interest . . . You see, Lockheed Martin has an insider on its board
of directors, and that insider is none other than the new US PKK coordinator, Joseph
Ralston, also of the Cohen Group . . . The conflict of interest becomes more obscene by
the fact that both Joseph Ralston and Lockheed Martin are closely tied to the Turkish
lobby organization, the American Turkish Council (ATC). Joseph Ralston is a member
of the 2006 ATC Advisory Board, while a former Lockheed Martin executive, George
Perlman, is a member of the 2006 ATC Officers and Board of Directors. Lockheed
Martin Corporation is a Golden Horn member of the ATC, as is General Electric
Company, Boeing Corporation, Raytheon, and BAE Systems, all of which stand to profit
from the current sale. This conflict of interest makes it clear that neither the US nor
Turkey has the intention of finding a just and peaceful solution to the great opportunity
the PKK ceasefire affords them. On the contrary, both countries seek a return to the
Dirty War, in order to reap the profits of repression.112

The reactions of General Ralston and of the entire Turkish establishment, from
General Büyükanıt to Prime Minister Erdogan, to the ceasefire proclaimed by PKK
starting on 1 October 2006 have, predictably, been almost identical. The ceasefire has
little value; the ‘‘terrorist group’’ should lay down its arms unilaterally; a ceasefire
implies a relationship between two states, and PKK is a terrorist organization, not a
state. In essence, their stance is that there will be no negotiations with ‘‘terrorists.’’
The stance of the UK, another member of the ‘‘coalition of the willing,’’ has been
just as questionable. Chomsky has referred to the ‘‘righteous terror and ethnic
cleansing that ([Tony] Blair’s) government and its allies’’ have helped ‘‘to implement
within NATO’’ (i.e., in Turkey).113 William Clark wrote in 1999 that ‘‘the UK
government is happy with the Turkish state, and has supported the war against the
Kurds . . . The . . . UK’s record on Kurdish issues proves it has contributed to and
supported the genocidal war against them by Turkey.’’114 According to lawyer Gareth
Peirce,
the British and Turkish governments, under the rubric of ‘‘suppression of terrorism,’’
have [even] managed to criminalize the (‘‘Turkish’’) Kurdish (refugee) community of
Great Britain. Without engaging the legitimacy of a Kurdish struggle for national
rights, the British police has deliberately worked to cast doubt on every Kurd in the UK
as terrorist suspects.115

The program of assisting with the criminalization of the (‘‘Turkish’’) Kurds is clearly
being used to advance the geo-strategic, anti-PKK psychological warfare operational
interests of two of Britain’s NATO partners and allies—Turkey and the United States—
as well as the agendas of the G7/8 Terrorism Summit116 and the European Union’s K4/
Europol and Schengen states.117 In return for such support, the British government has
been able to secure lucrative arms, construction, privatization, and oil deals for British
companies (including BP, a key party in the BTC pipeline project), as well as a number of
its own geo-strategic objectives in the Near East, the United States, and Europe.
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Northern Iraq and the Question of ‘‘Stability’’ in the Region
In the debate over the restructuring of the Middle East, the KRG has sought to
emphasize its pivotal significance to the US administration since 2003. Portraying
itself as the one relatively stable and dependable region of Iraq, capable of promoting
US interests in the country and in the wider region, the KRG has suggested that its
existence and its support are essential. Any threat—such as that brought about by a
major Turkish military invasion and occupation—will lead to defensive actions,
heightened conflict, and the destabilization of an oil-rich zone that is critical to US
interests and to American geopolitical designs. KRG President Massoud Barzani,
seeking to dissuade Turkey’s generals from invading South Kurdistan (in northern
Iraq), has warned that any such action will also lead to turmoil in southeastern
Turkey. In response, Turkey’s chief of general staff, General Büyükanıt, ‘‘said he had
already sought government approval to mount military action. ‘We told both Turkey
and the world on April 12 [2007] that as soldiers we are ready.’ ’’118 At the end of May
2007, Büyükanıt further
hinted at military action against Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani and
the . . . Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq if the [Turkish] government
formally requests a cross-border operation. ‘‘Are we going to fight only the PKK once we
enter northern Iraq or will something happen with Barzani?’’ Büyükanıt asked.119

Lale Sariibrahimoglu, furthermore, confirms that retired general Edip Bas" er,
‘‘the appointed Turkish coordinator in the fight against the PKK, told news station
CNN Turk on March 9 [2007] that Turkey’s priority strategically has been to prevent
the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq rather than the fight against
PKK terror. Though I found his statement odd, Gen. Bas" er was at least admitting
Turkey’s real concerns’’120 and agendas. For Yilmaz, ‘‘Baser is expressing the view
consistent with Henri Barkey’s analysis from 2005 . . . It’s not only the prevention of an
independent Kurdish state in South Kurdistan that the Ankara regime opposes, but
control of Kerkuk is also a major issue.’’121
While some commentators have argued that the policies and practices of the KRG
could serve as a model for the rest of Iraq and the Middle East—for example, in terms
of promoting ‘‘progressive’’ educational policies alongside other ‘‘democratizing’’
policies aimed at promoting ‘‘stability,’’ ‘‘security,’’ and ‘‘economic growth’’122—others
have cautioned against taking such a stance. The KRG’s educational language policies
may be praiseworthy in many respects, but other policies and practices have drawn
concern from a number of quarters. According to a 2007 UN report,
journalists in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region face arrest and harassment for
reporting on government corruption and poor public services . . . The United Nations
also criticised Kurdish officials for failing to tackle frequent cases of ‘‘honour killings’’ of
women123 and said hundreds of detainees in Kurdish prisons were being held without
charge . . . UNAMI [the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq] . . . said it continually
received reports about domestic and communal violence which were largely ignored by
the Kurdish authorities . . . The report said UNAMI had received allegations of torture
or ill-treatment of detainees at government detention centres.124

Another 2007 report—Incipient Genocide: The Ethnic Cleansing of the Assyrians
of Iraq, by Peter BetBasoo—details the following concerns:
The 2007 report of the United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom (USCIRF) describes Kurdish treatment of Assyrians in North Iraq:
‘‘Government complicity in religiously-motivated discrimination is also reported in
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the pro-Western . . . KRG. According to the State Department, Christians and other
minorities ‘living in areas north of Mosul asserted that the KRG confiscated their
property . . . without compensation and . . . Assyrian Christians also alleged that the
Kurdish Democratic Party-dominated judiciary routinely discriminates against nonMuslims.’ Chaldo-Assyrian Christians have also alleged that KRG officials affiliated
with the Kurdistan Democratic Party deny Christians key social benefits, including
employment and housing.’’
. . . On October 8, 2002 the Kurdish Parliament of north Iraq adopted a resolution . . .
The practical effect . . . was to legally transfer Assyrian lands that were illegally
confiscated to Kurdish persons . . . Assyrian villages are [also] targeted by Kurds.
The USCIRF report states: ‘‘Additional reports also alleged that foreign reconstruction
assistance for ChaldoAssyrian communities was being controlled by the KRG without
input from that community’s legitimate leaders. KRG officials were also reported
to have used public works projects to divert water and other vital resources from
ChaldoAssyrian to Kurdish communities. These deprivations reportedly threatened
the safety of ChaldoAssyrians leading to mass exodus, which was later followed
by the seizure and conversion of abandoned ChaldoAssyrian property by the local
Kurdish population . . . Combined with non-state sources of instability, . . . the KRG’s
practices add to the continuing flight of Iraq Christians and other ethnic and religious
minorities to sanctuaries outside the country.’’125

In the main, these worries seem well documented, even if the situation for
Assyrians is much worse in the rest of Iraq. But there have also been accusations
about linguistic oppression of Assyrians for which the evidence is less than strong.126
Reality is complex. Stability, in today’s world, is always contextualized, both
historically and globally. As long as outside interests frame the maneuvering space for
both Kurds and other players in the Near and Middle East, cynically engaging in
imperialist adventures (or misadventures) that leave devastation in their wake, and as
long as the historically developed internal power relations favor domestic and
patriarchal elites, regardless of their ethnicity, who are more or less intent on power
sharing, positive models will remain scarce. In this context, KRG policies that seek to
promote the right to education for all ‘‘through the medium of one’s mother tongue’’
deserve our support and recognition, even as those that violate any group’s human,
cultural, or political rights urgently need to be confronted and addressed.

Conclusion: Oil, Arms Deals, and Political Control—Forget about
Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law
In the words of George Kennan, the main US negotiator at Bretton Woods, where the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were put in place, the United States
in 1948 had
50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. In this situation, our real job
in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which permit us to maintain
this position of disparity. To do so, we have to dispense with all sentimentality . . . we
should cease thinking about human rights, the raising of living standards, and
democratization.127

Old US foreign policy thus continues today. Noam Chomsky’s view on the United
States is that it represents industrial feudalism rather than industrial democracy.128
Without the millions of undocumented (‘‘illegal’’) immigrants whose rights are almost
non-existent, like serfs under feudalism, US (industrial) agriculture would not be
able to function, and neither would many other areas of the economy that feature
difficult working conditions and minimal salaries.129 Some aspects of the governing
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structures of today’s Turkey (the ‘‘deep state’’130) might be seen as representing
military–economic corporatism.131
Kurds cannot expect any support from Britain either—Tony Blair expects them
to ‘‘acquiesce’’ in their treatment: ‘‘A top-secret memo seen by The Sunday Telegraph,
reveals [that] Tony Blair and his senior officials have drawn up an extraordinary
‘wish list’ of how they would like to see the world looking just 10 years from now . . .
A contentious section deals with the Kurdish populations of Turkey, Iran and Iraq,
all of whom face repression. To avoid being seed beds for terrorism, these populations
must be acquiescing in their treatment,’’ wrote Patrick Hennessy, political editor of the
Sunday Telegraph, in a 2006 article.132
Is there a future for the Kurds in Turkey? If they face a combination of Turkey’s
military–economic corporatism and the United States’ industrial feudalism, while
the United Kingdom’s best-case scenario is that they ‘‘must be acquiescing in their
treatment,’’ a positive outcome seems, at best, uncertain. Maintaining and supporting
diversity is a prerequisite for stability; denial of linguistic and cultural human
rights leads to conflict, and conflicts are expensive, politically and economically, as
well as in terms of human suffering. Respect for linguistic and cultural human rights
generally leads to stable coexistence and increased harmony—and this is what
should be supported and encouraged in (Iraqi) South Kurdistan. We can see some
substantive beginnings of this policy as it applies to linguistic human rights in
South Kurdistan, however weak, problematic, and vulnerable. The issue of
discriminatory practices against Assyrians in the north and south of Iraq urgently
needs to be addressed. Meanwhile, Turkey and the United States, with help from
the United Kingdom and other EU and NATO countries, through their genocidal
activities or acceptance of same, are actively preventing peace in Turkish Kurdistan
and destroying the Kurds.
We should remember the words of Mahatma Gandhi: ‘‘The cause of liberty becomes
a mockery if the price to be paid is the wholesale destruction of those who are to
enjoy liberty.’’133
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of Systematic Negation (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights,
October 2006), 12.
Wikipedia, s.v. ‘‘Kurdish People,’’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_people (accessed
25 October 2006).
For all these countries see The Kurdish Diaspora (Paris: Institut Kurde de Paris, 2006),
http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/ (accessed 25 October 2006).
Lokman I. Meho, ‘‘The Kurds and Kurdistan: A General Background,’’ in Kurdish
Culture and Society: An Annotated Bibliography, comp. Lokman I. Meho and Kelly
Maglaughlin, 3–26 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 4.
Wikipedia’s estimate of 60,000, from Radio Sweden International’s Kurdish program, is
too high; we use here the estimate given in Amir Hassanpour and Shahrzad
Mojab, ‘‘Kurdish Diaspora,’’ in Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee
Cultures around the World, ed. M. Ember, C.R. Ember, and I. Skoggard, 214–24
(New York: Kluwer Academic, 2005).
‘‘Kurds in Georgia,’’ in Eurominority: Portal of European Stateless Nations and
Minorities (Quimper, France: Organization for the European Minorities, 2006), http://
www.eurominority.org (accessed 25 October 2006); The Kurdish Diaspora.
NZZ, 20 September 2002, quoted in International Association for Human Rights of
the Kurds [IAHRK], ‘‘Kurdish Tuition Permitted in Turkey: Bureaucratic Hurdles to
Prevent Language,’’ IMK Weekly Information Service 168 (17–25 September 2002),
http://www.kurds.dk/english/2000/news114.html (accessed 9 January 2008).
Mariam Carrion Benitez and David Lawson, The Trial of Students: ‘‘Tomorrow the Kurdish
Language Will Be Prosecuted . . .’’ (London: Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2002), 7.
Evrensel, 14 August 2002, cited in IAHRK, ‘‘Teachers Before Court,’’ IMK Weekly
Information Service 165 (14–22 August 2002), http://www.kurds.dk/english/2000/
news112.html (accessed 10 January 2008).
Hurriyet, 11 June 2002, cited in IAHRK, ‘‘27 Children Brought Before Diyar-bakir’s
State Security Court,’’ IMK Weekly Information Service 160 (17–28 June 2002),
http://www.kurds.dk/english/2000/news107.html (accessed 10 January 2008).
Aram Publisher, ‘‘Conspiracy and Crisis: Turkey and the Kurdish Question: From
the Nineties to the Present Day,’’ ZNet Policy Watch, 22 January 2002,
http://www.zmag.org/content/ForeignPolicy/aram0122.cfm (accessed 10 January 2008).
Jon Rud, ‘‘Turkey’s Implementation of European Human Rights Standards—Legislation
and Practice,’’ in EU Turkey Civic Commission: International Conference on Turkey,
the Kurds and the EU, European Parliament, Brussels, 22–23 November 2004—Conference
Papers, ed. Mark Muller, Claire Brigham, Kariane Westrheim, and Kerim Yildiz, 53–70
(London: Kurdish Human Rights Project [KHRP], 2005), 65.
‘‘Ten Local TVs Queued for Kurdish Broadcast,’’ BIA News Center, 25 August 2005.
Yedinci Gündem, 12 May 2002, cited in IAHRK, ‘‘Kurdish Tuition as Grounds for
Torture,’’ IMK Weekly Information Service 156 (13–24 May 2002), http://www.kurds.dk/
english/2000/news102.html (accessed 10 January 2008).
Evrensel—TIHV, 6 April 2004, cited in Info Turk, ‘‘Members of a Music Group on Trial
in Diyarbakir,’’ Info Turk 308, April 2004, http://www.info-turk.be/
308.htm#Members%20of%20a%20Music%20Group%20on%20Trial%20in%20Diyarbakir
(accessed 10 January 2008).
Kerim Yildiz and Mark Muller, ‘‘Turkey, Kurds, Europe and the EU Accession
Process: What Is To Be Done?’’ in EU Turkey Civic Commission: International Conference
on Turkey, the Kurds and the EU, European Parliament, Brussels, 22–23 November
2004—Conference Papers, ed. Mark Muller, Claire Brigham, Kariane Westrheim, and
Kerim Yildiz, 91–103 (London: KHRP, 2005), 97.
67

Genocide Studies and Prevention 3:1 April 2008

24.

25.

26.

27.
28.
29.

30.

31.

32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.

41.
42.

43.

Jon Rud, ‘‘Turkey’s Implementation of European Human Rights Standards—Legislation
and Practice,’’ in EU Turkey Civic Commission: International Conference on Turkey, the
Kurds and the EU, European Parliament, Brussels, 22–23 November 2004—Conference
Papers, ed. Mark Muller, Claire Brigham, Kariane Westrheim, and Kerim Yildiz, 53–70
(London: KHRP, 2005), 65.
Zorab Aloian, ‘‘Kurdish Linguistic Rights Report, 2006: Submitted to the Translation and
Linguistic Rights Committee of the International PEN at the Ohrid Conference, Republic
of Macedonia, 14th–17th September 2006,’’ Kurdish Info, 20 October 2006, http://
www.kurdishinfo.net/modules.php?name¼News&file¼article&sid¼4507 (accessed
24 August 2007).
Richard Boudreaux, ‘‘Nameless Kurds of Turkey,’’ Los Angeles Times, 30 January 2003,
reproduced in Kurdistan Observer, http://home.cogeco.ca/$observer/3-2-03-namelesskurds.html (accessed 24 January 2008).
‘‘Turkey Persists in Denial of Basic Cultural and Language Rights as Mayor Dismissed for
Providing Multi-lingual Services’’ (KHRP press release, 18 June 2007), 1.
Ibid.
‘‘Mayor Sacked for Providing Multilingual Services,’’ Turkish Daily News,
16 June 2007, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid¼75989
(accessed 10 January 2008).
DTP Local Government Commission, ‘‘Appendix 2: Some of investigations and court cases
launched against the DTP Mayors related to promotion or use of Kurdish on various
occasions,’’ in Report on Local Government and Local Democracy Dynamics Concerning the
DTP Municipalities in Turkey, as reproduced in Mizgin Sen, ‘‘Neglecting the Principles of
Democratization,’’ Rastı̂, 24 March 2007, http://rastibini.blogspot.com/2007/03/neglectingprinciples-of.html (accessed 14 January 2008).
BIA News Center, 20 April 2006, cited in ‘‘Human Rights Activists: ‘New Anti-Terror Bill
Incites More Violence,’ ’’ Info Turk 332, April 2006, http://www.info-turk.be/
332.htm#Human (accessed 10 January 2008).
Quoted in BIA News Center, 22 September 2006, cited in ‘‘TIHV: ‘Not Only 301, Fourteen
Articles Need Change,’ ’’ Info Turk 337, September 2006, http://www.info-turk.be/337.htm#
Droits (accessed 10 January 2008). See also the protest letter addressed to Turkish president
Necdet Sezer by Article 19, an NGO monitoring freedom of expression, www.article19.org/
pdfs/letters/turkey-amendments-to-terror-law.pdf (accessed 10 January 2008).
Fernandes, ‘‘Cause for Concern?’’
Jon Rud, ‘‘Turkey’s Implementation,’’ 57.
Ibid.
Kurdish Democratic Party—Iraq, ‘‘General Information,’’ http://www.kdp.pp.se/?do¼kurdistan (accessed 11 January 2008).
Ibid.
Quoted in ‘‘Full Text of Iraqi Constitution,’’ Washington Post, 12 October 2005, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html
(accessed 11 January 2008).
Kurdistan Democratic Party—Iraq, ‘‘Education in Iraqi Kurdistan,’’ http://www.kdp.pp.se/?
do¼edu (accessed 11 January 2008).
Katarina Tomasevski, The State of the Right to Education Worldwide. Free or Fee:
2006 Global Report (Copenhagen, August 2006), http://www.katarinatomasevski.com/
images/Global_Report.pdf (accessed 11 January 2008), 238, Table 25.
Abdulaziz S. Faris (Director General of Primary Schools and Kindergartens, Ministry of
Education), in conversation with the author, Hawler/Erbil, March 2006.
Fakhradin Bahaddin (director general of Turkoman education, Ministry of Education) and
Nazar Hana Khizo (director general of Assyrian education, Ministry of Education), in
conversation with the author, Hawler/Erbil, March 2006.
For Assyrian-language education see, e.g., E.Y. Odisho, ‘‘Assyrian (Aramaic):
A Recent Model for Its Maintenance and Revitalization,’’ in Schools of Oriental Studies
68

Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan

44.

45.
46.

47.

48.
49.

50.

51.
52.
53.

54.

55.

56.
57.

and the Development of Modern Historiography (Melammu Symposia IV), ed.
A. Panaino and A. Piras, 183–96 (Milan: Università di Bologna and Istituto Italiano
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Variant: Cross Currents in Culture 8, special supplement (1999): 1–12,
http://www.variant.randomstate.org/pdfs/issue8/Variant8supplement.pdf (accessed
14 January 2008).
Reported in V. Vosbigian, ‘‘Seminar Discussing Kurdish and Armenian Genocides,
1915–99’’ (press release, London: KIC, Peace in Kurdistan Campaign, and United
Kurdish Committee, 17 July 1999), 2. For a detailed discussion of this matter, see Desmond
Fernandes, The Criminalization of Kurdish Asylum Seekers and Refugee Communities in
the UK and Germany (London: Peace in Kurdistan Campaign, 2001); Fernandes,
Psychological Warfare Operations; and Defend the Kurds Campaign, Discussion Document
on the Case of PKK European Representative Kani Yilmaz, the Criminalization of Kurdish
Communities in Britain and Europe and the Erosion of Democratic and Civil Rights
(London: Defend the Kurds Campaign, 1996).
This meeting was held in Lyons, France, in June 1996.
For further details, see Defend the Kurds Campaign, Discussion Document.
‘‘Top General Hints at Fight against Both the PKK and Barzani,’’ Turkish Daily News,
1 June 2007.
Ibid.
Lale Sariibrahimoglu, ‘‘Is a Turkish Cross-Border Operation in the Offing?’’ Today’s
Zaman, 12 April 2007, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/
yazarDetay.do?haberno¼108147 (accessed 14 January 2008).
Mizgin Yilmaz, ‘‘Buyukanit Brays,’’ Rastı̂, 12 April 2007, http://rastibini.blogspot.com/
2007/04/buyukanit-brays.html (accessed 14 January 2008).
See, e.g., Nimrod Raphaeli, ‘‘The Opportunity Before Kurdistan: A New Model for
Middle East Democracy’’ (Middle East Media Research Institute, 7 September 2005),
http://web.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?rnr¼77&lngnr¼12&anr¼5863&smap¼ (accessed
24 January 2008), quoting Khaled Al-Kishtainy, Iraqi columnist for the London daily
newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat.
For additional information about the situation of women see Shahrzad Mojab and
Himani Bannerji, eds., ‘‘War and Militarization,’’ special issue, Resources for Feminist
Research 30, 3/4 (2003); for a recent account, listen to ‘‘Post-war Reconstruction and
Democracy Promotion: Women’s NGOs in Iraq,’’ an interview with Shahrzad Mojab,
http://www.kpfa.org/archives/index.php?arch¼19061 (accessed 14 January 2008); the
interview is based on Mojab’s research, entitled Role of Women’s Organization in Post-war
Reconstruction: Diaspora–Homeland Relations in the Kurdish ‘‘Safe Haven,’’ 1991–2003.
Yara Bayoumy and Shamal Aqrawi, ‘‘U.N. Criticises Iraq’s Kurdistan on Press Freedom,’’
Reuters, 25 April 2007.
Peter BetBasoo, Incipient Genocide: The Ethnic Cleansing of the Assyrians of Iraq
(N.p.: Assyrian International News Agency, 2007).
For example, in March 2007 the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA) reported the
following from Dohuk, in northern Iraq: ‘‘Kurdish authorities are preventing Assyrian
72

Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan

127.
128.

129.

130.

131.

132.

133.

businesses from using Assyrian names or putting up signs using the Assyrian language on
the front of their stores, according to the Assyrian website assyrian4all.net [accessed
20 May 2007]. Kurdish authorities have informed they may use Kurdish or English only.
An Assyrian businessman observed that this policy is no different from that under
Saddam’s regime, when Assyrians were forced to use Arabic instead of Assyrian names.
‘‘Kurdish Authorities Outlaw the Assyrian Language in North Iraq,’’ AINA, 10 March
2007, http://www.aina.org/news/20070310144443.htm (accessed 14 January 2008). We sent
the text of this news release to a colleague in Dohuk, lawyer Mueyed Taib, on 22 May 2007.
He went out immediately to take pictures in Dohuk and e-mailed us a dozen within a
couple of hours, showing Assyrian shop signboards and other texts outside buildings in
Assyrian/Syriac, Assyrian colors flying from cars, and so on, and absolutely denied that the
language would be forbidden.
John Pilger, Hidden Agendas (London: Vintage, 1998), 59.
Chomsky can be seen articulating this view, for example, when asked by an interviewer
what he would say if he could spend one minute with George W. Bush: see ‘‘One Minute
with George Bush’’ (uploaded to YouTube on 21 May 2006), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v¼aQ2LScRiz1U&mode¼related&search¼ (accessed 24 January 2008).
See Deepa Fernandes, Targeted: National Security and the Business of Immigration
(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006); see also Jeffrey S. Passel, Randy Capps, and
Michael Fix, ‘‘Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures’’ (Urban Institute
Immigration Studies Program, 12 January 2004), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
1000587_undoc_immigrants_facts.pdf (accessed 14 January 2008); League of United Latin
American Citizens, ‘‘The Truth about Undocumented Immigration,’’ http://www.lulac.org/
advocacy/issues/immigration/truth.html (accessed 14 January 2008).
Mizgin Yilmaz, ‘‘Nexus of Evil—Part 1,’’ Rastı̂, 17 March 2007, http://rastibini.blogspot.com/2007/03/nexus-of-evil-part-1.html (accessed 14 January 2008); Mizgin Yilmaz, ‘‘Nexus
of Evil—Part 2,’’ Rastı̂, 18 March 2007, http://rastibini.blogspot.com/2007/03/nexus-of-evilpart-2.html (accessed 14 January 2008).
Benito Mussolini is reported to have said that ‘‘Fascism should more appropriately be
called corporatism because it is a merger of state and corporate power.’’ Giovanni Gentile,
ed., Encyclopedia Italiana, s.v. Benito Mussolini, quoted in Thomas J. DiLorenzo,
Economic Fascism, cited in Rick Parkany, ‘‘The Economics of War . . .’’ (University of Milan,
2003), http://www.borg.com/$rparkany/PromOriginal/EconomyOfWar/
EconomicsOfWar.html (accessed 14 January 2008).
Patrick Hennessy, ‘‘Blair Entrusts Policy to Peace, Love and Harmony,’’ Sunday
Telegraph, 30 October 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml¼/news/
2006/10/29/nmemo129.xml (accessed 14 January 2008).
M.K. Gandhi, Gandhi on Non-violence: A Selection from the Writings of Mahatma Gandhi,
ed. and introd. Thomas Merton (New York: New Directions, 1965), 54.

73

The United States’ Response to Genocide
in the Independent State of Croatia,
1941–1945
Rob McCormick
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In April 1941, Ante Pavelic´, the fascist leader of the Independent State of Croatia,
and his paramilitary force, the Ustasˇe (‘‘rebels’’), began a genocide that killed at
least 330,000 Serbs and essentially eliminated Jews and Roma from Croatia. The
American response to genocide in Croatia provides a fuller context for examining
Washington’s reaction to the Nazi genocide. By the summer of 1941, the US
government had reliable information that genocide was taking place in Croatia.
Washington expressed little interest in this slaughter, except insofar it affected
Croatian–American and Serbian–American relations; made no direct public
statement condemning the Ustasˇe’s actions; and offered no protest to the Vatican.
Croatian events, however, propelled the FBI and the Office of War Information to
suppress pro-Ustasˇe supporters in the United States.
Keywords: Croatia, genocide, United States, Ante Pavelic´, State Department
For much of World War II, a substantial amount of the US State Department’s
information about Croatia originated in Ankara and Istanbul. Neutral Turkey,
situated at an important crossroads for Germany, Britain, the United States, and the
Soviet Union, was an excellent location for mischief and fact finding. All belligerents
found it a convenient playground for cloak-and-dagger operations, as well as a more
innocuous center for information gathering. On 6 May 1941, a disturbing telegram,
which foreshadowed future events, arrived in the State Department from the
American embassy in Ankara. Rushed to Washington, the telegram contained
information gained from Yugoslav contacts. The alarming message read, ‘‘according
to dependable information partizans of Pavelić (in some cases in conjunction with
Magyars) are massacring Serbs in Croatia, the Voyvodina and Bosnia. There is need of
urgent intervention by the Vatican at Zagreb and Budapest.’’1 The intervention so
desperately sought never materialized. No one came to the aid of Serbs, Jews, and
Roma who suffered so mightily under Ante Pavelić’s reign in the alleged Independent
State of Croatia. This telegram was the first report received in Washington that spoke
of the slaughter, which eventually reached catastrophic proportions. By the end of the
war, Pavelić and the Ustaše (the paramilitary force he founded in 1929) had murdered
between 330,000 and 390,000 Serbs, many of whom were tortured and executed in the
most despicable manner.2 Tens of thousands were forced to convert, often at gunpoint,
from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. The Jewish and Roma populations, substantially
smaller, were all but eliminated.
Historians have paid little attention to America’s role in confronting Ante Pavelić’s
killing spree.3 Much has been written about Washington’s response to Nazi mass
murder, but the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, or NDH)
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has been left out of this discussion. Historians have given only a passing glance at
America’s views of and policy toward Croatian wartime atrocities. Washington’s
reaction to atrocities in Croatia offers an interesting case study and provides a fuller
context for evaluating America’s reaction to World War II genocide. Although policymakers learned of the Independent State of Croatia’s massacres at an early date, the
evidence of the slaughter did not move them to significant action. The White House
and the State Department made no detailed and direct public statements about the
atrocities being perpetrated in the NDH. Even with accurate information in hand,
much of it arriving early in the course of the genocide, officials in Washington chose to
remain aloof.
It is easy to criticize American officials for failing to publicly decry the atrocities in
the NDH or to attempt in any significant way to influence Pavelić’s regime. Regardless
of the vivid and often thorough reports of mass slaughter, American officials offered few
internal or external comments about these atrocities, even after the United States
entered the war. With a strong current of non-intervention and nativism focusing
attention on domestic issues, one can understand why policy makers made the decisions
they did. Policy toward the atrocities was dictated by the need to limit ethnic tension
between Serbian Americans and Croatian Americans. The American government was
concerned that the crisis in Croatia had the potential to foster violence in the United
States that would weaken the domestic war effort, especially in heavy industry, where
Yugoslav immigrants tended to work. This was a highly practical way of responding to
atrocities in a small, distant land that only rarely garnered American attention.

The Ustaše
To fully appreciate American response to the atrocities in the Independent State of
Croatia, one must examine Ustaše ideology and the activities of the organization once
it gained power in Croatia. The ideological foundation of the Ustaše reaches back to the
nineteenth century, when Ante Starčević established the Party of Right. Starčević,
a stalwart opponent of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, consistently favored Croatian
independence and rejected any idea of a Yugoslavia, as supported by Bishop Josip
Strossmayer. Josip Frank was the heir to Starčević’s gospel, but Frank reversed a key
aspect of Starčević’s views: hoping to elevate Croatia’s political prestige in the Dual
Monarchy, Frank’s Pure Party of Rights supported the regime. Although there were
different opinions about Croatia’s role in the Habsburg Empire, Frank’s party
embraced Starčević’s view that Serbs were the enemy of Croatian political and
territorial ambitions. As time passed, aggressively anti-Serbian views became the
hallmark of the Pure Party of Rights. With the collapse of the Dual Monarchy and the
creation of Yugoslavia, Frank’s party descended deeper into its anti-Serbian and antiOrthodox positions. They were fervent opponents of the centralist 1921 constitution,
believing that the document extinguished hope for Croatian independence while
ensuring Serbian hegemony in the new state. In this they were not alone. The Croatian
Peasant Party, the political voice for the majority of Croatians, also opposed the 1921
constitution.4
Those in tune with Frank’s violent anti-Serbian positions found a unifying voice in
Ante Pavelić. A native of Bradina, Pavelić emerged in the 1920s as the leading
spokesman for Croatian independence. Fully embracing the anti-Serb views of
Starčević and Frank, and believing that a professional revolutionary organization
was needed if Croatia were to gain its independence, Pavelić, a lawyer by training,
established the Ustaše along the lines of Bulgaria’s infamous Internal Macedonian
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Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). From its inception in 1929, the Ustaše was
violent and revolutionary.5 Their beliefs were a collection of seemingly disparate
ideologies bound together in one movement. In this way, they hoped to attract a wide
variety of followers. In Ustaše ideology, one could be a proto-fascist and, at the same
time, a deep believer in Catholicism. At its ideological core was a fervent, mystical
belief in the holiness and sanctity of the Croatian state. As Ustaše’s architect, Pavelić
maintained that Croatians had established a state 1,400 years earlier and that, over
the centuries, they had never abandoned their right to independence. Regardless
of the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, or the Karadjordjevićs, Croatia had always
existed. Therefore, Pavelić’s chief goal was the resurrection of an independent
Croatian state with borders corresponding to earlier manifestations of Croatia.
This objective was achievable only through the destruction of Serbian—foreign—
influence within Croatia, which, in turn, necessitated the annihilation of Yugoslavia.
Correspondingly, the well-being of the state was of such significance that individual
rights ran a distant second to the establishment and maintenance of Croatia. Pavelić’s
fascist tendencies were apparent.6
In their desire to demonstrate the distinctiveness of their people, the Ustaše
deemed Croatians of pure peasant stock a separate nationality from their Balkan
neighbors. By the beginning of World War II, Ustaše ideologues would proclaim that
Croats were Goths, and therefore of Germanic origin, far removed from the inferior
Slavic Serbs. Any myth could be used to separate Croatians from Serbs. Like the Nazis,
the Ustaše placed the peasant on a pedestal, extolling his virtues of clean living and
hard work. The peasant was nearly incorruptible, and there was much discussion of
establishing a peasant republic. Both Nazi and Croatian currency during World War II
featured images of the solid and pure peasant. Pavelić, though he believed in the
virtues of the peasant, was a clever politician who judged that such depictions would
attract disenchanted peasants to his cause while weakening the Croatian Peasant
Party.
Another key aspect of Ustaše ideology was a deep-seated commitment to the
Catholic faith. As a devoted Catholic, Pavelić believed that Croatians had been chosen
by God to defend Catholicism against assaults from both Orthodoxy and Communism.
This religious zeal, which held no tolerance for Orthodoxy, helped provide a spiritual
appeal to the Ustaše movement. According to Pavelić and his minions, Croatians had
been warriors and martyrs for Christianity and needed to continue the good fight for
their independence, which would only strengthen them as the ‘‘bulwark of
Christianity.’’ This fervor enabled Pavelić to successfully demonize Serbs. He did not
despise Serbs simply because they were a different ethnic group, one that had
exercised power over all of Yugoslavia for the past decade, but also because they
embraced Orthodoxy, a foreign faith that, the Ustaše believed, was encouraged by the
Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian government. Thus Orthodoxy was viewed as a tool for
smashing Croatian national identity. Likewise, communists, who were on the march in
the 1920s and 1930s, were mortal foes of Catholicism and had to be stopped.7 To the
Ustaše, Croatians faced both political and religious enemies who were determined to
destroy Croatian culture, its traditions, its language, its political life, and its religion.
In other words, Ustaše ideology encouraged something akin to a holy war.
Perhaps the best description of Ustaše sentiment came during World War II from a
Lieutenant Miloš, an Ustaše guard. Speaking to Vladko Maček, the leader of the
Croatian Peasant Party and his prisoner, about the terrible murders of Serbs, Miloš
justified his and the Ustaše’s actions by saying, ‘‘I am perfectly aware of what is in
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store for me. For my past, present and future deeds I shall burn in hell, but at least
I shall burn for Croatia.’’8 Such extreme nationalistic zealotry was the foundation for a
loyal core of Ustaše.
After King Aleksandar’s coup in January 1929, Pavelić, fearing arrest, fled
Yugoslavia and proceeded to organize the Ustaše. His recruiting efforts, coupled with
his publicly admitted goal of overthrowing the Yugoslav state, forced Belgrade to
convict him of treason and hang the death penalty over his head. Not in the least
deterred, Pavelić stepped up his recruiting efforts. Hoping to create absolute loyalty
and esprit de corps, he required all members to swear allegiance to himself and to the
independence of Croatia in an elaborate ceremony that included a knife, a revolver,
and a crucifix. The Ustaše’s motto, Za Dom Spremni (‘‘Ready for the Fatherland’’), was
meant to rally his followers into fighting for an independent Croatia. Pavelić’s
recruiting efforts, however, achieved only modest results, since most Croatians were
repelled by his radical demands and his willingness to use violence. The majority of
Croatians followed Maček of the Croation Peasant Party, who, although lacking in
glamor, was seen as the only realistic option for gaining Croatian autonomy. Unable to
recruit many followers, the Ustaše remained a fringe operation with little support
within Yugoslavia. It survived by attracting thugs, the highly impressionable, and the
unemployed. By 1934, Pavelić had amassed an army of perhaps 500 to 600, mostly
disenchanted ne’er-do-wells. Though his numbers were small, Pavelić had established
an organization of men willing to sacrifice their lives for the Ustaše cause.
The Ustaše scored a significant success in 1934, when Pavelić planned the
successful assassination of King Aleksandar I of Yugoslavia in Marseilles. This
audacious crime attracted worldwide attention, but it did not lead to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, as Pavelić had hoped. Having received his second death sentence,
this time from a French court, Pavelić spent the remainder of the 1930s in Benito
Mussolini’s Italy. Often Pavelić’s protector, Il Duce believed that Pavelić was a
destabilizing force for Yugoslavia, who could be useful to Italian interests if Yugoslavia
were divided into its constituent parts. Mussolini hoped that Italy would one day gain
the Dalmatian coast that had been promised to it in the 1915 Treaty of London.9
Internally, tensions between Serbs and Croats continued to spell trouble for
Yugoslavia. Prince Paul and Vladko Maček signed the the sporazum (agreement) of
20 August 1939, hoping that it would quell unrest between Serbs and Croats and thus
strengthen Yugoslavia. This agreement provided for an autonomous Croatia within
Yugoslavia. Under the sporazum, Zagreb controlled its internal affairs through a sabor
(assembly) and a ban (governor), while Belgrade remained paramount in foreign
policy, defense, and the like. The sporazum, however, did little to solve the ethnic
problems. Muslims and Serbs who now found themselves under a Croatian
government feared for their rights, believing that Belgrade had abandoned them.
Likewise, Pavelić and the Ustaše opposed the sporazum, calling it another attempt by
Serbs to dominate Croatians. They argued that the accord did not go far enough, since
it excluded Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatian control and allowed for too much
authority from Belgrade. Pavelić insisted that no agreement was possible and that the
only solution was independence. His views were little more than sour grapes, because
the agreement was certainly a step in the direction desired by the majority of
Croatians. Although the sporazum was a noble attempt to unify Yugoslavia, it was too
little too late. The result was a more deeply divided Yugoslavia.
With war clouds descending over Europe, the sporazum never had an opportunity
to gain momentum. As the Third Reich extended its dominance over the continent,
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German ambitions began to dictate policy in Eastern Europe. It was only a matter of
time before Yugoslavia would have to choose whether or not to throw in its lot with the
Nazis. After Bulgaria joined the German camp on 1 March 1941, it was apparent that
Yugoslavia was going to sign the Tripartite Pact, regardless of political pressure from
Western nations. Prince Paul, Yugoslavia’s regent, believed that his signature, with a
bit of luck, would preserve some degree of independence and avoid bloodshed. Yugoslav
officials negotiated clauses that stipulated only political affiliation and did not
mandate military ties, a point that had no validity in Berlin. As Germany gained
influence in Bulgaria and pressure over the Italian debacle in Greece mounted, placing
Yugoslavia in an untenable position, Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković and Prince
Paul joined the fascists by signing the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941 in Vienna.
As this crisis was brewing in 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt, in conflict with
the State Department’s wishes, began to show an interest in Yugoslavia. Before
Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact, Roosevelt sent William ‘‘Wild Bill’’ Donovan on
a fact-finding mission into the Balkans, on the outside chance that Donovan could help
create a Balkan front against German aggression.10 Although such a policy was far
from feasible, Roosevelt realized that Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general were an
important factor in the drive to stymie German expansion. The president went so far
as to promise Yugoslavia access to Lend-Lease if it remained independent of
Germany’s clutches. This was not a significant carrot for Yugoslavia, however, with
the United States thousands of miles away and Germany on their doorstep. When Paul
signed the Tripartite Pact, Roosevelt immediately showed his displeasure by ordering
that all Yugoslav assets in the United States be frozen. The regent had done what he
believed was right for Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslav government, however, had signed its own death warrant, as
Yugoslavs erupted in protest against the Tripartite Pact. Cvetković’s government
lasted for only two more tumultuous days, both full of demonstrations against
Germany and demands for the government’s resignation. The Yugoslav military,
which leaned toward the Western Allies, could not stomach joining the Tripartite Pact,
believing it spelled the end of Yugoslavia and placed them squarely in the camp of their
long-term enemies. With the British urging a coup d’e´tat, the military overthrew the
government and established a new regime, under General Dušan Simović, in the name
of eighteen-year-old King Peter II. In a lightning stroke, fascism was rejected, the
regency had ended, and young Peter was king.
The US State Department was jubilant over this turn of events and ordered its
minister to Yugoslavia, Arthur Bliss Lane, with great haste, to express America’s
approval of the coup. Lane was directed to proclaim that ‘‘this event constitutes a
matter for self-congratulation for every liberty-loving man and woman.’’11 Washington
wanted the new government to know that,
in accordance with the provisions of the Lend-Lease Bill, the President, in the interest
of the national defense of the United States, is enabled to provide assistance to
Yugoslavia, like all other nations which are seeking to maintain their independence and
integrity and to repel aggression.12

Obviously Roosevelt wished to continue the policy of promising military equipment to
Yugoslavia in return for a continued stand against Germany.
By all accounts, Hitler was furious at the coup and demanded that Yugoslavia be
crushed. The Führer was certain that Yugoslavia would easily collapse under German
military might, judging that the Croatians would side with Berlin against Belgrade.
Hitler was correct in his estimation. As Ulrich von Hassell, former German
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ambassador to Rome, commented during his visit to Zagreb in March 1941, ‘‘Freundt
(German Consul in Agram) and all Croats with whom I spoke emphasized the great
differences between Croatia and Serbia. In Croatia there is no opposition whatever to
Germany (with a few exceptions); on the contrary, a desire to co-operate.’’13
On 6 April 1941, German forces invaded Yugoslavia; in a matter of days,
Yugoslavia was defeated. With the approval of Berlin, Mussolini quickly moved to
install Ante Pavelić as the poglavnik of the alleged Independent State of Croatia.14
Pavelić, with a small number of devoted Ustaše, entered the new satellite state on
13 April.

Genocide
Upon gaining power, Pavelić wasted no time in attacking Serbs, Jews, Roma, and
Croatians who opposed the NDH. His initial step was to protect the NDH by
eliminating all who spoke out against it, while placing all non-Croatians on the fringes
of society by revoking their citizenship. Similar to Jews in the Third Reich, Orthodox
citizens were required to wear blue armbands bearing the letter P, for Pravoslavac
(Orthodox). Meanwhile, the Cyrillic alphabet was prohibited on 25 April 1941, an act
designed to destroy Serbian identity and transform those Serbs deemed most pliable
into Croatians. All schools operated by the Orthodox Church were closed. Serbs were
banned from Croatian businesses and denied access to public events such as films and
concerts. Over time, Serbian private property was confiscated, much of it going directly
to the NDH leadership.15
The Ustaše’s position on citizenship, made clear in the Law Concerning
Nationality, provided the legal foundation for ending the non-Croatian presence in
the NDH. Decreed by Pavelić on 30 April 1941, this law stated that
a citizen is a national of Aryan origin who has proven by his conduct that he did not
engage in activities against the liberation efforts of the Croatian people and who is
ready and willing to serve faithfully the Croatian nation and the Independent State of
Croatia.16

This sweeping edict effectively reduced all Serbs, Jews, and Roma, as well as any
Croatians who had opposed independence or the NDH, to the status of aliens residing
within Croatia. The law fit perfectly with the Ustaše’s position that Croatia should be
ruled and inhabited only by ‘‘pure’’ Croatians, those who supported the NDH.
What gave added strength to the above-mentioned edicts was the broad Law on the
Protection of the People and the State, issued by Pavelić on 17 April, which decreed
that
whoever in any way does or has done harm to the honor and vital interests of the
Croatian nation or who endangers in any way the existence of the Independent State of
Croatia or its government authorities, shall be considered guilty of high treason, even if
his act was but a mere attempt.17

Acts of treason were punishable by death. In essence, the law gave the NDH carte
blanche to arrest and execute anyone who opposed the state in any way. Since it was
retroactive, it could even be used against those who opposed the Ustaše before they
came to power. Execution was meted out summarily to those who were found guilty of
violating the law by hastily organized ‘‘People’s Courts.’’18
Beginning in the spring and summer of 1941 and continuing until the end of the
war, Pavelić and his henchmen unleashed a reign of terror rarely paralleled in history.
A veritable murderous frenzy possessed the Ustaše, whose goal, according to an
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infamous statement by Mile Budak, minister of education and doglavnik (second to
Pavelić), was to ‘‘convert a third, expel a third and kill a third’’ of the Serbs.19 Budak, a
well-known novelist and journalist and an outspoken Ustaše supporter, publicly
outlined this policy in Gospić on 22 June. According to Budak’s plan, Serbian culture
would be eliminated from Croatia either by extermination, exile, or assimilation.
And so began a killing spree designed to purify the new Croatia. The Ustaše’s
viciousness shocked even Nazi observers. Describing the horror, the late Irish
historian Jonathan Steinberg wrote,
Serbian and Jewish men, women and children were literally hacked to death. Whole
villages were razed to the ground and the people driven into barns to which the Ustasi
set fire. There is in the Italian Foreign Ministry archive a collection of photographs of
the butcher knives, hooks and axes used to chop up Serbian victims. There are
photographs of Serb women with breasts hacked off by pocket knives, men with eyes
gouged out, emasculated and mutilated.20

Serb men, women, and children were pushed from cliffs, plunging to their deaths.
Whole villages of Serbs were annihilated. Unlike Germany’s systematic executions,
often conducted in a clinical and sterile fashion, the Ustaše reveled in their bloodlust,
employing various acts of torture such as skinning and burning victims alive. Sexual
mutilation was far from unknown and was embraced by the especially wicked. Some
Serbs were hacked to pieces, with their noses, ears, and tongues cut off. These
techniques were often meted out to Orthodox priests, the Ustaše’s most hated enemy.
There was little effort to bury the dead, unless victims had previously dug their own
graves at gunpoint. Often, Ustaše victims were left to rot in the open; sometimes they
were tossed into the Sava River. Such unspeakable acts were commonplace.21
In Glina, for example, about 600 Serb men, women, and children were shot,
stabbed, and beaten to death in their Orthodox church, which was subsequently
burned. The murders continued unabated throughout the summer of 1941. Konstantin
Fotić, Yugoslavia’s minister to Washington, wrote that
Thousands of corpses were dumped into the Sava River, which flows into the Danube at
Belgrade, with the inscription ‘‘Visa for Serbia’’ on tags around their necks. The
river . . . became so contaminated by these corpses that access to its beaches was
prohibited by the German occupiers during the whole summer of 1941.22

In June 1941, the NDH began deporting selected Serbs from Croatia. They created
the Državno Ravnateljstvo (State Directorate for Renewal), which established camps
designed to assemble Serbs for resettlement. It did not take long before these camps,
rife with disease as a result of poor sanitation and notorious for brutal treatment,
became, in effect, death camps. To the casual observer, they did not look much like
camps; instead, they resembled cattle pens. There were few barracks, and those that
existed offered little sanctuary from the elements. Serbs were tossed into barbed-wire
enclosures and forced to live in deplorable conditions. The NDH had no desire to
resettle anyone; their ambition was to kill. The Serbs who did not die from exposure or
malnutrition were executed by other means, such as axe blows and shooting. The openair camps merely aided the execution process.
The most infamous of all the camps was Jasenovac, where thousands of men,
women, and children were butchered with bullets, axes, hammers, and any other
instrument available.23 Built in a low-lying flood plain, Jasenovac was established in
August 1941 and quickly grew into the third-largest concentration camp in Europe.
In fact it was a series of five camps, located along the Sava River south of Zagreb.
Jasenovac was the Croatian Auschwitz: torture and execution were daily occurrences
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for Jews and Serbs alike, and guards needed only the flimsiest of excuses to shoot
prisoners. The chief execution site was at Gradina, where thousands were killed by
Ustaše guards. Like German-operated camps, Jasenovac discriminated on arrival
between useful prisoners and those deemed suitable only for execution. Those without
needed skills were summarily killed shortly after arriving in the camp, while those
who were allowed to live endured a slow death from strenuous labor, malnutrition,
physical abuse, and unsanitary living conditions. Anyone hardy and skillful enough to
survive longer than three months was summarily executed, in accordance with camp
rules.24
Although Ustaše ideology directed the greatest attention toward the Serbs, Pavelić
wasted little time in unleashing brutal attacks on Jews, chiefly because he recognized
that he had to satisfy Hitler and the Nazis in order to remain in power. Like the Serbs,
the Jews were rounded up by the NDH beginning in the summer of 1941. Following
Hitler’s lead, the NDH stripped Jews of their citizenship and property, forced them to
wear a yellow star armband, forbade them to marry gentiles, and removed them from
all government positions. Before the end of 1941, most were well on their way to
extermination. The Jewish community in Sarajevo, which totaled about 10,000, was an
early and easy target. By the end of 1942, Sarajevo’s Jews and most other Jews either
were confined to concentration camps or had been executed. Most of Zagreb’s
approximately 10,000 Jews avoided the death camps until 1944.25 The Ustaše enjoyed
great success in abolishing the Jewish presence in Croatia by killing all but a few
thousand Jews, confiscating all their private property, and destroying almost all the
synagogues in the country. Hitler and his henchmen were more than satisfied with
their understudy’s treatment of Croatian Jews.
Since Raphael Lemkin coined the term ‘‘genocide,’’ controversy has swirled about
applying the term to particular atrocities.26 Soon after World War II ended, the
Yugoslav government, recognizing that ethnic hatreds emerging from the war had the
capacity to destabilize the new Communist regime, tried to paper over wartime
atrocities, hoping to establish a Yugoslav identity. Although the goal was to mask
specific ethnic losses by extolling the dead, collectively, as victims of fascism, it did not
take long for nationalism-driven figures to re-emerge, seeking to address wartime
atrocities. Those killed by the NDH became a political football used by Serbian
nationalists to attack all Croatians as enemies of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Serb victims
of the Ustaše became symbols of Serb suffering and martyrdom that complemented the
theme of romanticized suffering, an important component of Serbian history. In this
way, Serbian history could be interpreted through the mythology created around such
events as the defeat at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the heroic retreat through
Albania during World War I. Even today, the Kosovo question resonates in a similar
fashion. As Croatian national identity reemerged in the 1960s, Croatian nationalists
sought to minimize the events in the NDH, explaining Serbian accusations of genocide
as out of context and exaggerated.27 Croatians wanted to turn attention toward the
Bleiberg Massacre, when British troops returned Croatians to Yugoslavia to be
slaughtered by Tito’s Partisans. Through a denial of the extent of Ustaše crimes,
Croatian history could be safely rescued from the blemish of genocide and refocused on
the new paradigm of a long, noble history of fighting for independence. Even Ante
Pavelić could be rehabilitated as a hero of Croatian independence.28 During the
warfare of the 1990s, focus on the NDH’s atrocities reached its apex, and the atrocities
of World War II were used extensively by both sides to justify all kinds of horrific
acts.29 This heated debate between Croatian and Serbian camps has made it difficult
82

The US Response to Genocide in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941–1945

for historians to develop a sober understanding of the NDH atrocities perpetrated
during World War II.
If one examines the standard for genocide outlined by the 1948 UN Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG), Ustaše murders
meet the criteria.30 But this standard has received much criticism for being too narrow
and much too obtuse. Over the last several years, numerous scholars have devoted
themselves to studying the problematic nature of the UNCG, while sometimes
providing or calling for a definition of genocide.31 Crafting such a definition has been
difficult, often politically charged. By most of these definitions, especially those
established by Ben Kiernan, Helen Fein, and Robert Melson, the Ustaše were guilty of
genocide.32 Ante Pavelić targeted Serbs as a specific ethnic group; NDH policies
initiated the campaign to destroy the Serbian presence in Croatia, including its
historical legacy.
There is precedent for calling NDH atrocities ‘‘genocide.’’ Edmond Paris, in 1961,
was the first author to term the Ustaše slaughters ‘‘genocide’’; Paris’s version of
events, though emotionally driven and lacking in context and perspective, brought
attention to atrocities in the NDH.33 Since that time, several historians, devoid
of nationalist sentiments and emotional judgments, have applied the term to the
events in the NDH. In 1968, John A. Armstrong wrote that ‘‘genocide, in the most
literal sense of the term, was the Ustasa ‘final’ solution.’’34 In Accounting for Genocide,
Helen Fein agrees with other historians that the atrocities in the NDH were
genocide.35 Leo Kuper has echoed these sentiments; Kuper calls Ustaše actions
‘‘genocide,’’ explaining that they ‘‘arose out of a long history of conflict between Croats
and Serbs, fuelled later in the newly constituted state of Yugoslavia by Croatian
resentment of Serbian hegemony and repression.’’36 Other notable scholars such as
Bette Denich, Robert Hayden, and Michael Sells have used the term ‘‘genocide’’ to
describe the NDH’s behavior.37 More recently, in The Catholic Church and the
Holocaust, Michael Phayer terms Ustaše actions in the NDH ‘‘genocide’’ in his
discussion of the Vatican’s culpability in Ustaše atrocities perpetrated against Serbs,
Jews, and Roma.38 It appears clear that Ustaše actions in the Independent State of
Croatia did constitute genocide.

The United States Loses a Listening Post
The rapid and successful German invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 forced Lane
and the American delegation in Belgrade to vacate the country, leaving the Zagreb
consulate as America’s only representation in Croatia and, for that matter, in
Yugoslavia. But Consul John J. Meily’s outpost was not destined to last for long.
The Ustaše had no interest in offending their fascist masters by keeping a potential
security risk open and running. Croatian authorities were suspicious of the close ties
that had existed between the British and American consulates prior to the German
invasion and seized this opportunity to prove their mettle. In June 1941, Meily was
summoned to the Croatian Foreign Ministry and ordered to close the consulate.
The State Department offered no resistance, because Washington did not wish to
operate a consulate in a county it did not recognize and was planning to close it
voluntarily. Maintaining the consulate could be construed as tacit recognition of the
Croatian state, something Washington wished to avoid. In late August and early
September, Croatian authorities, with the help of the Italian press, accused Meily, a
diplomat sympathetic to Croatian interests, of spying on behalf of the British. Their
evidence, based on a few seized American documents, did little more than prove that
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Meily had worked closely with the British, which was certainly no surprise in the days
of Lend-Lease. Croatian accusations of espionage were far from valid. This weak
attempt to embarrass Washington and ingratiate the NDH with the rest of the Axis
never bore fruit.39
With no diplomatic ties to Croatia, the United States gained information about the
Pavelić regime from various other locations. Ankara and Istanbul became natural
centers for information through Turkey’s juxtaposition to the Balkans, physically and
historically, and its neutrality. The country was teaming with ex-patriates, including a
large number of businessmen, and served as a clearinghouse for news and rumor.
Neutral Switzerland was another place where information on Croatia arrived,
especially on Allan Dulles’s desk. Another source used later in the war was operatives
of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). All these outlets proved to be remarkably
reliable and detailed in their news gathering and analysis on Pavelić’s Croatia. Though
rarely closely involved in Croatian affairs, Washington had channels for regular and
often trustworthy information.

Washington Learns of the Massacres
Even with Yugoslavia ripped apart by the Nazi juggernaught, it did not take long for
Washington to learn about the atrocities being committed in Pavelić’s new state. One
of Lane’s last telegrams from Belgrade reported that ‘‘Serbs and Jews in Zagreb have
been ordered to leave portion of city north of Illice Street. All Serbs expelled from
government position in Croatia.’’40 This message, sent via Budapest, was an indication
that Pavelić was following a pattern established by his fascist friends in Germany.
In June 1941, a Standard Oil Company employee who had recently left Zagreb offered
more evidence of persecutions conducted by the Pavelić regime when he reported to the
American delegation in Geneva that ‘‘a reign of terror’’ had descended on Serbs and
Jews.41 Although he did not mention deaths or executions, he explained that theft and
looting were widespread. It was becoming obvious that a very dangerous situation was
developing in Croatia.
On 14 August 1941, a letter, accompanied by sixteen pictures, reached the State
Department from former Belgrade consul Karl L. Rankin with detailed information
about mass executions. Though the number of victims was in dispute and was
considered to be a bit ‘‘fantastic,’’ it was clear ‘‘that many thousands of Serbian civilians
[had] lost their lives’’ at the hands of the Ustaše.42 The information presented to the
State Department came from an unnamed Serbian government official and was
therefore potentially easy to refute as exaggeration and propaganda. The anonymous
Serbian official wrote that ‘‘we [Serbians] are confronted with a comprehensive policy
aiming at the extermination of the Serbian race in the regions in question, which would
be preceded by the destruction of the Serbs from an economic standpoint.’’43 The author
details a series of incidents in which the Ustaše executed Serbs, starting with the first
attacks at the end of April in and around Bjelovar. These initial slaughters of Serbs set
the tone for the next several months, during which the Ustaše terrorized the Serbian
and Jewish populations. Some victims were slaughtered not by gunshot but in an almost
animal-like fashion, with hammers and knives, their bodies hacked into pieces. Death
by bullet may have been a welcome relief. The author reports that others were killed by
hand grenades. Special attention, the writer notes, was given to the persecution and
execution of Orthodox priests and former Yugoslav politicians. This highly detailed
document includes the names of individuals executed by the Ustaše. The author even
mentions the establishment of a concentration camp in Koprivnica.44 Rankin thought
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that the information was of great value and suggested that ‘‘more publicity regarding
atrocities which the Germans are permitting, and which are possible only because of the
German conquest and dismemberment of Yugoslavia, would be helpful to the Serbian
and Allied cause.’’45 Rankin’s advice was not accepted by the State Department.
Rankin’s report came on the heels of a missive from King Peter, then in exile, to
Roosevelt that also addressed the horrors taking place in Croatia. Obviously moved by
news of the massacres, Roosevelt asked his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, whether
Peter’s letter should be made public. Unfortunately, Hull recommended that it be kept
private and that the White House inform the young king that the president had given
the letter his full attention.46 This silence did nothing to draw notice to the tragedy
taking place in Croatia. If anything, by not making a strong, official statement, the US
government enabled zealots for Croatian independence within the United States to
insist that the executions and massacres were nothing but Serbian and Jewish
propaganda. Likewise, the lack of an official statement only fanned the flames of
hatred among Serbian Americans. Without a doubt, domestic peace between Croatian
and Serbian Americans played a major role in the government’s decision, but the
atrocities were so outrageous that it boggles the imagination that any country could or
would keep news of them silent.
Even with the above information in hand, Hull and the State Department refused
to appreciate the scope of what was happening. Only once did the State Department
inquire about the NDH’s policy toward Serbs. On 29 September 1941, Hull asked the
American embassy in Rome to investigate reports of ‘‘mass deportations of Serbs from
Croatia.’’47 There is no record of a response from Rome, but Hull’s lone question, in
spite of the letters and reports already received by the State Department and those
that would pour into Washington later, signified a sense of disinterest as well as
skepticism in Washington. In Hull’s and the State Department’s defense, they were
dealing with numerous reports of mass killings and what would later come to be called
genocide; it was difficult to separate the incidents in Croatia from those taking place in
other corners of the globe. Hull’s lack of curiosity, however, deserves particular
emphasis, especially because information about the slaughter of Serbs and Jews by the
Ustaše streamed into the State Department throughout the war. Beginning in 1942,
regular status reports on Croatia were sent to the State Department by Samuel
Honaker, the American consul general in Istanbul, and similar officials. These detailed
and remarkably accurate documents, supplemented with information from Bern, all
paint the same picture: Pavelić and the Ustaše had slaughtered thousands of Serbs
and Jews, terrorized the countryside, and, in the process, tried to erase any Serbian
heritage from Croatia by destroying Orthodox churches and forcing conversions to
Catholicism.
Although it was difficult to ignore this consistent drumbeat of information, nonintervention in foreign affairs had been a theme in the State Department during the
1920s and 1930s. Even in Latin America, an arena where the United States had made
numerous intrusions prior to World War I, Washington chose to avoid direct
intervention in the interwar years. Underpinning non-intervention was the ‘‘fear
that insidious alien influences were endangering America’s unique institutions.’’48 The
ideology of nativism, most clearly enunciated in the National Origins Act of 1924,
continued to influence American domestic and foreign policy. Roosevelt was another
factor: he was suspicious of the State Department and never granted officials,
including the secretary of state, much latitude in expanding the role of American
foreign policy.49 Although often chafing under Roosevelt’s leadership style, most
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officials in the State Department had a narrow view of the country’s role in
international affairs and were not eager to change it, especially when dealing with
Croatia. Yugoslavia was a distant place, believed by most in the State Department to
be primarily an area of British interest, far removed from American consciousness.50
Only later in World War II, after the most vicious period of atrocities had passed, did
the United States begin to play as large a role in Yugoslavia as the British did. The
State Department’s inaction can be explained also by its concern over keeping the
peace between Serbian and Croatian Americans, as well as by an undercurrent of antiSemitism.51
In part, the blame for America’s slow and restrained response rests not with the
State Department but on the shoulders of the Yugoslav government-in-exile. Wracked
by dissension between Croat and Serb members, it failed to spread the word of
Pavelić’s murderous spree. Too often Serb and Croat politicians only emphasized their
ethnicity and jockeyed for position to gain the best deal possible for their particular
nationality at the war’s conclusion. Again the Ustaše’s atrocities became a political
football. Many Croatians in the government were unwilling to proclaim the truth
about Pavelić’s murderous regime, mainly because their desire for an independent
Croatia led them to ignore the slaughter. Croatians in the exiled Yugoslavian
government believed that recognizing the NDH’s crimes would place Croatian
interests in an unfavorable light at war’s end. Demanding that the horrors be
proclaimed from the highest mountain, Serbs, such as Konstantin Fotić, often
incorrectly castigated all Croatians as murderers. Serb nationalists hoped that
information about Ustaše atrocities would help justify some of the abusive policies
favored by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian government prior to the war. Since
Yugoslavism was a rare bird, most attempts to draft statements damning the NDH’s
actions were sabotaged.52
Regardless of the exiled government’s problems, by early 1942 there were too many
reports detailing the atrocities for there to be any doubt that genocide was taking
place. Accounts from various sources—all repeating the same major themes, some with
more detail than others—were hard to ignore. For example, an account from a ‘‘neutral
businessman’’ who left Croatia in September 1941 states that the Ustaše had run
roughshod over the country, terrorizing and murdering Serbs. This businessman, a
resident of Croatia, noted that some sources claimed that 250,000 Serbs had been
slaughtered, a figure exaggerated at this point in the war. ‘‘These mass killings took
place mostly in the country, where Ustasi armed bands went from village to village and
deliberately tried to exterminate every Serb.’’53 In major cities, Serbs had ‘‘almost
disappeared,’’ having been forced into concentration camps, ghettoized, or deported.
The same treatment had been dispensed to the NDH’s Jews: ‘‘They have been
murdered and beaten, sent to concentration camps, herded into railway trucks by the
hundred and allowed to die en route from starvation and exposure.’’54
Even with a wealth of information at hand, Roosevelt’s attention was far from the
activities in the NDH. When young King Peter visited the United States in the summer
of 1942, he delivered to Roosevelt another account of some of the atrocities committed on
Pavelić’s watch. According to Fotić, the Yugoslav government-in-exile’s representative
in the United States, the president was ‘‘shocked at the details of Ustashi massacres.’’55
Croatian activities, however, were so far from Roosevelt’s mind that Fotić, a Serbian
nationalist, had to remind him that the NDH was at war with the United States. At that
moment, ‘‘the President raised his hands in surprise and said that he had almost
forgotten about that.’’56 Speaking more directly about war crimes, Roosevelt told Peter
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that he would make sure the Ustaše realized that they would have to pay for their crimes
at the end of the war, something that, in fact, would happen only in rare cases. More
pointedly, Roosevelt explained that ‘‘he would try especially to impress ‘this man
Pavelićh.’ ’’57 Roosevelt’s comment screamed ignorance of Pavelić’s personality and his
movement. The president’s inattention is somewhat understandable, but his glaring
ignorance of the situation in Croatia is surprising. Fotić responded to Roosevelt by
noting that the United States could say little that would affect Pavelić.
In light of Roosevelt’s remarks, it is not surprising that the president never urged
Pope Pius XII to put pressure on Pavelić to end the Ustaše’s genocide. It is obvious that
other wartime matters occupied the president and took precedence over events in
Croatia. Myron Taylor, however, had a good relationship with the pontiff and could have
raised the issue of Croatian atrocities with him. As US representative to the Vatican,
Taylor, in 1942, asked the papacy to speak out about Axis atrocities. As he did
throughout the war, Pius XII only made indirect comments about the genocidal acts
being committed by the Nazis and their satellite states.58 Since the Vatican enjoyed a
close relationship with the NDH, and Pius XII had held two audiences with Pavelić by
the end of 1942, there was at least a possibility that American pressure on the Vatican
might have elicited a few words of restraint in Zagreb. Unfortunately, this opportunity
was missed.
One member of the government was deeply concerned with the NDH’s atrocities.
Roosevelt’s minister to the Yugoslav government-in-exile, A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., was
fed a diet of reports from the royalist Ćetnik leader Draža Mihailović, who was waging a
halting guerilla campaign against the Nazis. These reports were of varying accuracy
and quality, because the exiled government and Mihailović wanted Washington to
believe that they were the only legitimate force waging war against the Germans.
Biddle, one of Roosevelt’s close friends, was told by the government-in-exile that the
NDH had killed about 600,000 Serbian men, women, and children as of September
1942—an exaggerated figure, designed to attract American attention, but not
completely out of the ballpark. Another 300,000 had reportedly been forced out of
their homes. Regardless of the numerical accuracy of these reports, exterminations were
indeed taking a crushing toll, especially in ethnically diverse Bosnia.59
With so much evidence, including the publication of Martyrdom of the Serbs by the
Orthodox Church of the United States and Canada, a book that vividly detailed the
Ustaše’s crimes, there was no way for the American government to question the scope of
the atrocities being committed in the NDH.60 An Office of War Information (OWI)
document from August 1943 underscores Washington’s concern about relations between
Serbian and Croatian Americans, explaining that Martyrdom of the Serbs had the
capacity to generate greater disturbances between these two ethnic groups by
tarnishing all Croatians as supporters of Ante Pavelić and the Ustaše. Interestingly,
the OWI did not question the validity of the publication, noting that ‘‘so far as is known
many of these charges are true’’ and declaring that ‘‘the Ustashi . . . set out to
exterminate the Serbs of Croatia.’’61 The evidence of wholesale slaughter, carried out
in the most despicable fashion, was abundant. Pictures of decapitations, bludgeonings,
and mutilations, followed by detailed reports of the extinction of villages, were not a
closely kept secret. Despite the wealth of information documenting genocidal events, the
US government made few comments. The White House and the State Department were
concerned about domestic unrest between Serbian and Croatian Americans as a byproduct of Pavelić’s actions in Croatia and decided on a strategy of silence as the best
course. In this way, Roosevelt could avoid offending either nationality while charging
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the OWI, the government body responsible for monitoring America’s various
nationalities, with keeping both Croatian and Serbian Americans united in their
opposition to Nazi Germany.62

The Public Learns of Genocide
The American public, outside of Serbian- and Croatian-American circles, did not learn of
the Croatian atrocities until 11 October 1941, when a short item appeared on page 3 of
the New York Times stating that the Ustaše had murdered 300,000 to 340,000 Serbs and
pro-Yugoslav Croatians. Citing intelligence reports from agents in Croatia and Bosnia,
the anonymous reporter explained that ‘‘nearly 5,000 Serbs were slaughtered by
Croatian Ustashi in a concentration camp outside Yatovo [probably Jadovno]’’;63 the
article describes specific atrocities, some with inflated numbers. This report of
thousands of deaths failed to register with the American public, however; there was
little to no reaction. For most Americans, content with isolationism, Yugoslavia was a
faraway speck on the map with little relevance to American interests. This genocide
seemed distant to Americans, who were trying to enjoy their long Indian summer
outside of the war.
The American responsibility to address this genocide increased dramatically after
Germany declared war on the United States. Hitler’s foolish declaration of war on
11 December 1941 mandated that Pavelić follow suit. The poglavnik, always loyal to his
fascist controllers, declared war on the United States and its Allies on 15 December. This
action had the potential to cause ethnic unrest in several American cities, for the United
States was home to the largest Croatian population in the world outside of Croatia.
Likewise, the declaration made it difficult for Pavelić to draw much financial,
diplomatic, or moral support from Croatian Americans, who now had to choose sides
in the conflict. Pavelić’s significant recruiting and media efforts in the United States
during the 1930s would never pay the immense dividends he and his supporters desired.
The cause of Croatian independence had lost most of the sympathy traditionally allotted
by Americans to nationalities seeking independence; instead, Croatia was viewed as
part of Hitler’s Europe, having sold its soul for a chance at a patina of independence
within the fascist world.
With much bigger concerns in the Pacific Theater, the United States paid little
attention to Pavelić’s declaration; it received, for example, no more than one paragraph
in the New York Times. What damage could Croatia do to American interests? Would
American forces face Croatian troops in battle? Pavelić’s announcement was recognized,
rightly, as the action of a pawn.
In early 1942, evidence of Croatian atrocities continued to mount with the
publication of a report, issued by the archbishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church,
stating that more than 180,000 people had been killed by the Ustaše prior to early
August.64 This document, featuring many grisly details, was forwarded to the US
government, where it was received as authoritative. Nevertheless, government
officials and the media did little more than read the archbishop’s report.
Even at this point, there were no public statements from the White House or the
State Department about the executions and tortures taking place in Croatian
concentration camps or about the vast number of indiscriminate murders. One of
the first confirmable reports of major concentration camps came on 9 March 1942 in a
telegram from Bern. The Wiener Tageblatt had reported that Croatia had spent
120,000,000 kuna to establish ‘‘work camps.’’ Jasenovac was specifically mentioned as
housing 1,050 people, mostly Jews, who were well treated.65 This veneer of legitimacy
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was transparent to anyone in the State Department who followed affairs in the Third
Reich. Unfortunately, the news never reached the American public.
Finally Roosevelt realized that a public declaration was needed to define America’s
position on these and other Axis atrocities. This was especially true because evidence
of odious activities, as well as rumors, many being reported in Serbian and Croatian
newspapers in the United States, was mounting. After receiving a letter from King
Peter II that discussed atrocities being inflicted in Yugoslavia, Roosevelt requested that
some action be taken to ‘‘compel the enemy to discontinue this ruthless slaughter’’ and
asked that the men responsible for these crimes face justice at some later date.
The president decided to make a public declaration pledging that those who had
committed atrocities would be held responsible for their actions. As Biddle said, ‘‘The
President plainly wants to publish something [a response to the atrocities]—including
King Peter’s letter.’’66 Knowing that the State Department would favor making a
minimal statement, if any at all, Biddle sagely added that ‘‘in dealing with atrocities you
do not try to be courteous, or diplomatic, or nice. The subject matter requires that it be
handled with punch.’’67 The State Department was wary of taking unilateral action on
war criminality, preferring to make a statement in cooperation with other Allied states.
Although Peter’s letter of 22 July was the second time the Yugoslav government had
made a request for an American statement on Yugoslav war crimes—the first being on
13 April 1942—the State Department suggested that the White House only produce a
statement in cooperation with the other major Allies.68 The State Department carried
the day. Roosevelt’s reply to King Peter promised to collect evidence of war crimes so
that war criminals could be brought to justice at the end of the conflict. His response,
however, did not go as far as the king had requested and included little more than vague
promises.69
In a public statement, the White House pledged that those who had committed war
crimes would be held responsible for their actions:
The perpetrators of these crimes against civilization can no longer be dealt with merely
as units of the national guilt of the Axis powers. Guilt is personal; and the men, as
individuals, who have thus violated, and who continue to violate the most elementary
rules of civilization, must be held personally accountable. When the time comes—as
come it will—justice must be done, and civilized law must be vindicated.70

These were welcome words; but the statement does not mention Croatia or Yugoslavia
by name. Instead, it was designed as a very general statement on atrocities, carefully
worded so as not to offend any of the Allies or to be a future impediment to united Allied
action against atrocities. Such a statement was a far cry from what King Peter had
hoped for.
The wording of this announcement and others—such as that 7 October 1942, which
declared that war criminals would be tried before courts at the end of the war—did
presage the Moscow Declaration’s Statement on Atrocities, agreed upon by the Big
Three in October 1943. These documents did not mention that quislings and war
criminals from Nazi satellites would be punished, although the Allies resolved to pursue
German war criminals and try them for war crimes at the end of the conflict. The
omission was unfortunate, and certainly it disappointed Serbs and Serbian Americans.

America’s Domestic Concerns
Although a public statement directly damning NDH atrocities was not to be had, the
deaths in Croatia did serve to influence some government action against Pavelić’s
sympathizers in the United States. There was deep concern in many government
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departments and in the White House that Pavelić’s activities in Croatia would foment
unrest between Serbian and Croatian Americans. This was all the more important
because many of these immigrants worked in manufacturing sectors that were critical
to the war effort. Most Croatian and Serbian-Americans were members of the working
class and lived in close proximity to one another in industrial cities such as Pittsburgh,
Youngstown, Akron, Chicago, and Detroit. Serbian-Americans were dismayed,
shocked, and full of rage when news of Ustaše atrocities reached the United States.
The American Srbobran, the largest and oldest Serbian newspaper in the United
States, reported Pavelić’s crimes in great detail beginning on 4 November 1941.
In light of the news from Croatia, the paper moved toward a staunchly Serbian
nationalist position, heavily criticizing Pavelić’s regime and Croatians in general.
American authorities determined that many Serbs had seized on Pavelić’s killing spree
as an excuse to favor a Greater Serbia at the end of the war. This was a rather cynical
way of looking at the changing Serbian position, although it did have a certain level of
truth. The strong condemnation of Pavelić, and of Croatians in general, came as no
surprise, considering the magnitude of the news being reported.71 After reading about
the deaths of family members and friends at the hands of the Ustaše, Serbian fraternal
organizations and newspapers unsurprisingly took a harsh anti-Croatian position,
laced with a strong dose of Serbian nationalism.
Prior to the birth of the NDH, there was little direct animosity between Serbian and
Croatian Americans, except on the part of fringe elements. The Ustaše’s crimes changed
this. It was fortunate for American interests that the Pittsburgh newspaper Nezavisna
Hrvataska Drzˇava (‘‘Independent State of Croatia’’), a Pavelić mouthpiece established
in the 1930s, found it more and more difficult to follow its pro-Pavelić line as news from
Yugoslavia drifted back to the United States. Before World War II, the Post Office, the
State Department, and the Justice Department repeatedly attempted to close the paper,
without success. After Pavelić declared war on the United States, however, the paper,
under the leadership of Luka Grbić since 1938, was forced to close its doors in March
1942.72 Its demise was beneficial to the American war effort, since otherwise this
fervently pro-Pavelić newspaper would have done nothing but fuel ethnic hatred. But
small numbers of Croatian Americans sympathetic to Pavelić continued to spread their
views. In early 1942, the FBI raided Domobran organizations, fraternal groups
established by Ustaše operatives in the 1930s, and effectively drove a number of Pavelić
supporters underground. Although none of the key Domobran members were arrested,
J. Edgar Hoover had made his point; fifth columnists would not exist in the United
States.73
An outspoken advocate of Pavelić throughout the 1930s, Ante Došen, as the highestprofile Pavelić operative in the United States, required special attention and had been
arrested in 1941 by US Immigration officials. Došen had been active for years,
organizing support for Pavelić among Croatian-American communities and raising
money to fund Pavelić and his Ustaše operations in Europe. Seemingly always able to
avoid the government’s clutches, he successfully delayed the prosecution of his case and
obtained letters of support from both US senators representing Pennsylvania.74 Clearly
frustrated by the Došen case, an OSS agent very familiar with Pavelić sympathizers in
the United States remarked that,
Regardless of our constitutional rights, this man should not receive the benefits of said
rights which he has flagrantly violated for years . . . Even if this man is convicted on
illegal entry and a technical charge of perjury, he still would not receive just
punishment.75
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The United States was unable to get any charges to stick to Došen. As late as the
1970s, he was living in New York City.
Interested in identifying and locating Axis supporters or sympathizers, the OWI
and the FBI believed that the Croatian Catholic Union (CCU), headquartered in Gary,
Indiana, had pro-Pavelić members. Articles appearing in its weekly paper, Nasa Nada
(‘‘Our Hope’’), gave the impression that the organization was at least in favor of Croat
separatism and at most pro-Pavelić. As early as 1941, there was evidence that the CCU
was opposed to any criticism of Pavelić, or even of Hitler, on the grounds that Nasa
Nada was not a political newspaper. Francis X. Kolander, the paper’s editor,
condemned Pavelić’s declaration of war against the United States and was
reprimanded by George Rakić, the CCU’s president and one of its founders.
Kolander was warned not to print articles expressing opposition to Pavelić again.76
In May 1942, the FBI recognized that the CCU had ‘‘never issued any statement
condemning the present Quisling government of Dr. Ante Pavilćh in Croatia.’’77 To no
one’s surprise, the FBI became interested in removing the CCU’s board of directors
from their positions, since they deemed them to be dangerous Nazi sympathizers
operating under the aegis of Ante Pavelić.78 In the fall of 1942, Kolander was defeated
for re-election to his post as editor of Nasa Nada, partly because he had ‘‘openly
condemned . . . Pavelić for having declared a state of war against the United States.’’79
Later, Kolander, who had a son fighting in the US Army, produced a letter written by
Nasa Nada’s new editor, Monsignor M.G. Domladovac, that described the sentiments
of some in the CCU:
Whatever PAVELIĆ may be, he at least has freed Croatians from Serbian chain. That
he is not a traitor . . . is seen from the fact that neither Hitler nor Mussolini believe him,
because Pavelić’s children and wife are as hostages in Italy so that Hitler and Mussolini
have a guarantee . . . Therefore: As American citizens we are bound to help our new
fatherland in its war, but no one can force us to condemn anyone in the old fatherland
until we know the TRUE situation in the old country.80

Monsignor Domladovac’s comments are interesting, if a bit delusional. Although the
evidence against Pavelić was becoming mountainous, the editor refused to condemn
him and, incongruously, sought to support both America and Croatia in their war
efforts, even though Croatia was at war with the United States.
Both the OWI and the OSS were aware of the activities of Došen and Domladovac,
but their concerns went beyond these two figures. Reverend Ivan Stipanović of
Youngstown, Ohio, and Ivan Krešić, editor of Hrvatski List i Danica Hrvatska
(‘‘Croatian Gazette and Croatian Morning Star’’), attracted interest because of their
staunch and public support for Pavelić. Stipanović served as president of the newly
formed Supreme Council of American Croats, the heir to the dormant Domobran cells
that Branimir Jelić, a key Pavelić operative, and his followers had worked so hard to
establish.81 The actions and beliefs of Stipanović and Domladovac were symbolic of
how Pavelić’s message had infiltrated Croatian Catholic leadership within the United
States, particularly among Franciscans. Both men were so obsessed with establishing
an independent Croatia that they became blind to the horrors occurring in the NDH.
Hatred of Serbia, combined with intense nationalism and a romantic view of Croatia,
dictated their thoughts and actions.82
As Croatian and Serbian rhetoric escalated, Yugoslavian politicians in the United
States became sources of controversy. Konstantin Fotić was accused of ‘‘whipping up
anti-Croat sentiment.’’83 Others believed that Momcilo Ninčić, the Yugoslav foreign
minister, was ‘‘the chief instigator of this Greater Serbia campaign.’’84 The State
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Department and the FBI believed that such accusations could elevate Serbian and
Croatian rivalry to the point of seriously damaging the American war effort. At the
State Department, Wallace Murray was fearful of what ethnic rivalry—or
‘‘hyphenisms,’’ as ethnic groups were often called—would do to the United States if
a strong American identity was not accepted by new immigrants. ‘‘I hope I am wrong,’’
he wrote,
but I have the uneasy feeling that we are storing up serious trouble for ourselves in the
future by permitting the propagation of bitter controversial questions among foreign
residents and foreign-born American citizens in this country.85

The battles between Serbian and Croatian newspapers reached such a boiling
point that Elmer Davis, in charge of the OWI, held a meeting with editors of some of
the more influential papers to explain that they had to suspend their ‘‘quarreling.’’
Davis, and the State Department in general, believed that the newspapers were
creating ‘‘a danger to the American war effort.’’86 Fortunately, the division between
Serbs and Croats never did damage the American war machine, partly because most
Serbian- and Croatian-Americans favored the reestablishment of a Yugoslavia at the
war’s end or were largely apathetic with respect to events in the old country. These
immigrants had become Americans.
Though small numbers of Croatian Americans pledged allegiance to Pavelić, the
vast majority remained fervently loyal to America’s cause and implacable enemies of
the Axis. As we have seen, Croatian Americans were torn between favoring
Yugoslavism, supporting an independent Croatia sanctioned by the United States
and Western Europe, or settling for Pavelić’s state. The OWI worked tirelessly to
convince Croatian Americans that their first allegiance must be to the United States.
As Davis noted while speaking before the Croatian Conference on 19 September 1942,
‘‘no American citizen can have more than a secondary interest in what government
is workable in the old country. One thing we can be sure of is that (the future
Jugoslavia problem) will be solved there by people rather than by people in this
country.’’87 The OWI’s chief concern was to unite Serbian and Croatian Americans in
the crusade against the Axis. Dissent between the two would only harm the war effort,
as Davis emphatically explained at a meeting of Slavic leaders held in the State
Department on 18 September 1942.88
Croatian organizations in the United States made an appeal to meet on 20–21
February 1943 in Chicago to proclaim just such sentiments. In their call for action,
these prominent mainstream Croatian-American organizations clearly demonstrated
support for the United States and condemned Pavelić. They proclaimed that ‘‘those
who follow Pavelićh are baiting Croatians against the Serb people’’ and maintained
that Pavelić and Serbian strongman Milan Nedić were ‘‘heirlings’’ of Hitler and
Mussolini.89 They went so far as to call Pavelić a bandit. Delegates were careful,
however, to mention the Ustaše’s atrocities only vaguely. This is understandable, but
regrettable, as a clear denunciation of Pavelić’s crimes would probably have won them
a great deal of respect from the American government and the grudging esteem of
Serbian-American groups. This meeting was followed in September 1943 by the Sixth
Convention of the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), the largest Croatian organization
in America, at which Croatian representatives pledged their loyalty to the United
States and their devotion to the war effort while rejecting Pavelić and his movement.90
Although there were varying political positions on both right and left in the CFU, it
was becoming clear that very few Croatian Americans could support Pavelić’s policies,
regardless of whether or not there was an independent Croatia. Only obsessively
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nationalistic and ardently anti-Communist groups such as the CCU were willing to
tolerate Pavelić’s regime.

Roosevelt and Croatia’s Future
The NDH’s atrocities, however, were an important influence on Allied views of a postwar Yugoslavia. Considering the horrific events, could Croats and Serbs live peacefully
in a reunited Yugoslavia, or was separation the only viable answer? Roosevelt hinted
at his opinion of post-war Yugoslavia as early as October 1942, in a meeting with Fotić.
Sympathetic with the Serbs and fond of their young king, Roosevelt informed the
ambassador that Serbian desires were paramount, considering their commitment to
the Allied cause. Roosevelt did not oppose the continuation of Yugoslavia; instead, he
wished for South Slavs to determine their fate without its being dictated to them by
Western powers.91 These opinions were suitably vague, for the early part of the war, to
allow Roosevelt to alter his views as events dictated.
The president’s opinions had shifted somewhat by early 1943. In a meeting with
Anthony Eden and Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt contended that the Croats and Serbs had
virtually nothing in common and that the concept of reuniting them in one state was
‘‘ridiculous.’’ Roosevelt believed that Serbia deserved to emerge as an independent state,
while Croatia would exist under a trusteeship of some sort. All of this had the obscurity
of casual conversation. Influenced to some extent by the Yugoslavian government-inexile, Eden thought that Yugoslavia could exist again with Croat and Serb side by side.92
Post-war Yugoslavian affairs were far from the president’s main concern. In discussions
surrounding the Moscow Declaration, which dealt with holding war criminals
responsible for their crimes at the end of the war, little was said about Yugoslavia’s
ultimate fate. The president merely reiterated his position that ‘‘Croatia may have to be
set up separately from Serbia.’’93 Neither Britain nor the United States believed that
Tito would forge a united Yugoslavia under his star power and the Communist banner.
Interestingly, the regular situation reports on Croatia that littered State
Department files appear to have had only limited effect in altering the views of the
White House. From these documents, it was obvious that Pavelić and the Ustaše had
ravaged the country, annihilated its economy, and destroyed tens of thousands of lives.
The reports made for interesting reading, but they were largely ignored by both the
White House and the State Department.

Conclusion
American information about NDH atrocities was exceptionally and surprisingly
accurate and detailed. A mere two weeks after the horrific assaults on Serbs began, the
US State Department had reliable evidence that atrocities were occurring. Although
the evidence mounted as weeks turned into months, and it became clear that the
Ustaše’s assaults had expanded to include the Jewish population as well, neither the
White House nor the State Department ever uttered a public word specifically
condemning the NDH’s actions. Regardless of appeals by King Peter, silence remained.
American authorities did issue statements condemning atrocities, but only in vague
and almost neutral terms. Likewise, neither the State Department nor President
Roosevelt made any effort to pressure the Vatican to counsel restraint in the NDH.
Although it is far from certain that American pressure would have influenced the
Vatican to act, it is certain that no such attempt was made. In part, the lack of
response was because the State Department considered Croatia—and Yugoslavia,
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for that matter—a British region of influence, distant from American interests. Only in
the months prior to the German invasion had the United States directed attention to
Yugoslavia. The White House and the State Department concerned themselves with
the more significant states in Europe, paying only modest attention to the wide-scale
atrocities being committed in Croatia.
This case study of American response to a lesser-known genocide illustrates the
complex issues that governments face when confronting such atrocities. It is tempting
to offer stern criticism of American inaction on this issue; however, the genocide did
move policy makers to action in the United States. US authorities were quick to realize
that atrocities in the NDH had the capacity to elevate friction between Croatian and
Serbian Americas. This concern was very real to the OWI, the FBI, the White House,
and the State Department, and each of these agencies focused on keeping the
American war effort moving forward while preventing any fifth-column elements from
emerging. A detailed public statement from the White House or the State Department
condemning Pavelić’s actions might have served only to increase ethnic tensions in the
United States, and speaking out on NDH atrocities would have meant making
statements on all ethnicities under assault by fascist regimes. Most likely, such a
‘‘bidding war’’ would only have led to greater ethnic tension in the country. The State
Department was convinced that any statement on wartime atrocities needed to be
made in cooperation with the Allies. It was deemed best to allow the OWI to monitor
Serbian-American and Croatian-American newspapers and organizations, urging
them to moderate their nationalism-laced views. The OWI stressed to both Croatianand Serbian-American communities that their allegiance was to the United States and
not to Croatia or Serbia. Likewise, the FBI was used to squelch the pro-Pavelić forces
that had been active in the country since the early 1930s. In this manner, the genocide
in Croatia had a direct effect on US domestic policy decisions. In the final analysis,
although genocide was perpetrated in Croatia, American authorities remained silent,
choosing instead to make exceedingly pragmatic decisions designed to maintain a
peaceful and productive war effort.
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The Prefiguration of Some Aspects of the
Holocaust in the Armenian Genocide
(Revisiting the Comparative Perspective)
Vahakn N. Dadrian
Zoryan Institute
The field of genocide studies has been marked by a comparative tendency, while at
the same time scholarship on the Holocaust has tended to focus on its singularity;
the Armenian Genocide has often been treated as representing a ‘‘dress rehearsal’’
for the Holocaust. This article examines the parallels and commonalities, as well as
the differences, between the two events, with a view to drawing them into a
comparative perspective. More specifically, four major factors (vulnerability of the
victim group, degradation of victims, war as opportunity, and fear of retaliation on
the part of perpetrators) and three subsidiary factors (methods of extermination,
disregard of economic factors, and terminological deflection) are examined with
respect to both the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide.
Keywords: Holocaust, Armenian Genocide, comparative perspective
From its very inception, genocide studies has been marked by a tendency to be infused
with some elements of comparativeness, while the case of the Holocaust has benefited
from a profusion of works focusing on and detailing elements of singularity. The World
War I Armenian Genocide has served, in this respect, a useful purpose, especially
because of its significant similarities to and certain commonalities with the Holocaust.
This element of a nexus, a connecting link, was not only recognized but harnessed by
Raphael Lemkin for a wide and encompassing project that ushered in the era of
genocide studies. In ‘‘Totally Unofficial Man,’’ Lemkin wrote,
In 1915 . . . I began . . . to read more history to study whether national, religious, or racial
groups as such were being destroyed. The truth came out after the war. In Turkey, more
than 1,200,000 Armenians were put to death . . . After the end of the war, some 150
Turkish war criminals were arrested and interned by the British Government on the
island of Malta . . . Then one day, I read in the newspapers that all Turkish war
criminals were to be released. I was shocked. A nation that killed and the guilty persons
were set free . . . I felt that a law against this type of racial or religious murder must be
adopted by the world.1

The seminal nature of the perspective inherent in this statement is noteworthy.
Lemkin is not only recognizing the reality of centrally organized mass murder but also
discerning the pressing need for legal mechanisms to control such a crime, with the
ultimate objective of preventing it. Unlike many earlier authors, however, Lemkin set
out to pave the way for framing and eventually establishing internationally prevalent
penal codes for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Central to all
this legal and criminological endeavor was the quest for a solution to the ubiquitous
problem of impunity attending that crime.2 The threat of punishment, to the extent
that it could be made credible, was meant to serve the purpose of prevention.
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One of the foremost leaders of Zionism in Germany, Richard Lichtheim, who
represented that movement in the Ottoman capital during World War I, went further
when he focused on the matter of precedence. Lichtheim wrote that the Armenian
experience was ‘‘the first instance of a systematic persecution in modern history,
resembling Hitler’s . . . crusade of destruction against the Jews.’’3 Two other experts
appear to have concurred: Joseph Guttman characterized the Armenian case as
‘‘the beginnings of genocide,’’4 while Jehuda L. Wallach, a military historian from Tel
Aviv, discerned ‘‘a certain parallel between the Jewish and Armenian catastrophes.’’5
These linkages found a legal echo in the declaration of a jurist who played a major
role in the criminal prosecution of Nazi leaders at Nuremberg. Robert Kempner
was chief of division, responsible for preparing the cases of these leaders; he was
also assistant to Justice Robert Jackson, chief counsel for the United States. In a
law-journal article dealing with the Armenian Genocide, Kempner declared that
‘‘for the first time in legal history,’’ the principle of ‘‘human rights violations, especially
genocide,’’ was recognized. He further declared that such recognition was acted
upon ‘‘without committing unauthorized intervention in the internal affairs of another
country.’’6
In the more recent past, several noted experts on the Holocaust have expressed
themselves along identical lines or in similar ways. Richard Rubenstein, for example,
discerns ‘‘an eerie parallel’’ between the two cases.7 Stating that the Armenian
Genocide ‘‘foreshadows the Holocaust,’’ Yehuda Bauer uses the same term, ‘‘parallel.’’8
In a subsequent essay he again cites the Armenian case as offering ‘‘the closest parallel
to the Jewish Holocaust . . . On this continuum of murderous behaviour, the Armenian
massacres would figure nearest to the Holocaust.’’ However, Bauer seems to have felt
the need to interject a caveat: ‘‘The Turks never planned the murder of Armenians
outside Turkey . . . [whereas the Jews became victims of] a plan for the total physical
annihilation of a people, everywhere one finds them.’’9 Sharing Bauer’s view of the
‘‘uniqueness’’ of the Holocaust, Lucy Davidowicz also grants the parallels, as evident in
the Turkish massacres of Armenians, which in their extent and horror most closely
approximated the murder of European Jews . . . The once unthinkable ‘‘Armenian
solution’’ became, in our time, the achievable ‘‘Final Solution,’’ the Nazi code name for
the annihilation of European Jews.10

In his classic treatise on the subject, Leo Kuper, another pioneer, after describing it as
the ‘‘forgotten genocide,’’ saw it fit to characterize the Armenian Genocide as ‘‘the
precursor of the coldly calculated bureaucratic genocide’’11—that is, the Holocaust.
For his part, Israel Charny describes the Armenian instance as ‘‘a dress rehearsal for
the Holocaust.’’12 Yisrael Ring, another Israeli historian, is quoted as saying that the
Armenian Genocide, ‘‘a model for recent history,’’ in fact proved to be a ‘‘purifying
precedent’’ for the Holocaust.13
Reference may also be made to Helen Fein, who occupies a prominent place in the
galaxy of pioneers in genocide studies. Fein’s basic premise, shared by many others cited
above, is that unless single case studies progress to the level of comparative studies, the
field of genocide studies will essentially be handicapped as a scientific discipline. This
standpoint is enunciated in her magnum opus, Accounting for Genocide, through the
postulate that ‘‘for over a millennium preceding their annihilation, both Jews and
Armenians had been decreed by the dominant group that was to perpetrate the crime to
be outside the sanctified universe of obligation.’’14 As a matter of fact, the concept of the
‘‘sanctified universe of obligation’’ has become the very essence of Fein’s overall
conceptual framework in the general theory of genocide.
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The present essay is an attempt at further developing the common body of
knowledge in genocide studies by exploring in more detail the comparative aspects of
these two genocides. Such an attempt neither negates the very important factors that
separate the two nor discounts the signal fact that the Holocaust is simply the bestknown case in the overall picture of genocide studies. As a point of departure, however,
one may revert back to Fein’s perspective. In her introductory chapter Fein repeatedly
singles out some of the specifics of this phenomenon, which may be summed up as
follows. Both victim groups (i.e., the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the Jews in
Europe) lacked ‘‘sovereignty’’ and a ‘‘parent state’’; hence, both were highly ‘‘vulnerable’’
victim groups, notwithstanding their ‘‘international affiliations,’’ which did not compare
with the protective condition afforded by a nation-state. This vulnerability was
ensconced in the belittling titles—‘‘rayah’’ and ‘‘alien’’—that were attached to both
victim groups. Similarly, both victim groups had experienced, at various levels and
under different conditions, episodic ‘‘pogroms’’ during the nineteenth century—even
though Jews were more assimilated, in terms of their involvement in political parties.
Armenians stood among their neighbors very much as the Jews of Poland and Russia
did; the former suffered the indignities of exclusion from the ‘‘Islamic universe,’’ the
latter of exclusion from the ‘‘Christian universe.’’ Both victim groups became targets of a
‘‘premeditated genocide’’ that was coterminous with ‘‘organized state murder’’ involving
‘‘rational function’’ (i.e., ‘‘choice by the perpetrator’’). Both perpetrator groups, the Nazis
and the Young Turks, also ‘‘test[ed] the ground’’ by recourse to pre-genocidal
‘‘oppression’’ and ‘‘calculated violence against the victims.’’15
By departing from this overview of insights and observations, which appear to be
conditioned by the authors’ inveterate connectedness to Jewish ethnicity, the nexus to
a transposed image of victimhood, it may be possible to construct a comparative
perspective. In this respect, four primary factors may be designated for the further
exploration of the comparative perspective: vulnerability, degradation of the victims,
war as opportunity, and fear of retaliation. On a secondary level, the following
subsidiary factors may be singled out for brief comment: techniques of extermination,
belittling the economic factor, and terminological cover-ups and deflection.

1. Vulnerability
Declaring Jews ‘‘a security risk,’’ the Nazi Foreign Ministry urged ‘‘the deportation’’ of
all Jews residing ‘‘in Axis countries.’’ This vulnerability, in the main, issued from the
fact that the Jews were ‘‘all alone’’ and had ‘‘no parent state,’’ while the ‘‘Allies
refrained from intervening.’’16 General Wladyslaw Sikorski, president of the
Conference on War Crimes held at St. James’s Palace in 1942, justified the Allies’
refusal to publicly acknowledge Nazi crimes against the Jews in their declaration on
war crimes in January of that year by arguing that ‘‘the Jews were considered
nationals of their reflective states’’ rather than being a distinct national group.17
In the Armenian case, we can observe a similar pattern of exploiting the
vulnerability of the Armenian minority in the Ottoman Empire. Notorious in this
respect is the promulgation, on 19 May/1 June 1915, of the Deportation Law, which
was first proposed to the cabinet by Interior Minister Talât on 13/26 May 1915 and
approved first by Grand Vizier Said Halim on 14/27 May and subsequently, and rather
deviously, by the cabinet on 17/30 May (the established procedure required cabinet
approval first). Article 2 of that law rendered the entire Armenian population, rather
indirectly, a target of the whims of military authorities at almost all levels, who were
thus given license to order deportations at the slightest hint (hissetmek) that the
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victims might be suspected of ‘‘espionage and treason.’’18 The vulnerability here stems
from the deliberate vagueness, imprecision, and general arbitrariness of the
legislation. Talât recognized this element of license when he explicitly exhorted the
Armenian parliamentary deputy Vartkes, just before the latter’s arrest and
subsequent murder—despite his parliamentary immunity—that he intended to take
full advantage of the opportunity offered by the war to settle scores and resolve the
Armenian question.19 When Henry Morgenthau, then US ambassador to Turkey, tried
to intercede on behalf of the Armenians, Talât reportedly brushed him off, saying that
‘‘the fate of the Armenians’’ should be of ‘‘no concern of the U.S.A.’’20 A brief
examination of the comparative aspects of this vulnerability factor affecting the fates
of both victim groups is available within the framework of a legal analysis.21

2. Degradation of the Victims
Going back to the era of the anti-Semitic protestant leader Martin Luther, the Nazis,
faithfully emulating him, proceeded to denounce the Jew as ‘‘a criminal, a thug, a beast
of prey.’’ Hitler himself referred to ‘‘a battle against a satanical power,’’ while another
top Nazi, Julius Streicher, depicted the Jews as parasites ‘‘who live by the sweat of
others.’’ Heinrich Himmler, chief of the SS and the police; Hans Frank, the overall
governor of Poland; and Otto Thierack, the Nazis’ minister of justice, were inclined to
the view that the Jews ‘‘were a lower species of life which upon contact infected the
German people with deadly disease.’’22 Himmler, for his part, stated that ‘‘just because
we exterminated a bacterium, we do not want, in the end, to be infected by that
bacterium and die of it,’’ while Frank often described the Jews as ‘‘lice.’’23 In April
1943, during a visit to Berlin by Admiral Miklos Horthy, regent of Hungary, Hitler
again denounced the Jews as ‘‘tubercular bacilli.’’24
Although there is a relative paucity of similar denigrations of the Armenians
within the Turkish camp, one of the most ferocious of the Turkish ge´nocidaires,
Dr. Mehmed Res" id—a veterinarian by training, and the governor general of Diyarbekir
province—described his Armenian victims as ‘‘microbes,’’ posing the rhetorical
question, ‘‘Isn’t the duty of a doctor to destroy these microbes?’’25

3. War as Opportunity
It is no accident that the two of the twentieth century’s many genocides were
consummated, with remarkable efficiency, during the two world wars (specifically,
between 1942 and 1945 and in 1915–1916). Indeed, on 13 December 1942, Joseph
Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister, declared, ‘‘At bottom . . . I believe both the
English and the Americans are happy that we are exterminating the Jewish riffraff.’’26 Himmler and Goebbels considered the war a ‘‘unique opportunity for ‘Solving
the problem.’ ’’27 While completing the preparations for the Auschwitz concentration
camp, Himmler told Rudolf Höss, commandant of the camp, that Hitler’s order for the
‘‘Final Solution’’ would have to be carried out because otherwise ‘‘the Jews will later
destroy the German people.’’28
Official German documents amply confirm the same wartime opportunism with
respect to the Armenian genocide. On 27 July 1915, for example, Germany’s consul in
Aleppo, Walter Rössler, reported to his chancellor in Berlin that the Turkish
authorities were exploiting the war and their alliance with Germany to solve ‘‘the
Armenian Question.’’29 On 10 August 1915, Erzurum’s vice-consul, Max Erwin
Scheubner-Richter, likewise informed the chancellor that the ‘‘Armenian question’’
that for decades had been occupying European diplomacy ‘‘will be solved now, during
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the war.’’30 The German Colonel Stange, on duty in the area of the genocidal
operations, reported to his superior, Marshal Otto Liman von Sanders, that the Turks
were bent on exploiting ‘‘this favorable opportunity’’ (diese günstige Gelegenheit) for
solving the Armenian question.31 The wartime German ambassador, Count Paul von
Wolff-Metternich, reported that the Turks were hiding behind the argument of
‘‘wartime exigency’’ to justify their atrocities (verschanzen sich hinter
Kriegsnotwendigkeiten).32 In a second report, Scheubner-Richter told Berlin that the
Young Turk leaders (otherwise identified as leaders of the Committee for Union and
Progress, or CUP) had confided to him, as a representative of an allied power, that the
wartime deportations of the Armenians were only a vehicle for the latter’s ultimate
eradication.33 The foremost urgency of completing the task of eradicating the
Armenians during the war was given expression in a memorandum jointly signed by
Talât and Enver on 2 August 1916. Forwarded to Berlin by Marine Attaché and Lt.
Commander Hans Humann, this memo contained Talât’s revealing exhortation to
Berlin that he must bring to completion his plan of liquidating the Armenians: ‘‘The
work that is to be done must be done now.’’34

4. Fear of Retaliation
Raul Hilberg maintains that the overall public rationale for the genocidal campaign
against the Jews was the so-called Jewish danger. Even the Nazis’ mobile killing units
(Einsatzgruppen) had to contrive such rationales, although they had no need to
account to anyone for their crimes—not even Reinhardt Heydrich, chief of the Reich
Security Head Office.35 Himmler, in the course of an address to the general lieutenants
(Gruppenführer) of the SS delivered in 1943, declared, ‘‘We had the moral right vis-àvis our people to annihilate (umzubringen) this people which wanted to annihilate
us.’’36 On 5 February 1943, in the wake of the shattering defeat at Stalingrad, the
German press was instructed to emphasize that ‘‘if we lose the war, we do not fall into
the hands of some other states but will all be annihilated by world Jewry. Jewry firmly
decided (fest entschlossen) to exterminate all Germans. International law and
international custom will be no protection against the Jewish will for total
annihilation. (totaler Vernichtungswille der Juden).37
Ismail Enver, war minister and de facto commander-in-chief of the OttomanTurkish Army during World War I, told Morgenthau that he had ‘‘greatest admiration
for the intelligence and industry’’ of the Armenians; but, he added, ‘‘a few hundred
bright Armenians [are capable of] overturning Turkish government.’’38 For his part,
Talât, omnipotent CUP party boss and interior minister, told the American
ambassador that ‘‘no Armenian can be our friend after what we have done to
them.’’39 Lewis Einstein, special agent at the American embassy in Constantinople
(now Istanbul), reported that in a recent exchange Enver had admitted the CUP’s
apprehensions, saying that the CUP ‘‘fears the Armenians.’’40

Additional Subsidiary Factors
1. Techniques and Methods of Extermination
Although the gas chambers were the principal vehicle of Nazi mass murder, other
methods served as auxiliary means; these, however, should be viewed as infrequent
and, therefore, as incidental rather than regular techniques. One of these was the act
of burning alive (i.e., the en masse incineration of victims). In Slonim, for example,
‘‘many houses were set afire, until the entire ghetto was a mass of flames . . . Additional
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raiders then arrived with gasoline cans and burned the dead and wounded in the
streets.’’41 Moreover, following the establishment of the anti-partisan command under
Erich von dem Bach Zelewski, ‘‘[the perpetrators] were thrown into the action on
November 26, 1942 . . . 1828 Jews not counting bandits, Jews, etc., were burned in
houses or dugouts.’’42 Commenting on von dem Bach’s role, a psychologist described
him as a man
whose record of looting, arson and mass murder is equaled only by the Huns and
Mongols of days past. General von dem Bach was the deputy Genghis khan of this
horde. The troops which he commanded included the notorious Dirlewanger Brigade
which was composed of habitual criminals . . . one single report . . . shows that, among
others, 363,211 Jews were executed by these formations.43

However, Hilberg mentions an incident that depicts von dem Bach as a man weary of
the psychological damage his troops were suffering as a result of these barbarities.
He reportedly told Himmler,
Look at the eyes of the men in this Kommando, how deeply shaken they are! These men
are finished [fertig] for the rest of their lives. What kind of followers are we training
here? Either neurotics or savages!44

Such acts of immolation, however, as stated above, were quite widespread in the
Armenian case; as such, they were a more or less integral part of the Armenian
Genocide. Among numerous accounts available for study is the vivid eyewitness
testimony of a Jewish observer, Eitan Belkind, an officer in the wartime Turkish army
with duties at the headquarters of the Ottoman Fourth Army:
After a three day ride I reached the heart of Mesopotamia where I was a witness to a
terrible tragedy . . . The Circassian soldiers ordered the Armenians to gather thorns and
thistles and to pile them into a tall pyramid . . . afterwards they tied all the Armenians
who were there, almost five thousand souls, hand to hand, encircled them like a ring
around the pile of thistles and set it afire in a blaze which rose up to heaven together
with the screams of the wretched people who were burned to death by the fire . . . Two
days later I returned to this place and saw the charred bodies of thousands of human
beings.45

Colonel Ludwig Schraudenbach, German commander of the Ottoman-Turkish
Fourteenth Division, operating likewise in Mesopotamia, cites in his memoirs another
case of burning alive. Relaying information he had received, he writes that ‘‘children
were placed between wooden planks, tied to them, and then burned to death.’’46
The Swedish missionary Alma Johansson, on duty in wartime Turkey, reported that
the Armenian inmates of an orphanage in Mus" , along with the staff, were burned alive
(‘‘lebendig verbrannt’’).47 For his part, the German physician H. Stoffels, likewise on
duty in wartime Turkey, reported that on his way to the same city of Mush he saw ‘‘a
large number of formerly Armenian localities, where in the churches and houses were
charred and decomposed corpses of women and children’’ (verkohlte und verweste
Frauen und Kinderleichen).48 Rafael Nogales, a Venezuelan major who had
volunteered his services to the Turkish Army during World War I and held the title
Inspector General reported observing, in the same area, ‘‘women and children penned
up and burned alive.’’49
Even more striking in this connection are authentic Turkish testimonies.
Foremost among them is that of General Mehmed Vehip, commander of the Turkish
Third Army, who testified before the Turkish military tribunal that prosecuted the
authors of the Armenian Genocide in the aftermath of World War I. Vehip reported that
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‘‘Armenian women and children were burnt alive in the village of Churig, located five
kilometers north of Mush’’; during an inspection of the area, he had seen the charred
remains of the victims.50 Reference may also be made to the testimony of a Turkish
military officer who, likewise, had personally observed the evidence of the holocaust in
and around Mus" and who ventured to identify Küçük Kâzim, the Turkish military officer
who ‘‘was burning down the entire Mush valley and was annihilating the Armenians.’’51

2. Discounting the Economic Factor
According to Hilberg, ‘‘the destruction process was oriented not to cost but to
efficiency.’’52 In the Nazi case, the authorities of the Ministry for Eastern Occupied
Territories insisted that ‘‘economic questions should not be considered in the solution
of the Jewish question.’’53 A similar frame of mind can be discerned in the attitudes of
the CUP leaders involved in genocidal decision making in Turkey. During an exchange
with Morgenthau, for example, Talât declared, ‘‘We care nothing about the commercial
loss. We have figured all that out . . . We don’t worry about that.’’54 Enver declared to
the same ambassador, ‘‘Economic considerations are of no importance at this time’’; the
two were discussing the huge fiscal losses the Turkish economy was incurring as a
result of the elimination of the Armenians.55 These considerations are confirmed by
the memoirs of Halidé Edib, a nationalist and feminist Turkish writer whom Talât,
particularly, held in high esteem. Edib relates some exchanges with Talât and
acknowledges that, in fact, self-serving economic considerations played a paramount
role in the decision to uproot the Armenians: the goal was ‘‘to end the economic
supremacy of the Armenians thereby clearing the markets for the Turks and the
Germans.’’56

3. Terminological Deflections and Cover-Ups
The Nazis contrived an extensive vocabulary for the express purpose of camouflaging
their real goal with respect to the Jews; Hilberg’s list takes up most of a page.57
The most recurrent terms are Ausschaltung (‘‘elimination’’), Aussiedlung (‘‘resettlement’’), Sondermassnahmen (‘‘special measures’’), Sonderaktionen (‘‘special
actions’’), and Sonderbehandlung (‘‘special treatment’’). The Jews were ‘‘bluffed’’ and
tricked with ‘‘registrations’’ and ‘‘resettlements,’’ with ‘‘baths’’ and ‘‘inhalations.’’58 In
the Armenian case, however, the decision makers throughout confined themselves to
the twin terms tehcir (‘‘deportation’’) and tebdili mekân (‘‘relocation’’), deflecting
attention from the covert purposes of the mechanisms of deportation and covering up
the ultimate, exterminatory goal.59

Conclusion
Superseding in import and consequence all these similarities and commonalities is the
overarching illegality of the origins and evolving careers of the regimes of both
perpetrator groups—the type of illegality that, completely devoid of elements of
responsibility and accountability, readily degenerated into lethal criminality. In the
process, the functions of each state were overwhelmed by the imposition on their
respective systems of the desiderata of two highly monolithic and dictatorial political
parties. The subversion and ultimate criminalization of these state functions thus
became the order of the day. The Reichstag fire and the Enabling Act (in February and
March 1933) and the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, on the one hand, or the January 1913
Young Turk overthrow of the government and the subsequent political purges
throughout the land, on the other, are the incipient initiatives of this process. The
prevalence of the common pattern of substituting party authority (that of NSDAP and
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the CUP, with all their variants) for legitimate state authority is all too evident.
Accordingly, the cardinal lesson to be derived from this comparative essay is that the
arch determinant in cases of genocide is not the state, to whose powers and resources are
generally attributed the latitude for genocidal decision making and the associated
enactment, but the progressively incremental power structure of dictatorial political
parties. Equally important is the fact of the illicit capture of constitutional authority and
its transfer from the legitimate state to a political party that is mobilized with highly
secretive and radical designs, some of them exterminatory; such illicit action is capable
of providing the requisite dynamics for genocidal radicalism. Among the many ways in
which state functions are thus subverted, perhaps the most consequential is that many
of these functions are reduced and instrumentalized for the hidden goals of the party. In
other words, in addition to subverting its functions, the quasi-omnipotent party
specifically aims to reduce the state to a level of optimal subservience to the party.
This has been confirmed by wartime Turkish general Vehip. In one way or another,
consequently, the state ultimately becomes complicit in the series of crimes that
inevitably ensues. This is a process that might be called outcome-oriented, radical, and
deadly task performance. Such an outcome was foreseen by Aristotle when he declared,
nearly twenty-five centuries ago, that ‘‘when separated from law and justice man is the
worst of all animals.’’60

Notes
1.

2.

Steven Leonard Jacobs and Samuel Totten, ‘‘Totally Unofficial Man,’’ in Pioneers of Genocide
Studies, ed. Samuel Totten and Steven Leonard Jacobs, 365–99 (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers, 2002), 371. When separating singularity from the concept of
‘‘uniqueness,’’ Leo Kuper, a pioneer of genocide studies, is quoted in the same work as saying
that ‘‘the weakening of empathy for other groups in their affliction has always seemed to me
a betrayal of traditional Jewish concern and compassion for the suffering of others.’’ Kuper
goes on to state that such a sense of ‘‘uniqueness’’ can be ‘‘combined with a heightened
concern for the suffering of others.’’ Ibid., 469. Lemkin’s original unpublished manuscript is
housed in the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public
Library. In addition. the American Jewish Historical Society has a Raphael Lemkin
collection containing ‘‘several rare documents’’ from 1915–1919 and 1946–1948, Box 9,
Folder 23. Many of these pieces are discussed in the special issue of Journal of Genocide
Research (volume 7, no. 4, December 2005) dedicated to the life and work of Raphael Lemkin.
Armenian sources aver that Lemkin, on several occasions, emphasized the special impact
the horrors of the Armenian Genocide had on him. In a 1959 article, he wrote that ‘‘the
sufferings of the Armenian men, women and children thrown into the Euphrates River or
massacred on the way to Deir Zor have prepared the way for the adoption for the Genocide
Convention by the United Nations . . . one million Armenians died, but a law against the
murder of peoples was written with the ink of their blood and the spirit of their sufferings.’’
Raphael Lemkin, ‘‘The Armenian Stake in the Genocide Convention,’’ Hairenik Weekly, 1
January 1959: 3.
Lemkin, in this respect, was not far off the mark. The convention he refers to here was
preceded by two principal resolutions issued by the United Nations. One of them, Resolution
95(1) of 11 December 1946, states that the UN General Assembly ‘‘affirms the principle of
international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of
Tribunal.’’ But article 6(c) of that charter, which embraced the legal norm of ‘‘crimes against
humanity,’’ was, in the main, derived and adopted from a declaration made by the Allies on
24 May 1915 with respect to the initiation of the wartime Armenian Genocide, which they
branded as a ‘‘crime against humanity.’’ This fact is acknowledged by the authoritative UN
War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the
Development of the Laws of War (London: HMSO, 1948), 26, 25, 191, 194, 196–97.
106

The Prefiguration of Some Aspects of the Holocaust in the Armenian Genocide

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Richard Lichtheim, Rückkehr (Stuttgart: Deutsche-Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), 287, 341.
Unless otherwise stated, all translations into English are my own.
Joseph Guttman, The Beginnings of Genocide: A Brief Account of the Armenian Massacres
in World War I (New York: Armenian National Council of America, 1948). This document
was first published in Yiddish in Israel.
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Guenter Lewy’s The Armenian Massacres
in Ottoman Turkey
Taner Akçam

‘‘Listen Muhittin, let them say whatever they want to say. The fact is that
I know what I am doing. We are engaged in a war for life or death. Had we
been at that time defeated by the revolution and the Russian army, today one
would be able to count the Turks in Anatolia with one’s finger. We were not
defeated at that time as it was our duty to ensure our right to live. I performed
that duty. Perhaps everybody today, and even you, may be blaming me, however,
at a later time the Turks with relish will remember my name. Nobody is
responsible in this matter; the entire responsibility relative to the severity of the
applied methods belongs to me.’’ Thereupon, I raised my doubts whether he,
Talaat, in spite of everything and everybody could have been as brutal in the
implementation of the [Armenian deportations] as Dr. Bahaeddin S! akir, who is
being mentioned as one of those who have sought such brutality. He responded
as follows: ‘‘As far as the law is concerned I am the one who is responsible.
When promulgating the law, I certainly, proceeded in accord with my colleagues.
When it comes to the matter of enforcing that law, however, I assume full
responsibility for the severity applied . . . notwithstanding the fact that plenty of
time has elapsed since, I absolutely don’t regret my deed.’’1

The dust jacket of Guenther Lewy’s The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey:
A Disputed Genocide2 features Norman Stone’s assertion that this book, ‘‘which has
Olympian fair-mindedness as well as thorough knowledge of the various sources, now
replaces everything else.’’ Lewy claims, in his book, to be situated outside the
parameters of what he describes as ‘‘the Turkish view’’ and ‘‘the Armenian view.’’
Having positioned himself as being above such partisanship, he also claims that his
book ‘‘subjects the rich historical evidence available to the test of consistency and
(as much as the state of knowledge allows) attempts to sort out the validity of the rival
arguments’’ (x).
A book that did not shy away from interpreting the opposing views of the events of
1915, one grounded in a solid knowledge of the historiography and the relevant
documents, would indeed prove useful to individuals and circles not knowledgeable
about the subject. One could even argue that, with respect to the vast field that is
called conflict resolution, the preparation of such an inventory might be considered one
of the principal tasks. But Lewy has failed to perform this task, and instead pursues
a highly contentious one. Tessa Hofmann of the Eastern Europe Institute of the Free
University of Berlin has revealed that
in the summer of 2000 a retiree, resting on my couch, expressed a strange intention.
Guenter Lewy, the retired American political scientist, wanted to subject
‘‘the Armenian massacres’’ to a similar revision as he had done before with respect
to the Sinti and the Roma. That revision, argued Lewy, had shown that even though
their fate in World War II proved tragic, it did not represent a ‘‘real’’ genocide, as
there were no centrally organized and state-sponsored premeditation and genocidal
intention.3
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The Central Thesis of the Book
One of Lewy’s main theses is that ‘‘the Armenians can hardly claim that they suffered
for no reason at all. Ignoring warnings from many quarters, large numbers of them
had fought the Turks openly or played the role of a fifth column’’ (109). Perpetrators
always have some reason to justify their actions. It is natural, therefore, that the
Ottoman authorities felt there were ‘‘logical reasons’’ for the annihilation of their own
Armenian citizens. Throughout his book, Lewy explains why the Ottoman authorities
felt compelled to exterminate the Armenians wholesale.
After a brief historical introduction, Lewy defines the central problem as follows:
The key issue in this quarrel . . . is not the extent of Armenian suffering, but rather
the question of premeditation: that is, whether the Young Turk regime during the
First World War intentionally organized the massacres that took place. (ix)

He repeats this assertion several times in the book:
The fact that large numbers of Armenians died or were killed during the course of the
deportations can give us no reliable knowledge of who is to be held responsible for
these losses of life. The high death toll certainly does not prove in and of itself the
guilt of the Young Turk regime. (54)
The argument that the deportations in reality constituted a premeditated program of
extermination of the Armenians of Turkey is difficult to square with many aspects
and characteristics of the relocations. (251)

According to him, the ‘‘incredibly high death toll’’ was possible ‘‘without a premeditated
plan of annihilation’’ (253).
The book’s central thesis is this: ‘‘no authentic documentary evidence exists
to prove the culpability of the central government of Turkey for the massacre of
1915–6 . . . it is safe to say that no such evidence exists for the events of 1915–6’’ (250).
There were undoubtedly deaths, but they resulted from the ‘‘harsh climate, the long
distance to be traversed on foot, and the arbitrariness of local officials’’; furthermore, a
large number of Turkish civilians died as a result of severe shortages of food and
epidemics; large numbers of Turkish soldiers . . . perished . . . these results surely
do not prove that the Ottoman government—ultimately responsible for all of these
conditions—sought and intentionally caused the death of its own civilian
population, of its own soldiers. (54)

Lewy similarly explains that Armenians perished ‘‘as a result of starvation
and disease’’ or ‘‘were killed by Kurds . . . or fanatic Muslims’’ (256). He argues that
‘‘for all these occurrences the Ottoman regime bears some indirect responsibility; but
there is a difference between ineptness, even ineptness that has tragic and far
reaching consequences, and the premeditated murder of a people’’ (256). Lewy is
convinced of ‘‘the absence of Turkish documentary evidence that proves the complicity
of the Ottoman government’’ (246).
In order to provide a basis for these assertions, Lewy declares untrue, invalid, and
unreliable the documents and related materials produced by those who characterize the
experiences of 1915 as genocide or as a crime against humanity. In this section I list
these documents; I will later give detailed information on each of the listed groups.
First among these ‘‘questionable’’ sources are those known as the Naim–Andonian
documents.4 Lewy concurs with the criticisms leveled at these documents by S! inasi
Orel and Süreyya Yuca,5 he believes that these authors ‘‘have raised enough questions
about their [the documents’] genuineness as to make any use of them in a serious
scholarly work unacceptable’’ (73).
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The second group of documents that Lewy considers unreliable is that obtained in
connection with the proceedings of the Istanbul courts-martial following World War I.
He argues that the documents and the evidence revealed in the course of pre-trial
interrogations and trial sessions cannot be taken seriously for the following reasons:
the trials were launched for political reasons (74), ‘‘the proceedings in 1919–20 lacked
many basic requirements of due process’’ (78) and ‘‘suffered from serious shortcomings
when compared to Western standards of due process of law’’ (79); ‘‘throughout
the trials, no witnesses were heard; the verdict of the courts rested entirely on
documents and testimony mentioned or read during the trial proceedings’’ (80); ‘‘in
many cases we do not know whether the official gazette or the newspapers covering
the trials reprinted all or only some of the text of the documents reproduced. Neither
can we be sure of the accuracy of the transcription’’ (80); and, perhaps most
importantly,
the most serious problem affecting the probative value of the 1919–20 military court
proceedings is the loss of all documentation of these trials. This means that we have
none of the original documents, sworn testimony, and depositions on which the courts
based their findings and verdicts. (80)

As far as Lewy is concerned, ‘‘the serious violations of due process as well as loss of
all the original documentation leave the finding of the military tribunals of 1919–20
unsupported by credible evidence’’ (82). Accordingly, he characterizes as ‘‘alleged
documents’’ those sources dating to the period from 1919 through 1920 (250).
Among the third group of documents that Lewy declares to be invalid are those
implicating the Special Organization (SO) in the Armenian deportations and
massacres. These charges come to light in the key indictment of the Turkish
Military Tribunal that prosecuted the leaders of the İttihad ve Terakki (the Committee
for Union and Progress, or CUP), but, according to Lewy,
there is no credible evidence other than the assertion of the indictment of the main
trial for the allegation that the SO, with large numbers of convicts enrolled in its
ranks, took the lead role in the massacres . . . there is no evidence anywhere
that . . . any . . . SO detachment was diverted to duty involving the Armenian
deportation. (84–85)

As Lewy argues, in the course of the trials ‘‘the defendants denied any connection
between the SO and the central committee of the CUP . . . as well as any role of the
SO in the Armenian deportation and massacres’’ (86).
Lewy casts his suspicious glance elsewhere as well. Res! it Akif Pasha, in a
speech he delivered in the Ottoman Senate on 21 November 1918, revealed that
the Central Committee of the CUP had ordered the destruction of the Armenians and
that the brigands and the accompanying gendarmes were to execute this order by
attacking and massacring the convoys of Armenian deportees. As far as Lewy is
concerned, however, ‘‘the existence of this circular order . . . must be considered
suspect’’ because Akif Pasha’s ‘‘speech was part of the elaborate propaganda
campaign.’’ Moreover, he writes, the fact that Akif Pasha described the CUP as
a ‘‘tyrannical body’’ and cursed it is sufficient grounds to be suspicious about
the existence of such a document (89).
As can be deduced from the preceding examples, which he dismisses as being
of ‘‘highly questionable authenticity’’ and as ‘‘alleged documents’’ (250), Lewy is not
satisfied merely to declare that ‘‘no documentary evidence exists to prove the
culpability of the central government’’ (250). Proceeding further, he states that ‘‘it is
also significant that so not one of the many thousands of officials who would have been
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involved in so far-reaching a scheme as a premeditated plan to destroy the Armenians
has ever come forth to reveal the plot’’ (250).
Lewy does not stop at declaring the Naim–Andonian documents and the Istanbul
court-martial proceedings unreliable and invalid. Inveighing against all other
conceivable sources that might be used to demonstrate that the extermination of the
Armenians was the result of decisions made by Istanbul’s central authorities (i.e., the
government and the CUP), Lewy, as the Turkish saying goes, gives them ‘‘the sword
treatment’’ (kılıctan geçirir). According to him, the German documents are important,
but ‘‘they do not prove the responsibility of the central government in Constantinople
for these killings’’ (135). The British ‘‘Blue Book’’ is ‘‘based on hearsay’’ (138) and
‘‘contains no evidence proving the responsibility of that government for the massacres
that did occur’’ (139). The reports of missionaries reflect prejudice and one-sidedness,
since the Muslims are portrayed as ‘‘the terrible Turk’’ and ‘‘Armenians were regularly
depicted as innocent victims’’ (144). As to ‘‘survivor accounts,’’ they are hardly a
reliable source of information on the events, for ‘‘the most basic problem regarding any
survivor testimony . . . is of course that such recollections do not so much reproduce
reality or reconstruct history as present a version of reality in tune with the survivor’s
personality, perceptions, and experiences’’ (148). In brief, according to Lewy, all these
sources, though some of them are most valuable, fail to prove the Ottoman central
government’s plan for premeditated annihilation.
Lewy recognizes that countless reports prepared by American and German
diplomats, as well as other foreign observers, attest to the exterminatory purpose of
the Armenian deportations, but these, too, are dismissed. As he puts it,
Given the very large number of deaths and the observed complicity of many local
officials in the murders, it is not surprising that not a few diplomats, like other
eyewitnesses on the scene, concluded that the high death toll was an intended
outcome of the deportations. Still, well-informed as many consular officials were
about the horrible events unfolding before their eyes, their insight into the mindset
and the real intention of the Young Turk leadership was necessarily limited to
hunches and speculation. (250–51)

After describing as ‘‘hearsay,’’ ‘‘hunches,’’ ‘‘speculation,’’ and so on and declaring
invalid all documents identifying the CUP as the mastermind of a plan of
extermination, Lewy presents his thesis in the following words:
I start with the assumption that the various decrees issued by the government in
Constantinople dealing with the deportation and its implementation are genuine and
were issued in good faith. The Ottoman Government, I am inclined to believe, wanted
to arrange an orderly process but did not have the means to do so. (252–53)

If there was a well-intentioned government in Istanbul, how is one to explain the
magnitude of the fatalities? On this subject Lewy offers us a model. One leg of this
model is ‘‘the incompetence and the inefficiency’’ of the authorities in Istanbul. Despite
their good intentions, he says, they did not have the tools or the organization to
implement such a gigantic undertaking. We are dealing here, argues Lewy, with a
‘‘bureaucratic fiasco’’ (253): ‘‘the government in Constantinople did not approve of
these developments but did not do enough to prevent them either’’ (254). Further,
the contention of American and German consuls that if the Ottoman regime could
not ‘‘guarantee the smooth working of the relocation’’ they ‘‘should have refrained
from deporting the Armenians’’ is in no way tenable, for the Ottoman authorities
had ‘‘strong illusions and misconceptions about the ability of [the] bureaucracy
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to accomplish the deportation of the Armenian community without too many
problems’’ (255).
Besides the matter of Istanbul’s clumsiness and inefficiency, Lewy’s model has a
second leg: local authorities did not listen to Istanbul and acted on their own initiative.
Lewy writes that ‘‘the ability of the central government to influence the events in the
province remained limited’’ (208); as a result of this weakness of the central
authorities,
some of the killings are said to have been organized by CUP fanatics, who in certain
towns formed a kind of shadow government. We know that in many cases local
officials disregarded instructions received from Constantinople; or interpreted orders
of the central government in an especially harsh manner. (231)

There were two reasons for this disobedience. First, ‘‘some of these officials were
Muslims who had been forced to flee from the Balkans or Russia and therefore hated
all Christians with great vehemence’’ (231). Second, before these local authorities
initiated any steps, they would try to find out what the CUP’s thinking was; ‘‘if the
wishes of these men contradicted orders received from the central government, then
these orders were disregarded.’’ Hence, the ‘‘central government had little or no
control’’ (231).
Throughout the book, Lewy predicates his argument regarding the causes of
Armenian deaths upon a single factor: the center’s inability to exercise control on local
authorities. According to him, for example, one such case was ‘‘the tug of war in
Erzurum between the constituted authorities and the CUP radicals’’ (165). Lewy
theorizes that in Erzurum, party potentate Hilmi, Bahaeddin S! akir, and many
others ‘‘had been able to thwart the basically well-meaning intentions of the
government, and these people probably were responsible for the harsh measures and
the massacres’’ (164–65). The radical elements of the CUP who were defiant toward
the government were able to keep the provinces under their control. The situation in
and around Adana was similar. Indeed, in June 1916 ‘‘local officials in Adana, under
the pressure of the rabid anti-Armenian CUP branch, ordered the deportation
of thousands of Armenian railroad workers and their families. Interior Minister
Talaat reaffirmed the exemption order on August 4, but the local officials disregarded
it’’ (230).
In the end, Lewy, who is forced to admit the patent reality of the crimes that
were committed, is driven to the task of proving that they were not committed on the
orders of the central government. According to him, the perpetrators of the crimes
were the Kurds, the gendarmes, and the brigands, those chettes, volunteers, and
irregulars whose true identities he is unable to pinpoint accurately but whom he does
not want to identify too closely with the CUP. He writes that ‘‘the common element
is that chettes [i.e., çete] were irregulars who (no matter how recruited, directed, or
composed) participated in the robbing and killing of Armenian deportees’’ (228).
For Lewy, the perpetration of the crimes by these elements—and nobody knows who
organized, directed, and assembled them—was made possible not by Istanbul’s central
authority but through local authorities. He claims that ‘‘these militia units were
usually organized by local authorities, often under the influence of militants in the
CUP clubs’’ (223).
The picture is somewhat confusing, however, in Syria and Iraq. Since such
categories of killers as ‘‘milis,’’ ‘‘brigand’’ (çete), and ‘‘irregulars’’ are no longer
operational, leaving only gendarmes and Circassians, it becomes evident that the
murders in question were perpetrated by people identified with these two groups.
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This puts Lewy in a difficult situation, as Kurds, brigands, volunteers, and irregulars
are no longer available to take the blame. Among the German reports there is, for
example, the case of Ras-ul-Ain, where the kaymakam (county supervisor), on the
orders of the central government, organized the killing of Armenians. But, according to
Lewy, ‘‘whether the massacres had indeed been perpetrated on command from above,
and, if so, on whose command, will probably never be known’’ (210).
Lewy stretches his theory of lack of control to such an extent that, as far as he is
concerned, even the gendarmes assigned to protect the deportee convoys, who were
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, were beyond the government’s
control. Even Halil Mentes! e, the wartime Ottoman foreign minister, conceded that
anti-Armenian crimes were perpetrated by the gendarmes themselves (225); Lewy
confirms this, stating that ‘‘Turkish gendarmes and Kurds often cooperated
in arranging for massacres and the looting of Armenian convoys’’ (224). Lewy is
unable to explain how these contingents of gendarmes, attached to the Ministry of the
Interior, could have operated outside and beyond the latter’s control; he nevertheless
maintains, however, that the crimes in question had something to do with the
character of the gendarmes and not with orders from the central authorities. He states
that ‘‘the Turkish gendarmes were known to be ignorant, corrupt, and poorly trained’’
(224). The wartime release of convicts and their integration into the gendarmerie
helped to aggravate the situation. Lewy maintains that these ‘‘hardened convicts’’ were
the ‘‘men who in many towns murdered the Armenians arrested in the spring of 1915’’
(225). It is a fact, however, that it was the government that emptied the prisons; it was
the government, too, that incorporated the ‘‘hardened convicts’’ them into gendarmerie
units. Yet, as far as Lewy is concerned, the behavior of these gendarmes had nothing to
do with the disposition of the central government.
Another point most eagerly advanced by Lewy, within the framework of this notion
of a ‘‘central–local institutional contrast,’’ also requires attention. It concerns
the systematic liquidation of the Armenian conscripts enlisted in labor battalions.
By declaring that ‘‘in most cases we do not know who was responsible for the killings,’’
Lewy, who grants the existence of this practice, tries to sidestep the issue (229).
For him the aim is to feel at ease when he states that ‘‘we know much about events in
this province; but many questions, including the ultimate responsibility for the
massacres, remain unanswered’’ (168).
It appears that, for Lewy, the Ottoman Empire of 1915 resembles today’s
Afghanistan. Istanbul, as a capital, is just like Kabul; being extremely weak, it is
almost entirely bereft of influence. According to Lewy’s understanding, the CUP’s
local outfits functioned as shadow governments, just like Afghanistan’s warlords.
The regions were controlled by local potentates who defied the central authorities. This
is a serious assertion, and, in order to eventually transcend its hypothetical confines,
it must be proven. But Lewy has yet to come up with any documentary or other
evidence to support his profound belief in the good faith of Istanbul’s Ottoman
authorities or to show the existence of a conflict between local authorities and the
central government.
In brief, the most serious problem with Lewy’s book is that he has failed to apply to
his own thesis the same criteria by which he sees fit to dismiss as ‘‘alleged,’’ ‘‘hearsay,’’
and ‘‘hunches’’ all the documents and evidence demonstrating the primary role of
the Central Committee of the CUP in the genocide. His key concept of ‘‘center–local
conflict,’’ contradicted by hundreds of documents, is hollow speculation. If, as he claims,
the underlying fact of the mass murder of Armenians was the ‘‘center–local conflict’’ and
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the lack of central control in the regions in question, such a fact would surely have left
traces that could be pursued by researchers.
In none of the conceivable relevant sources can one find any document that shows
a center–local conflict within the CUP or between Istanbul and regional party
chieftains, nor is there any evidence of any social or political consequences of such a
conflict. It is precisely for this reason that, among the many scholars dealing with
twentieth-century Ottoman history and among the dozens of works by Turkish and
foreign academics exploring the CUP, one is hard put to find any reference to or any
indication of awareness of such a conflict. On the contrary, hundreds of documents,
memoirs, and scientific studies attest to the fact that the CUP’s central body exercised
extremely tight control and maintained a formidable influence not only on its own
organization but also on the government and the government’s central and provincial
organs.6

The Essential Flaws of the Book
Lack of Familiarity with the Turkish Language
One of Lewy’s most important contentions is that a person who does not speak Turkish
‘‘can do meaningful work in this subject.’’ Indeed, ‘‘a requirement that only persons
fluent in the Turkish language be considered competent to write on this topic would
disqualify most Armenians, who also do not know Turkish’’ (xi). Lewy is right on
both counts. The criticism leveled against Guenter Lewy in some circles because of his
‘‘not knowing Turkish’’ is unjust, and it is made simply because of his views on the
topic: it is obvious that had Lewy advanced some new view as to why the experiences of
1915 ought to be identified as genocide, similar criticisms would have been made by
advocates of the official Turkish thesis. If we leave aside the familiar arguments
resulting from the exceeding politicization of the Turkish–Armenian conflict, we may
be able to state a general rule concerning the languages which are needed in order to
make an original contribution to the study of the events surrounding 1915.
Researchers, especially historians, can render two types of contributions with respect
to the topic they are exploring.
First, using their language skills, they can uncover new documents and new
knowledge. In the area of the Turkish–Armenian conflict, with some exceptions such
as German military records, we can accept that the Western sources, mainly in
German and English, are to a large extent known. But most Ottoman Turkish as well
as Russian and Armenian materials are not known, and the information available in
these languages has not been sufficiently absorbed by Western researchers. In this
sense, a common body of knowledge has not yet been created. The knowledge we will
be able to obtain from these sources is destined to substantially deepen, broaden,
and even alter our understanding and our interpretations of 1915.
A second type of contribution is the reinterpretation of documents written in
languages with which the researcher is familiar. Even though such reinterpretations
do not necessarily produce any new proof, they have the advantage of allowing a fresh
look at existing documents. Holocaust studies is replete with such examples. If we
admit that history and historicism involve interpretation and reinterpretation of lived
experiences, rather than merely the ‘‘uncovering of new documents,’’ then we must
acknowledge the value of such work.
We grant, then, that Lewy, or any other scholar not familiar with Turkish or
Armenian, has the potential to make useful contributions by using documents written
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in Western languages. Nonetheless, Lewy’s qualifications to undertake this study
remain problematic.
The fact is that Lewy is not sufficiently informed about the latest research and
publications in the Turkish language. From someone who claims to be the bearer of ‘‘a
new perspective’’ (xii), one would expect a thorough familiarity with some of the
existing Turkish sources and data. It is clear that those who assisted him in
translating (xiii) unfortunately did not provide sufficient knowledge about the sources
in question. As a result, Lewy has committed avoidable errors. Had he been informed
about documents in the volume The Armenians in the Ottoman Documents 1915–1920,
published by the General Directorate of State Archives in 1995,7 he would have
realized the falseness of his claims about the deportation of Armenian Protestants and
Catholics. By the same token, he would have recognized that the warning posted on
the walls during the Trabzon deportations, a subject to which he allocates two pages in
his book, was not an important document issuing from the central authorities but,
rather, was created by local authorities. Equally importantly, he would have learned
that Talât later prohibited its use (178–79).
Lewy’s ignorance of Nejdet Bilgi’s Ermeni tehciri ve Boğazliyan Kaymakamı Kemal
Beyin Yargılanması (written to support the official Turkish thesis) is also a major
shortcoming.8 Had Lewy availed himself of the material in this book, he might have
paused before offering such entirely imaginary tales as the allegation that defendants
in the post-war trials were denied the right to inspect the documentary evidence and
that no witnesses were heard during the trial sessions. It is evident that Lewy has not
been made aware of the work of some critical scholars relevant to the matter of
deportation and exile.9 For example, he makes claims about Ziya Gökalp’s supposed
lack of involvement in the matter of deportations (44–45).10 Had he been aware of the
works of Fuat Dündar, he would have learned that, starting in 1913, the CUP showed
a special interest in the ethnic make-up of Anatolia and that, as a result, under the
leadership of Ziya Gökalp, it had dispatched experts whose task was to research and
even to prepare a map of the region’s religious and ethnic constituents.11 He would
also have realized that the deportation and exile of the Armenians was not a violent
by-product of the war but, rather, was part and parcel of a plan to homogenize Anatolia
on an ethno-religious basis. The poor quality of the help Lewy received in the matter of
language (i.e., from those who translated for him) seriously handicapped his
investigation.
Can it be maintained that Lewy has brought a new approach to the task of
examining the existing documents, that he has offered ‘‘a new viewpoint,’’ from a new
perspective? Claiming that it supports their ‘‘official position,’’ people identified with
the Turkish Foreign Ministry have distributed Lewy’s book free of charge. Likewise,
the ASAM, (Center for Strategic Studies12)—the propaganda center of the official
Turkish denial policy on genocide—has honored Lewy with the High Award for
Combating Crimes Against Humanity. It is incumbent upon Lewy, I think, to ponder
seriously whether or not his theses are really original.

‘‘The Armenian Side’’ vs. ‘‘The Turkish Side’’
Lewy’s entire work is predicated upon theses and perspectives that he identifies as
‘‘Turkish’’ on one side and ‘‘Armenian’’ on the other. Lewy not only portrays
contemporary parties as ‘‘the Turks’’ on one side and ‘‘the Armenians’’ on the other
but also depicts the period of Ottoman decline as consisting of ‘‘Turks,’’ occupying one
end of the spectrum, and ‘‘Armenians,’’ occupying the other. The presentation of
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historical and social events, and especially the beginnings of twentieth-century
Ottoman history, in terms of ‘‘Turks,’’ ‘‘Armenians,’’ and ‘‘Kurds’’ as essentialized
collective actors misrepresents the complete web of relationships and conflicts and
projects today’s nationalistic polarization backward onto a period to which they do not
properly apply.
A simple case illustrates this point. It is a serious mistake to subsume both an
Armenian in a village in Edirne, in western Turkey, and an Armenian volunteer in the
Russian army under the uniform concept ‘‘Armenian’’ and to juxtapose such
occurrences as the events on the Eastern front or the roles Armenian volunteers
played in the Russian army during that period with the experiences of the Armenian
peasant in Edirne. To do so is to write a nationalistic history based on an image of a
monolithic ‘‘other.’’ The net result is that the common ethnicity of the Armenian from
the village in Edirne and the Armenian fighting under the Russian flag (most of these,
incidentally, were either from Russia proper or from the diaspora) leads to a unitary
image in which two disparate categories of Armenians living during that period
dissolve and merge into one and the same Armenian.
As a result of this mentality, a swift logical relationship is established between the
actions of the Armenian volunteers enrolled in Russian military units, on the one
hand, and the deportation of the Armenian from Edirne, on the other; and in no way is
such a procedure viewed as strange or wrong. A report would then depict the ‘‘other,’’
fictive, and abstractly conjectured Armenian as the source of the problem.
This example epitomizes the overall mentality underlying Lewy’s drive to overlook
the political, social, and cultural differences separating the many Armenian
communities, instead subsuming them all under a single, homogeneous Armenian
entity. In Lewy’s book, the ‘‘homogenous’’ and ‘‘other’’ Armenian, in the final analysis,
is portrayed as someone who always attracted attention through his anti-government
activities, his acts of ‘‘disturbing the peace,’’ and as someone who, if need be, would not
hesitate ‘‘to cooperate with foreign powers.’’ This explains the book’s total absence of
information about the social and political underpinnings of the Ottoman collapse and
about the divergent actions of diverse political actors.
In trying to account for the existence of different ‘‘Turkish’’ and ‘‘Armenian’’
standpoints, Lewy argues that the main point of contention between the two sides
is the question of premeditation. This assertion is invalid. First, Lewy is mistaken
in assigning a central role to the factor of premeditation and in rendering it
interchangeable with that of intent. Premeditation and intent are concepts with
different core meanings. Generally speaking, for the purposes of the genocide debate,
premeditation is not important; genocide can be explored without considering
premeditation.13 The subject of premeditation is less a point of dispute for the
‘‘Turkish’’ and ‘‘Armenian’’ parties than among academics who have agreed that what
happened in 1915 was genocide.14 In any debate over whether or not the events on
1915 should be considered genocide, the question requiring an answer is whether there
was an intent to exterminate.
Second, it is not appropriate to identify the arguments made in the debate as the
‘‘Turkish’’ view and the ‘‘Armenian’’ view; it should be an unacceptable attitude for a
social scientist to classify the differences of interpretation of these events according to
ethnic origin. Naturally, there will be people in every ethno-national group
who support the idea that one can examine the history through distinctly Turkish or
Armenian lenses. From the perspective of social science, however, such ethnocentric
explanations of history can hardly be defined as opposite positions; on the contrary,
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they are the reflection of one position and are generally treated as ‘‘nationalist
historiography.’’
Accordingly, when we classify different positions on the subject of mass murder, as
in the case of the Holocaust or the Rwandan and Cambodian genocides, we do not
categorize these positions according the parties of the conflict (e.g., the German
position, the Jewish position) or according to the ethnic origins of individuals. Rather,
we define them according to the arguments, or types of arguments, underlying the
various definitions and explanations. In the matter of the Holocaust, for example, the
differing interpretations are identified not as ‘‘Jewish’’ or ‘‘German’’ but on the basis of
different perspectives, approaches, and methods (e.g., functionalist vs. intentionalist).
One would expect from Lewy, a social scientist, a similar analysis of the differences
over the events of 1915, and a corresponding classification. Besides it is not technically
appropriate to identify the existing parties as ‘‘Turkish’’ and ‘‘Armenian.’’ Evidently,
one must grant that the meaning of the term ‘‘party’’ does change as the viewing
position of the observer changes. And, speaking of parties, the following is what I am
able to observe from where I stand at the moment.
On one side is the Turkish state, which has an official doctrine on 1915; this
doctrine is based mainly on repressing historical realities and forcing those who oppose
it into silence. The Turkish state is firmly convinced that it is competent to determine
what, how, and to what extent a citizen can think on matters of history. For this
reason, with the help of various ministries and institutes, it sternly supervises and
controls the ways and means by which Turkish society acquires the requisite
knowledge of history. It is no accident, therefore, that the first works dealing with
the Armenian question were written by diplomats associated with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Among the tasks of this ministry is to indoctrinate not only Turkish
citizens but other peoples and states about Ottoman-Turkish history, to condition
them to think about the subject in a certain way. It might not be too far-fetched to
compare the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to an institute of history, and its diplomats
to muftis issuing fetvas (authoritative opinions).
The official thesis is not shared by the majority of people in Turkey and cannot be
considered representative. Despite eighty-five years of induced amnesia and a policy of
repression, it is a fact that there exists, especially among the Alevi and Kurdish
communities, a narrative—not yet sufficiently written down, as it exists primarily as
part of an oral tradition—that is counterposed to the official thesis. To this one may
add the recent emergence in Turkey of a powerful democratic movement within civil
society. Undeniably an integral part of Turkish society, this group of people,
apparently unable yet to express themselves with adequate leverage and consequently
not yet sufficiently recognized by the public, consider the 1915 experience as a blot on
the country’s history, deserving of moral condemnation.
To restate the matter in other terms, if currently there are parties to the dispute,
what divides and separates them is not the question of whether or not to use the word
‘‘genocide.’’ Rather, the parties differ on the issue of whether the ill fate that befell the
Armenians can be considered a morally wrong act, a crime that must be condemned
accordingly, or whether it can be explained away or excused. On one side of the dispute
are those who treat the events of 1915 as morally indefensible, beyond the pale of
humanity, and therefore want to place them in the category of offenses. Subsumed in
this category of people, whose point of departure is moral condemnation, are (1) those
who consider the events of 1915 as a case of genocide; (2) those who prefer to refrain
from using that term, even though they may grant that that term does exactly reflect
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the reality; and (3) those who describe the act as a crime against humanity rather than
a clear-cut case of genocide. These people, anchored on a very powerful moral
foundation, are steadily gaining ground, as they proceed on the premise that no mass
murder can be justified or excused. Counterposed to this perspective is that of the
Turkish state, which posits that the situation under review here does not warrant
the use of the term ‘‘crime’’; even though there were some deaths, a state has the right
to resort to such an operation.
The existence of this strong ethical and moral conflict within Turkey renders this
subject exceedingly meaningful and important. A widespread segment of Turkey’s civil
society, which, relative to the events of 1915, has adopted the position of moral
condemnation, views the problem as an integral part of a process requiring an open
confrontation with Turkey’s history, placing 1915 within the framework of Turkey’s
contemporary pursuit of democracy and human rights. The need to confront the events
of 1915 and talk about them is, for them, an absolutely necessary condition for
the democratization of that society as a whole. Yet, the other side—which endorses
Lewy—the partisans of the official Turkish posture, using the leverage of the state,
continues to menace, prosecute, and intimidate with threats of imprisonment those
who would like to come to terms with history. The assassination of Hrant Dink cannot
be understood except within this context.

Serious Factual Errors
Lewy’s book contains many errors of fact; these errors alone may constitute sufficient
warning to readers that this work should be approached with suspicion. The following
very limited examples are offered by way of illustration.
First, in an article published as an introduction to the forthcoming book, we
find the following:
(1) ‘‘The first recorded tribunal began on February 5, 1919, in Yozgat, the province
which includes Ankara, charging three Turkish officials, including the governor of the
district, with mass murder and plunder of Armenian deportees.’’15 Three major errors
converge in this single sentence. First, the Yozgat trial series was conducted not in
Yozgat but in Istanbul. Second, Yozgat is not a province (vilayet), and Ankara is not
part of such a province; in fact, Yozgat is a county within Ankara province. Third,
Kemal not only was not governor but was not even serving as kaymakam (county
supervisor) in Yozgat during the period in question; in fact, he was kaymakam of
Bogazliyan county at the time. Only later did he become musatarrif of Yozgat.
(2) ‘‘Seven key figures, including Talât Pasha, minister of interior; Enver Pasha,
minister of war; and Cemal Pasha, governor of Aleppo, had fled, and therefore, were
tried in absentia.’’16 This statement contains two errors that appear to be minor but
nevertheless ought to have been avoided. At the time of his flight, Talât Pasha was
not interior minister but the former grand vizier, while Cemal Pasha was never vali
(i.e., governor) of Aleppo; rather, he was commander-in-chief of the 6th Ottoman Army
deployed in Lebanon and Syria.
Lewy’s book corrects these errors that appeared in the introductory preceding
article; it is likely that Vahakn Dadrian’s exposure of the errors prior to the
appearance of the book played a role in these corrections.17 Nevertheless, the book is
still replete with factual errors, some of which are detailed below:
(1) ‘‘German missionary Liparit . . . stated that Talaat was a man ‘who over the last
six years has acquired the reputation of a sincere adherent of Turkish–Armenian
friendship’ ’’ (65). This indicates that Lewy is unaware that Dr. Liparit Nasariantz was
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an Armenian activist, not a German missionary; he was a member of the GermanArmenian Society with Johannes Lepsius and later became a member of the Armenian
National Council.
(2) ‘‘In January 1916 the Russians, led by advance guards of Armenian volunteers,
took Diarbekir’’ (118). The fact is, however, that Diyarbekir was never occupied by
the Russians. Moreover, it is common knowledge in Turkey that on 11 March 1916
Mustafa Kemal was appointed to the post of commander in charge of the DiyarbekirBitlis-Mus! front, and that he remained on duty there from 1 April 1916 to the end
of 1917.
(3) ‘‘The Turkish Historian Kamuran Gürün . . .’’ (113); ‘‘. . . the Turkish historian
Ahmed Emin Yalman’’ (249). In fact, neither of these two men was a historian: the
former served as a diplomat, while the latter was a journalist.
(4) ‘‘Throughout the trials no witnesses were heard; the verdict of the courts rested
entirely on documents and testimony mentioned or read during the trial proceedings’’
(80). This is one of the most important arguments Lewy has advanced in questioning
the validity of the proceedings of Istanbul’s court-martial. Yet this argument is based
on a mistake that should have been avoided. In fact, witnesses were dispensed with
only in the trials of CUP leaders and the separately held trials of cabinet ministers,
both of which had been subsumed into a conjoined verdict-rendition sitting. Witnesses
for both prosecution and defense were allowed, and heard, in all other trial series.18
In many cases, recourse to witnesses was used simply to prolong the trial. In some
cases, witness testimony in favor of the defendant served as grounds to bring in a
verdict of ‘‘not guilty.’’19 Furthermore, some verdicts incorporated certain portions
of witness testimony or contained statements attributed to witnesses. A careful
reading of the available texts of the verdicts dealing with Trabzon and Yozgat, or of
others published either in Turkish daily newspapers of the time or in the official
gazette of the government (Takvim-i Vekâyi), will reveal plenty of quotations from
witnesses.20
(5) ‘‘None of the testimony, written depositions, and documents put forth by the
prosecution were subjected to cross examination by the defense, which makes it
impossible to consider these materials conclusive proof ’’ (82). Two separate problems
arise here. The first relates to the question of whether or not the method of crossexamination was in use in the Ottoman legal system. Lewy considers the absence of
this method a very important liability of the system, and, by extension, dismisses the
validity of the verdicts of the Istanbul trials. This is a very strange argument indeed,
for the issue is not unique to the Ottoman legal system but extends to European
practices and, especially, the French legal system, on which the Ottoman system was
based.
The Ottoman Penal Code, enacted in 1858, is a translation of the equivalent
French code promulgated in 1810; likewise, the Ottoman Code of Criminal Procedure,
enacted in 1879, is a translation of its 1808 French counterpart. It is curious to
conclude that since, technically, there is no room for cross-examination, the resulting
verdicts and the tribunals issuing them must be the products of a faulty system.
Indeed, it is unnecessary and meaningless to make an issue of the existing technical
differences between French and Anglo-Saxon legal systems, each of which has its own
peculiar advantages and disadvantages.21
I consider Lewy’s critique of the Ottoman system as lacking legal standards
simply because it differs from the Anglo-Saxon system a deprecation of the French
system and is a mistake that could have been avoided. Furthermore, although
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technically not permitting cross-examination, the courts throughout the trials did
allow considerable leeway to the defense. As a result, witnesses were bombarded with
questions by defense counsel, who enjoyed sufficient latitude that, during various
sittings, heated arguments developed between witnesses, their lawyers, the defendants, and their lawyers. The Yozgat and Trabzon trial series, as the first cases to be
prosecuted, became the battleground for such arguments; the daily newspapers of the
period echoed these debates, day in and day out, in detail.22
A second important point relates to Lewy’s assertion that the defendants had no
opportunity to inspect and verify the authenticity of the documentary evidence in the
possession of the court. This, too, is a major fallacy, as such evidence and witness
testimony were, in fact, offered to the defendants and their counsel for examination
and response. Here, again, two examples illustrate the point. The first relates to
Yozgat. During the ninth sitting of the trial series, on 22 February 1919, Colonel
S! ahabettin, interior commander of Kayseri’s 15th Division, appearing as a defense
witness, was caught by surprise; confronted with a batch of coded telegrams produced
by the prosecution, he denied that they had originated from him. When the prosecutor
asked whether he would like to examine them to be sure, the colonel instantly grasped
the risky situation and, reversing himself, said, ‘‘No need for it. Certainly, you
are correct’’—acknowledging that, indeed, the telegrams had originated from
him.23 S! ahabettin was subsequently taken into custody so that charges could be laid
against him.24
The second example is drawn from the proceedings of what is called the Main Trial
series, subsumed under which were the trials of CUP leaders and those of cabinet
ministers. During the second sitting of this trial series, on 4 May 1919, a document
introduced by Colonel Cevad, Istanbul’s wartime military governor, was not only read
out by Cevad himself but also read into the record through the dispensation of the chief
judge, making both acts part of the court transcripts.25 At the fourth sitting of the
same trial series, on 8 May, he was shown a number of telegrams bearing his
signature, which he verified.26 The same Colonel Cevad, at the fifth sitting (12 May
1919), verified the authenticity of these telegrams and that of his own signature at the
bottom of four separate telegrams; each of these was shown to him for confirmation, at
which point he said, ‘‘Yes, this is my signature.’’27 A similar procedure was applied
to Midhat S! ükrü, secretary general of the CUP, who was given an opportunity
to inspect and verify the telegrams bearing his signature and who declared, ‘‘Yes, sir,
that’s right, I remember.’’28
(6) According to Lewy, during the trial proceedings ‘‘the defendants denied any
connection between the Special Organization and the central committee of the CUP’’
(86). This statement is wrong, as is the assumption Lewy bases on it. During the fifth
and sixth sittings of the courts-martial, a number of documents were read into the
record that reveal the close links between the SO, the Central Committee of the CUP,
the Ministry of War, local party outfits, and units of volunteers. As usual, the
documents were shown to the defendants, who then confirmed having issued them.
Subsequently, the defendants, who previously had denied any links between the CUP,
the SO, and the Ministry of War, admitted to the existence of such links. At the sixth
sitting, for example, S! ükrü, admitting such a link between the SO and the CUP
relative to recruiting men for the purpose of creating contingents of brigands (çete), is
quoted as saying, ‘‘As the SO conveyed to us their need for a special type of people,
we accordingly forwarded their request to our provincial clubs.’’ The following set of
declarations by other operatives is along the same lines. Atif: ‘‘We already designated
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Midhat S! ükrü as the middle man for these undertakings. He is handling the problem
of communications and relaying to us the requisite items of information.’’ Talât:
‘‘Having been in touch with every institution, the CUP might have been likewise in
communication with the SO. It is possible that the SO had made a request to the CUP
saying, ‘Help us through your party, your organization.’ It is then natural that the
CUP’s Central Committee, in response to requests, be they from the Ministry of War
or, in its name, from the SO, hesitant to decline such requests, proceeded on the advice
of some of the members of its organization to accommodate these requests, whether
coming from the War Ministry, the SO, or the Interior Ministry.’’ Cevad: ‘‘From
the contents of these telegrams, it is clear that [the link] did exist.’’29 Some of the
defendants testified that these links were not ‘‘official’’ in nature. Ziya Gökalp’s
response was that, ‘‘since there was a war, it was our duty to assist,’’30 and Midhat
S! ükrü stated, ‘‘It was in the service of the fatherland. Anybody can pitch in
and assist.’’31
(7) ‘‘There is no credible evidence to support . . . assertion[s] about Stange’s service
as an SO commander’’ (84). This statement is also incorrect. There are three primary
sources documenting the German Colonel Stange’s involvement in the SO. First, this
involvement is attested by Yusuf Rıza, commander of the SO units headquartered in
Trabzon and a cohort of Stange, who testified at the Istanbul courts-martial. In his
testimony, after stating that he had worked closely with Stange, he declared that ‘‘we
were handling our communications through the medium of Stange’s cipher.’’32 Similar
testimony was given by a Turkish officer on duty in Stange’s regiment.33 Second,
Bahaeddin S! akir, a member of the CUP Central Committee and the operational chief
of the SO, likewise confirmed Stange’s involvement in the activities of the SO. In a
coded telegram he sent to the chiefs of SO units operating in the area of Trabzon, S! akir
declared, ‘‘You, along with your troops, are subject to the authority of Stange,’’34
clearly confirming Stange’s involvement in the SO’s operations.
The third source on Stange’s involvement in the SO is a document from the archive
of the General Staff’s Military History and Strategic Studies Institute, or ATASE
(Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüd Bas! kanlığı), in Ankara. An article titled ‘‘The Local
Administration of the Special Organization in Trabzon Province,’’ uses an official
Ottoman document from the ATASE archive, from which we learn that Stange
was appointed chief of the SO units in Trabzon region in March 1915, replacing the
above-mentioned Yusuf Rıza.35

The Naim–Andonian Documents
Lewy maintains that the deportation and consequent extermination of the Armenians
was not the result of a plan. In order to sustain this assertion, he disputes the
validity of three sets of documents that support the opposite claim. The Naim–
Andonian documents top this list (see note 4). These are documents published by Aram
Andonian in French, English, and Armenian, which are purported to have been
issued by Talât Pasha. Orel and Yuca declared them forgeries; Dadrian insists on
their admissibility.36
The main problem here is that the originals of these documents are missing, and
nobody seems to know where they may be. Pending the location of the originals, the
doubts surrounding these documents will be impossible to dispel. However, to dismiss
them entirely based on our limited information is as unsound as to accept them
unquestioningly.
124

Review Essay: Guenter Lewy’s The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey

One question that Lewy leaves unanswered is of central importance, however.
Should we find any other documents that support the Naim–Andonian documents, or
are akin to them, could we then still maintain that their contents are false? Dadrian
follows this path in his article on the subject, which he compared several documents
with other sources, reaching similar conclusions.37 This approach enables us to argue
that, at the very least, some of the documents published by Andonian—and, perhaps
most importantly, the material contained in these documents as a group—is
irrefutable.
An example is the work of Ahmet Emin Yalman. He provides a statement from
Bahaeddin S! akir whose content is similar to that of a statement appearing in one of
the documents published by Andonian.38 A similar picture emerges from two coded
telegrams in which Talât tells the army not to meddle in the matter of the Armenian
deportations. We learn from these documents that Talât persuaded the Ministry of
War to issue orders to local garrison commanders and to military not to interfere with
the expulsions. A circular to this effect was sent to the military authorities in the
provinces.39 We have at least two different sources that verify the content of this
document. At the seventh session of the Yozgat trial (11 February 1919), an army
officer, Halil Recai, said that he had received orders from Enver Pasha, then minister
of war, to the effect that the army was not to interfere in the deportation of Armenians.
Recai repeated this statement during the trial’s fourteenth session (26 March 1920).40
At the sixteenth session of the Trabzon trial (5 May 1919), Avni Pasha, commander of
the local garrison, claimed that he had received orders from the Ministry of War not
to interfere with affairs of the provincial governor.41
There is another case of two documents possessing identical content. One is an
order, bearing the number 801 and dated of 26 December 1915, attributed to Talât; the
other is a document lodged in the Prime Minister’s Archive, which orders ‘‘the removal
and expulsion of the regular and temporary Baghdad Railway workers—except those
who previously were already relocated.’’42 By identifying the numbers 840 and 860 as
belonging to documents published by Andonian whose contents are similar in part to
numbered documents found in the Ottoman Archives, Hilmar Kaiser has made a
similar comparison.43
Another issue is the viability of demonstrating the accuracy of some of the
documents reproduced by Andonian based on Ottoman documents. The incident at
Aleppo’s Baron Hotel may provide an example in this regard. After maintaining that
this hotel was a meeting place for Aleppo’s high-ranking government officials,
Andonian, referring to the owner of the hotel, says, ‘‘he was so generous in spending all
his wealth on entertaining the people who might any day become the executioners
of his nation, that he succeeded in gaining a great influence, which he used in
trying to save his compatriots.’’44 This is the reason why he suggests that one of the
most important tasks of S! ükrü Bey, director of the Office of Tribal and Refugee
Settlement (IAMM) of the Ministry of the Interior45 and, as such, responsible for the
problems of deportation and destruction in this area was ‘‘that the nest should
be cleared out.’’46
Two documents in the Prime Minister’s Archive corroborate Andonian’s assertions.
Here the identity of the person who signed the document is as important as the
document itself. Having been directly involved in the matter in question,
Talât, in a coded telegram containing the same details as those provided
by Andonian, requested that an investigation be launched into the officials upon
which the Armenian hotelier was exerting influence and that the results of this
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investigation be conveyed to him at once.47 As a result of the investigation, Talât,
through a coded telegram directed to Cemal Pasha, ordered the removal of the owner of
that hotel from that area.48 The Baron Hotel incident is important in another respect:
this telegram tellingly demonstrates, contrary to Lewy’s contention, Istanbul’s close
oversight over the developments in the various regions and Talât’s direct intervention
in several instances.

The Proceedings of the Istanbul Courts-Martial
Lewy advances three main arguments as to why he cannot make use of the documents
and related materials produced during the Istanbul courts-martial, which he devalues
as ‘‘alleged’’ evidence and thus devoid of usefulness. In addition to arguing that the
Ottoman legal system did not operate at the standard necessary to arrive at a judicious
verdict, and that the authenticity of the documents used in the proceedings cannot be
verified, since the originals are missing, and hence the documents are not reliable,
he also claims that the tribunals were merely the product of ‘‘victory justice.’’
The same argument has been made about the Nuremberg trials, which have been
labeled as a product of ‘‘victor’s justice’’ or as a ‘‘high-class lynching party.’’49 It is a
fact, however, that not only the Istanbul and Nuremburg trials but all other
similar courts set up in the wake of World War II, and even the International
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, could be dismissed with
the same rationale. Of course, one should not ignore the political character of all
these bodies.
However, the following examples demonstrate that conditions with respect to both
the prisons and the trials were quite lax. The same American and British sources that
Lewy uses to invalidate the findings of the Istanbul courts-martial confirm that, to
the contrary, the courts were favorably disposed toward the CUP.50
The judiciousness of the verdicts issued by these courts is not the subject matter of
this essay. Its central objective is not the examination of the verdicts themselves but,
rather, the reliability of the documents and of the testimony obtained both from
defendants and from witnesses for the prosecution, as well as the validity of all these
materials with respect to their documentation of certain historical events. Particularly
at issue here are the following questions: Were the testimonies of the defendants
and witnesses obtained as a result of torture? Were the accused in any way subjected
to pressure before providing their testimony? Did the accused or the witnesses, in
the course of the hearings or later in their memoirs, provide any revealing
information?
From the Istanbul court-martial proceedings, three different sets of documents are
available for study. One set consists of official documents belonging to various state
departments and institutions, such as the CUP; another contains testimonies obtained
from the accused and from potential witnesses during pre-trial interrogations; the
third comprises transcripts of the testimonies provided by defendants and other
witnesses during the trials. As far as the first group is concerned, there is strong
evidence that the documents are originals. Following an inspection by competent
ministerial officials as to their authenticity, each these documents was been stamped
with the formula ‘‘it conforms to the original’’ or ‘‘it is a true replica of the original.’’51
Equally and perhaps more important is the fact that, as indicated above, not only
were these documents shown to the defendants but the latter verified their
authenticity.
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Furthermore, it is known that all this evidence was obtained without resort to
violence or torture and that it was provided by defendants, as well as witnesses,
entirely voluntarily. The terms of oversight of defendants and prison conditions in the
period between 1918 and 1921 were exceedingly lax. From the very beginning of their
incarceration, suspects were held together at police headquarters and were able to
communicate and map out common defense strategies. According to one of these
suspects,
The uncovered balcony at the top floor of Police Directorate’s prison quickly became
a public gathering place . . . the inmates were offering each other home-made
tasty meals . . . I was witnessing a phenomenon that involved the reckoning of the
entire era.52

The conditions in Bekirağa prison, where the same defendants were also held,
were not much different; there was no strict control of those entering and leaving the
prison. A British report provides details about the living conditions of the 112 inmates
there:
The arrangements which at present exist at Seraskerat prison are not considered
sufficiently adequate to ensure the proper supervision or safeguard of the persons
confined therein, owing to the laxity and lack of system of control prevailing there.
The following points have been noted: a) All prisoners, of whom there are 112, are
allowed to walk about the prison and mix freely together during the day. b) Visiting
hours for friends of prisoners are supposed to be between 12:00–14:00 hours daily,
but these hours are not kept to, and individuals may be seen going and coming from
the prison throughout the day. c) Except for a casual glance at their passes,
individuals are not subjected to any inspection on entering the prison, and large
packets are often to be seen being carried in by individuals, stated to be food, but
might be anything. d) Women are allowed in all times during the day, and are never
inspected. e) Turkish soldiers who are detailed to look after the prisoners mix freely
with them, moving in and out of the prison at will, and if susceptible to bribery it
would be very easy for them to aid a prisoner’s escape.53

In his memoirs, Foreign Minister Halil Mentes! e relates how officials of the commission
of inquiry attached to the courts-martial frequently came to the prison to debate with
the inmates.54
Incredible as it may sound, many of the defendants were able to leave at any time
they chose, returning to the prison after several days, and then, as they put it, only to
avoid putting the prison director in an embarrassing situation.55 The external visits and
outings of those held in these prisons were reported in the daily newspapers.56 In his
memoirs, Yunus Nadi (himself a CUP man), who had prepared a plan for the escape of
imprisoned CUP men, discloses that only two of the latter had agreed to escape, whereas
the others had declined, expressing the belief that ‘‘we will soon be freed.’’57
The court proceedings that began in February 1919 were open to the press and
to spectators. Among the defendants, there was a very strong sense of solidarity.
The defense of Kemal, the county supervisor (kaymakam) of Boğazlıyan, for example,
was jointly prepared and written down by CUP men, his co-inmates.58 All these points
demonstrate that the evidence presented by defendants and by witnesses for the
prosecution were not sought and obtained under conditions of duress or pressure but
were solely their personally framed and freely offered testimonies.
Three types of sources are available for the complete or partial texts of these
documents—discounting the reproduction of limited excerpts in some personal
memoirs. These documents and testimonies are either completely or partially
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reproduced in the court transcripts published in Takvim-i Vekâyi; it is also possible to
get detailed data about them from the daily press. Furthermore, the copies of a
significant proprtion of these documents and related material are lodged in the archives
of the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem.
The important written testimony of Vehip Pasha, commander-in-chief of the
Ottoman Turkish 3rd Army during World War I, which Lewy dismisses as ‘‘unreliable’’
and invalid, best portrays the situation. ‘‘In the absence of complete original
documents,’’ Lewy writes, ‘‘we have to be content with selected quotations . . . but
without the full text we lose the context of the quoted remarks’’ (80–81). He
consequently sees no problem with describing this document as an ‘‘alleged’’ one (250)
and thus dismissing its contents. Yet, like Dadrian, he quotes excerpts from this
statement by General Vehip, parts of which appear in the key indictment as well as in
the Harput verdict (the full text of which was read into the record at the 29 March 1919
sitting of the Trabzon trial series). Vehip’s testimony is available not only in the
Takvim-i Vekâyi but also in the period’s press. Perhaps more important is a fact of
which Lewy is apparently unaware: the entire text of Vehip Pasha’s testimony was
published in the daily newspapers of the time.59 The same document is available in the
archives of the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem.60 The text of the Jerusalem copy
is identical to that published in the Turkish newspaper Vakit, as is true of the excerpts
quoted in the key indictment and in the verdict issued by the Turkish Military
Tribunal. In other words, the authenticity of Vehip Pasha’s testimony can be
determined and corroborated through different sources.
Similar corroboration can be established with respect to practically every other
document by way of such sources as the Takvim-i Vekâyi and Turkish daily
newspapers; in many cases, the archives of the Armenian Patriarchate of
Jerusalem; and, in some cases, personal memoirs. The set of documents that Lewy
rejects, calling them ‘‘alleged,’’ is the very set of documents whose existence and
content are verifiable.
By his own reasoning, inasmuch as there is no definite proof that documents related
to the deportations were destroyed, Lewy should have qualified his claims of their
destruction as ‘‘alleged.’’ Lewy somehow seems persuaded, however, that the important
documents were destroyed after all. This being the case, it is incumbent upon him to
answer two questions: For what conceivable reasons have those responsible destroyed
these documents? Is it reasonable to suppose that those responsible for destroying the
documents were attempting to hide their guilt?
In view of his own argument that the incriminating documents have been
destroyed by the perpetrators and that we have no original documents to hand, that
Lewy nevertheless proposes an explanation favoring those very perpetrators and
completely supporting their exterminatory intent is beyond all logic and is difficult to
comprehend.

The Special Organization
Lewy claims that the Special Organization had nothing to do with operations relating
to the deportations and mass murders in question. This is evident, he writes, because,
apart from some relevant testimony embedded in the key indictment but consisting of
mere assertions, there is no evidence or documentation of it whatsoever (84–85).
Here, however, Lewy gravely errs. Beyond the text of the key indictment, a very
large number of documents and related pieces of material in the Prime Ministerial
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Archive in Istanbul reveal the SO’s active involvement in the Armenian deportations
and massacres at issue here.
Let us start with the Istanbul trials to see how the defendants in these trials
openly admitted the involvement of the SO.
Confronted with some of these highly incriminating documents, Yusuf Riza, a
member of the CUP’s Central Committee, conceded the principal roles of that
committee and of the SO in perpetrating the crimes involved:
Regretfully we have now reached a point where it becomes evident that under the
direct orders of the CUP’s Central Committee, the Special Organization became
instrumental for the commission of all the crimes. I myself am unable, Your
Highness, to find and offer to you a satisfactory explanation.61

One reading of such documents occurred during the fifth session of the main trial
series. Addressing defendant Riza, the chief judge declared, ‘‘It is clear from your
testimony that among the contingents involved in the matter of deportations and
massacres, there also were companies, that is, Special Organization troops.’’ Riza’s
response was that there were two different types of Special Organizations. One of
these consisted of SO units like his own, which operated outside Ottoman borders.
On the other hand, local SO units directed by local governors (valis) and the CUP’s
responsible secretaries, did operate within Ottoman territory and thus became directly
implicated in the handling of the deporations.62
This matter of the SO’s direct complicity in crimes was bared especially by civilian
bureaucrats, as well as military officers, testifying throughout the trial sessions;
their testimonies were reproduced not only in the daily newspapers of the period but
also in the texts of the respective verdicts. An example is the testimony of Tahsin,
governor general of Erzurum. During the second session of the Harput trial series, on
2 August 1919, Tahsin testified that the SO, led by Bahaeddin S! akir, was directly
involved in the handling of the deportations and that ‘‘the massacres against the
deportee convoys were perpetrated by units subsumed under the name of the SO.’’63
The text of the verdict rendered in this trial series includes numerous documents, and
ample testimony from Turkish witnesses, attesting to the crimes committed by
the SO.64
At the 5 April 1919 sitting of the Trabzon trial series, similar testimony was
provided by Avni Pasha, who was commandant in the Trabzon province’s Lazistan
area during the deportations, and stated that ‘‘a band of brigands, known as Cemal
Azmi’s [the Trabzon governor general’s] volunteers, and involved in deportations and
massacres, were actually SO brigands.’’65 Another piece of testimony linking the SO to
the Armenian deportations was provided in the affidavit of Res! it Pasha, governor
general of Kastamonu province, which was entered into the record on 27 October 1919,
during the fifth session of the Responsible Secretaries trial series. In it the governor
declared that he had been dismissed from his post through a discharge certificate
signed by Bahaeddin S! akir with the title ‘‘Chief of the Special Organization.’’
The reason given there was that, as vali, Res! it had failed to comply with the order
to have the province’s Armenians deported.66 Likewise, at the seventh session of
the same trial series on 12 November 1919, the witnesses testified that of the
180 Armenians who were deported to Çankırı from Istanbul, only some thirty
survived; that the rest were murdered; and that Responsible Secretary Cemal Oğuz
directed the SO brigands involved.67 The verdict in the Bayburt trials reproduces
many statements excerpted from the testimonies of Turkish witnesses attesting to the
crimes committed by the SO. Adil, commander of Erzurum’s gendarmerie regiment,
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stated in his testimony, for example, that, following an investigation he himself
conducted and based on written responses he received from the commander of
Bayburt’s gendarmerie, he had established that ‘‘the Armenians were massacred by
the recruits of the SO.’’68
The Erzincan trial revealed that the crimes perpetrated in that region were the
work of the SO operating in the area. Details about the ways and means of these
crimes emerged in the course of the trial. The testimonies of Turkish prosecution
witnesses, led by Riza, a staff lieutenant-colonel, played a decisive role in the
administration of punishment at various levels against the defendants, including
Abdullah Avni, who later, on 29 July 1920, was executed by hanging.69 Described by
the press as the trial covering the ‘‘CUP brigands’ most important instrument of
execution’’ and as the trial of café owner Necati from Crete, the proceedings that began
on 19 July 1919 actually dealt with the brigands operating in the environs of
Diyarbekir and Urfa. The accused, Necati, belonged to a group of brigands known
as the brigands of Es! ref of Diyarbekir. In his testimony the defendant stated,
‘‘Your Highness, Pasha. I didn’t know our Detachment was identified as one of
brigands. Our garments, our crowd, our everything was soldierly; we were soldiers
indeed.’’ During the proceedings several pieces of witness testimony and certain coded
telegrams dealing with the crimes involved and with wrongful seizures were read into
the record.70 The list extends to several pages.
A second important aspect of Lewy’s claim that there is no proof of the involvement
of SO units stems from his lack of knowledge about the meaning of the terms
‘‘brigands,’’ ‘‘irregulars,’’ ‘‘chettes,’’ and ‘‘volunteers.’’ Lewy, while granting that such
groups were involved in massacre operations and, accordingly, discussing them at
some length, nevertheless maintains that he somehow was unable to pinpoint the
individual identities of their members or the identities of those who organized them.
This was the source of some frustration, since he could not precisely relate them to
a particular organization and yet acknowledges them as the actual perpetrators,
‘‘no matter how recruited, directed, or composed’’ (228).
From the Istanbul trials we learn that ‘‘brigands,’’ ‘‘irregulars,’’ ‘‘chettes’’ (çetes),
and ‘‘volunteers’’ are the official terms used to define and to describe SO units.
It should be noted that, based on sufficient available data, we can identify three
essential sources supplying the SO’s manpower needs: the Kurdish tribes, refugees
from the Caucasus and the Balkans (mainly Circassians), and convicts. Approximately
twenty relevant documents were produced during the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh
sessions of the main trial series.71 It is natural, therefore, that when describing these
brigands, several observers and those possessing a good memory affixed the words
‘‘Kurdish,’’ ‘‘Circassian,’’ or ‘‘convict.’’
It is astonishing indeed that Lewy failed to recognize the fact that these terms
were typically used to describe the SO’s brigand contingents (221–32). It may be useful
to adduce here some facts demonstrating that all such designations as ‘‘chette’’ (çete),
‘‘volunteer,’’ and ‘‘irregular’’ were used to depict the SO units and that the founders of
SO themselves especially used these descriptive labels. At the fourth session of the
main trial series on 8 May 1919, for example, the judge posed the following question:
‘‘What was meant by the term çete you have been using? Is it appropriate to designate
as ‘brigands’ a detachment that is connected to the War Ministry and is part of the
Army?’’ Colonel Cevad responded that ‘‘in the orders issued by the War Ministry,’’
these kinds of different labels were used, adding that ‘‘some detachments were called
volunteers, others were described as brigands.’’72 Similarly, during the fifth trial
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session, defendant Arif, another SO official, responded to the chief judge’s question,
‘‘What was meant by the term çete?’’ by declaring, ‘‘Well, sometimes we called these
units çete, and other times we referred to them as the volunteers detachment.
Also, among us, we used the term Committee to describe the chiefs, the leaders, and
the units they commanded.’’73
Indeed, throughout the trial proceedings, the telegrams and letters relating to the
Ministry of War, the SO, and the CUP’s Central Committee that were read into the
record identified SO units, time and again, as ‘‘the çetes,’’ that is, as brigands.
For example, a telegram introduced during the fifth session and bearing the signature
of SO leader Halil Pasha contained the order to ‘‘send off as soldiers some hundred men
from among those who are eager to serve as brigands.’’ During the same session was
read an official communication, sent to the CUP Central Committee by Samsun’s CUP
Secretariat, containing the following statement: ‘‘A contingent of fifty-five brigands,
under the command of Tufan Ağa from Artvin, has just been sent off via motorboat as a
fifth group.’’74 Testimony was heard during this session, and documents were read into
the record, about SO troops who were portrayed as volunteers. A few illustrative
examples may suffice.
At the fourth trial session on 8 May 1919, defendants Atıf and Cevad, responding
to questions dealing with the links established with the CUP in the course of creating
the SO units, defined these units as ‘‘volunteer detachments’’ or as ‘‘an outfit of
volunteers.’’75 Cevad offered a similar explanation again at the fifth session when he
described the SO units as ‘‘volunteer troops’’ and as ‘‘the company of volunteers,’’
reading out the texts of some telegrams in order to prove this point.76 Midhat S! ükrü, in
his testimony at the same session, admitted to having sent to CUP provincial
secretaries a formal request that ‘‘they should help recruit volunteers for the SO and
should otherwise render service to the fatherland.’’ For his part, Ziya Gökalp testified
that following the declaration of general mobilization, the Ministry of War launched
the SO and accordingly set out to organize volunteer bands. Similar testimony can be
found in official documents; for example (1) the use of the words ‘‘volunteer recruits’’
(gönüllü efradı) in an official Ministry of War document introduced during the fifth
session and (2) an instruction that, ‘‘the people in question being just convicts, they
should be sent off along with the battalion comprising similar type of people.’’77
Since Lewy is suspicious of documents issuing from the Military Tribunal, let
us close this section with some documents from the Prime Ministerial Archives
in Istanbul that also show the direct involvement of the SO in the deportation of
Armenians. One such document is a coded telegram sent by the office of the
commander of the Istanbul Military Police (Merkez Kumandanlığı), Lieutenant
Colonel Cevdet, on 2 June 1915 through the Ministry of the Interior to the governor
of Mamuretülaziz. In this telegram Cevdet asks the governor’s opinion on sending SO
troops against the Armenians in Dersim region, since many Armenians were escaping
from the convoys through the cooperation and help of the Kurds.78
This archive also contains dozens of documents showing that the Ministry of the
Interior was involved in organizing SO units in various provinces and that the terms
‘‘Special Organization’’ and ‘‘brigands’’ (çete), ‘‘volunteers,’’ and so on are synonymous.
For example, in a telegram sent on 26 November 1914 from the Ministry of the Interior
to various provinces and provincial districts, we read the following: ‘‘We need people
for purposes of brigandage in the Caucasus . . . Try to assemble as many Lazes and
Circassians as possible, namely those who are most suitable for brigandage.’’79
Similarly, another coded telegram sent by Talât, the interior minister, to Trabzon, uses
131

Genocide Studies and Prevention 3:1 April 2008

the terms ‘‘brigands’’ and ‘‘volunteers’’ to describe the SO units.80 Among various
telegrams with the same content, one deserves our special attention. This is a coded
telegram, sent by Talât to the governor’s office of Mamuratül province, in which Talât
informs the governor that the 3rd Army is ‘‘in charge of drafting volunteers from the
tribes.’’81
I assume that after looking into these documents, Lewy will revise his position
regarding the Special Organization.

A Marginal Note on the Subject of the Central Government
In all his arguments, Lewy underscores a single thesis: ‘‘No authentic documentary
evidence exists to prove the culpability of the central government of Turkey for
the massacre of 1915–6. . . . it is safe to say that no such evidence exists for the events
of 1915–6’’ (250). It is beyond the scope of this essay to tackle the subject of the policy
of extermination the central government is said to have systematically pursued
in targeting the Armenians. However, in the belief that it may prove instructive,
some marginal notes, framed in the light of documents from the Prime Ministerial
Archives, may be adduced here. Although this may appear at first to be only
a technical matter, it must nevertheless be singled out as an important issue.
Sufficient material and documents are available on the subject of the central
government’s having been rendered inoperative and impotent in the matter of
the wholesale destruction of the Armenians, whether with respect to its planning or
to its implementation. The operations of deportation and destruction were largely
carried out by the CUP, which had gained control over the affairs of the government.
In other words, the basic question, within the framework of the present debate,
is whether or not the mass deportations and mass murder in which the central
government was involved were carried out beyond the knowledge and will of
such persons as Talât, Enver, and Halil Mentes! e, as members of the government,
and of the CUP’s Central Committee, which exercised tight control over the
government.
The available documents, together with Talât’s statement, cited above, that
‘‘the entire responsibility relative to the severity of the applied methods belongs to me,’’
starkly sum up the picture.82 The events in question here did not take place within a
few weeks or months but, rather, covered almost two years. Furthermore, it is
impossible to confirm that the central government in Istanbul, during all this time,
made any serious effort to end the pain and suffering of the Armenians. Lewy’s
endeavor to account for this failure through the authorities’ ‘‘ineptness,’’ ‘‘misconception,’’ ‘‘bureaucratic fiasco,’’ or ‘‘lack of farsightedness’’ has no basis in fact. One
could show a measure of understanding for such explanatory notions had there been
any genuinely helpful efforts that, in the end, proved abortive or inadequate; in fact,
however, the available evidence points in the opposite direction. Indeed, there is not an
iota of evidence that any policy or plan existed to aid the relocation of the Armenians
in the very areas that were announced as their ultimate destination of exile.
For example, thus far there not a single record has been found in the Ottoman
Archives that the government even attempted to distribute land, seeds, houses, or
money to the ‘‘relocated’’ Armenians, who had left all their belongings behind; nor is
there any evidence that the land, houses, seeds, and tools were ever actually granted.
By contrast, the cipher office of the Ministry of the Interior is filled with hundreds of
documents dealing with the expropriation of the properties left behind. By the same
token, there is not the slightest evidence of a policy or administrative initiative
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pointing to an effort to remit to the Armenians the revenues resulting from the sale of
their properties; yet the same archives contain hundreds of documents showing that
these revenues were systematically used to meet the costs of other undertakings: to
help finance the war, to create an Islamic bourgeoisie, to relocate Muslim refugees, and
to cover the government’s expenses resulting from the work of deportation.83
The real purpose of the investigative commissions sent to certain provincial
regions in 1915–1916 was to check and control the plundering of Armenian properties
and to ensure that the ensuing revenues would flow into Istanbul.84 Moreover, it is
common knowledge that throughout this period the offers of foreign countries to
extend help to alleviate the plight of surviving Armenians were systematically turned
down.85 It is also known that investigations were launched and arrests made when
organizations and individuals tried to extend help to the Armenians languishing in the
deserts of Syria and Iraq. Some examples may be cited. When informed that
the American embassy had undertaken such initiatives, the Ministry of War, on
12 January 1916, sent a communication to the Ministry of the Interior to the effect
that, ‘‘through secret means,’’ it had learned that money and help were being given to
the Armenians and that, ‘‘following a serious investigation, the results are to be
reported back.’’86 On 30 January 1916, Talât dispatched to all provincial authorities a
telegram stating that, the fact of delivery of monetary assistance to the Armenians
having been ascertained, the matter ‘‘should be investigated in an earnest but secret
way.’’87 In another order, sent on 6 February 1916, Talât demanded that the moneys
the American missionaries were distributing be confiscated, asserting that they
‘‘will be distributed through the means of the government.’’88 In a telegram dated
13 February 1916, he relayed the order that ‘‘NO permit should be issued to
untrustworthy foreigners or to American or non-Muslim Ottoman merchants wanting
to travel to areas inhabited by Armenians.’’89 On 23 March 1916, upon learning that
monetary and other kinds of help from German and American organizations were
continuing, Talât reiterated that ‘‘the money delivered by American and German
organizations’’ would have to be distributed by government agencies, demanding the
cessation of the distribution in progress. A footnote in that document contains a
request that after three days the order be transmitted to all regions.90
Another problem besetting the government was the presence among local officials
of those who helped the Armenians or condoned such help from others. In an order sent
to the regions on 3 April 1916, Talât, invoking one of Enver’s orders, threatened severe
punishment for these officials.91 In a telegram dated 24 July 1916, Talât requested the
arrest and return to Aleppo of two Armenians, traveling with documentation from
the governorship of Aleppo, who had been observed secretly distributing money to the
Armenians in Deir Zor in the heat of the summer.92
The preceding discussion is not intended to examine the central government’s
policy on relief work, but it nevertheless demonstrates that the government
in question was not a weak entity unable to exercise control over the distant regions.
On the contrary, what the evidence shows is a government so keen, and able, to
maintain a tight grip that, in order to stop any help from reaching the Armenians, it
intervened in the most minute details of such aid operations—even going to the trouble
of tracking down two Armenians distributing money in Deir Zor so as to prevent
any and all help for the doomed victims. Indeed, some Turkish officials, whom
Cemal Pasha had authorized to help resettle the deported Armenians, disclosed in
their personal memoirs that the aim of the deportations was not relocation but
extermination.93
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Moreover, the authorities, whom Lewy portrays as feeble and impotent, proceeded
harshly against those local officials who really believed that the policy was a genuine
plan to resettle the Armenian deportees; some of these officials, as a result, were
liquidated in various ways, and others were dismissed from their posts. The murders of
at least six such officials are known: the governor general of Basra; the county
executives of Lice, Müntefak, Midyat, and Bafra; and the deputy county executive
of Bes! iri.94 Approximately twenty local officials were relieved of their posts, and some
of them openly stated in their oral and written testimonies at the Istanbul courtsmartial, as well as in their memoirs, that they were dismissed because they did not
want to get involved in the anti-Armenian exterminatory operations.95
Likewise, within the same period a policy of rewards was in place for those who
excelled in the performance of their murderous task. The bestowing of such a prize
upon Nusret, who in the summer of 1920 was tried, convicted, and executed on charges
of having organized the extermination of the Armenians in and around Bayburt, is an
example.96 The case of Diyarbekir province is another example. Through the initiative
of Res! it, the governor general, ‘‘some of the police and police chiefs of the province were
promoted, received monetary rewards, and were decorated with medals.’’97 During
the Armistice, the press published relevant news stories on the model of the region of
Thrace, where such promotions took place.98
However, it is necessary to underscore the special importance attached to the case
of Diyarbekir: the governor general there did not confine the exterminatory operations
to the Armenians but extended them to all Christians. As a result especially of the
pressures exerted by the German consul and the office of the German embassy, Talât
ultimately sent, on 12 July 1915, a reminder to the Res! it, governor (vali) of Diyarbekir
that ‘‘the extending to other Christians of the disciplinary measures that are being
applied against the Armenians is not permitted,’’ thus requesting the termination of
this practice.99 As the news of the crimes being committed in Diyarbekir emerged,
Talât felt impelled to send two separate telegraphic warnings, dated 22 July and
2 August 1915. In the latter, after informing vali Res! it of the continuing reports that
‘‘the brigands are pursuing and murdering the province’s Christians,’’ Talât
admonished him with the warning that he would be held responsible ‘‘for every
action and incident imputed to the bandits and brigands.’’100
What is so remarkable, however, is that not even a perfunctory investigation was
launched against Res! it. Even more significantly, the ceremonies rewarding the
officials of Diyarbekir and its environs took place at the very same time. The glaring
fact is that, Res! it was subsequently taken to task not for his murderous crimes but,
rather, for personally appropriating the property and jewelry of his Armenian victims,
which he had promised to deliver to the party and whose prompt surrender the state
demanded. A telegram dated 6 October 1915 and addressed to Res! it reads,
According to information provided by deputies, you have demanded the return
without damage of the moneys, jewelry, and other items taken from the Armenians,
who in the course of deportation became afflicted, in order to surrender them to the
Central Committee and for which purpose you took appropriate measures. It is
requested that you indicate the extent of this kind of recovery initiative and the
manner in which a record is being kept about it.101

The thing that interested Talât was not the fact that the Armenians were being
assaulted but, rather, the fate of their valuables.
We do not know Res! it’s answer to Talât, but we know that Res! it was appointed
governor of Ankara, which can be seen as a promotion. More interestingly,
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his appropriation of goods and jewelry would later lead to his being subjected to an
investigation and removed from the post of governor of Ankara: Res! it tried to buy a
waterside mansion with the confiscated funds, and, upon hearing of this, Talât
relieved him of his post. Prominent statesman and publicist Süleyman Nazıf’s succinct
comment: ‘‘Terribly annoyed at this, Talât Pasha dismissed Res! it as a thief, while
he adored him as murderer.’’102

The Excessive Trust Accorded to Talât
Lewy takes too seriously Talât’s gesture of rescinding some directives previously sent
to the provinces in order to pacify the Germans—an act that was subsequently
promptly cancelled. He treats as reliable, for example, the statement that, ‘‘as far as
possible, Catholic and Protestant Armenians, who on the whole had not participated in
revolutionary activities, would be allowed to return to their regular places of
residence’’ (184–86, 206–8), which the German ambassador noted in his talks with
Talât. By contrast, he dismisses as ‘‘slim’’ evidence my explanation of Talât’s deceptive
two-track system of communication (112).
Precisely for this reason, it may be useful to demonstrate here how, by dispatching
a subsequent order, Talât cancelled and thus invalidated a series of earlier orders that
he had framed for the sole purpose of satisfying the Germans. First of all, it should be
emphasized that, when the deportations began, the outgoing orders stated very clearly
that without exception, without regard to or distinction of religion, all Armenians were
to be subject to deportation. For example, in the text of a telegram dated 20 June 1915
and sent to those provinces held to be of special importance, we read the following:
All Armenians dwelling in the province’s towns and villages are, without exception,
and together with their families, to be exiled to the province of Mosul and to the
regions of Urfa and Deir Zor.103

Until the beginning of August, Talât was able to ward off pressure to exempt
Catholic and Protestant Armenians from deportation. In the face of growing pressures,
however, and in light of the fact that the bulk of these Catholic and Protestant
Armenians had already been deported, Talât pretended to favor such requests, and
issued orders accordingly. As far as can be determined, the first order, dated 4 August
1915, relates to the Catholic Armenians; it reads, ‘‘You are to refrain from deporting
and exiling the remaining Catholics.’’104 A similar order, issued on 15 August 1915,
relates to the Protestants and reads, ‘‘You are to refrain from deporting those
Protestant Armenians who hitherto have not been deported.’’105 It is noteworthy that
in both telegrams Talât uses the conditional phrase ‘‘do not deport (them) if they are
still there,’’ and, as will be shown below, these orders can by no means be interpreted to
mean that those Armenians already exiled are to be allowed to return. It becomes
clear, however, that these telegrams, sent by Talât in order to mitigate German
pressure, quickly became superfluous, as he immediately dispatched another telegram
enjoining his subordinates to resume the deportations as before, consistent with the
pattern already established. On the same day that the first order was issued (4 August
1915), he ordered via telegram
The complete expulsion and dispatch of the Armenians of Adana city proper, Mersin
and Sis proper, as well as the province’s residual Armenians, all of whose
deportations were hitherto deferred, to the designated areas.106

A similar telegram was dispatched the same day to Maras! , the region’s other
city.107
135

Genocide Studies and Prevention 3:1 April 2008

Apparently deeming these individual and separately sent telegrams inadequate,
Talât then, on 11 August 1915, proceeded to dispatch to all these provinces a common
telegram exhorting recipients that ‘‘the Armenian Catholics, just like the other
Armenians, are to be sent away and banished. Proceed accordingly.’’108 In another and
similar telegram, sent to Ankara on the same day, he requested that ‘‘Ankara
province’s Catholic Armenians, just like the other Armenians, be deported and
banished.’’109 In certain other situations involving telegrams sent to individual
provinces, Talât, as reported above, went out of his way to declare that the cessation of
deportation did not apply to Armenian Catholics and Protestants already deported.
In a telegram sent on 14 August 1915 to the district of Izmit, for example, he forbade
the return from exile of the Catholics and Protestants sent to Eskis! ehir from Izmit.110
In another telegram, sent to Eskis! ehir on 30 August 1915, Talât’s order reads,
It is not permissible that those Catholic and Protestant Armenians, who were sent
there from Izmit and other localities, be allowed to return. The order does not apply
to those who have already returned.111

Here, in other words, we see Talât prohibiting the return of Catholics and Protestants
to their original localities. The situation reached such a point that it could not escape
the attention of the Germans, who began to exert pressure. As a result, Talât felt
compelled to send, on 29 August 1915, another directive to the regions, requesting that
the deportation of Catholic and Protestant Armenians cease; not satisfied with this,
Talât personally went to the German embassy to exhibit these new orders. Trusting
Talât’s word, the German authorities promptly notified their provincial consular
offices by telephone of this order of cessation.112
In fact, the order excluding Catholics and Protestants from exile is but a repetition,
in a roundabout, circuitous way, of previous ones. More important is the fact that the
order emphasizes its applicability only ‘‘to those other Armenians who, unless they are
not removed from their places and deported, are still there.’’113 In a further order sent
to the regions on 2 September, Talât let it be known that the sense of his 29 August
1915 communication was that the deportation of the Catholics and Protestants must
continue, even providing guidelines to local administrators as to how to ward off the
pressures exerted by the Germans. As to those Catholic and Protestant Armenians still
not deported, through a new directive Talât expressed that he wanted them ‘‘exiled
together with their families.’’ This new directive advised his underlings on how to
disclaim responsibility by providing the excuse that ‘‘the order to defer their
deportation came after they were already deported.’’114 From his telegram dated 24
October 1915, we learn the dates and cipher numbers relative to all the preceding
orders specifying that all Armenians, including the Catholics and Protestants, are to
be deported: (1) 5 August 1915, with cipher no. 4917; (2) 22 August 1915, with cipher
no. 2025; and (3) 2 September 1915, with cipher no. 5745. In a further telegram
pursuant to this inexorable policy of wholesale deportation of the Armenian
population, Talât demanded an explanation for the laxity of officials in Maras! :
Despite the fact that you were informed of the necessity of the deportation of the
entire Armenian population of Maras! and their relocation in the designated localities,
it is incomprehensible how in Maras! city proper there still are more than 2,000
aggressive Armenians, and more than 3,000 Protestant [Armenians].115

Not satisfied with dispatching these telegrams, Talât found it necessary to send
inspectors to some regions. Adana is an important example, in that the German
consul had shown special interest in the fate of the Armenian population there.
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After reporting that Talât had sent Ali Münif to the area as an inspector, and that the
latter had declared some of Talât’s earlier telegraphic orders to be inoperative, the
consul, on 10 September 1915, denounced ‘‘the 31 August 1915 assurance of Babıali as
a big lie.’’116 As the consul continued, ‘‘the authorities’’ proceeded on the basis of Talât’s
second set of instructions, as pursued by Ali Münif, and ‘‘the deportations are being
carried out independent of the victims’ religious confessions.’’117 In his memoirs, Ali
Münif indeed confesses that it was he who prepared the lists of the Armenians to be
deported.118
As a matter of fact, in the month of September, the authorities indicated in a series
of telegrams that there were no more Armenians to deport.119 Another document may
be cited here to show how Talât, through a second telegram that is recorded in the
registers of the cipher office of the Ministry of the Interior, cancelled a preceding
order and declared it invalid. In a telegram sent to Terfurdağ (Tekirdağ) district on
16 April 1914, Talât Pasha used precisely these words:
Disregard the contents of the letter of recommendation given yesterday to a
delegation consisting of four to five people that the Patriarchate is going to dispatch
for purposes of counseling . . . The aforementioned people are to be kept under secret
surveillance and, without making them aware of it . . . , you will see to it that the
various matters of concern to us will fail to be realized.120

This telegram is extremely important. Through it Talât not only asks that his
letter of recommendation be disregarded but also demands that the expected
delegation be kept under surveillance and that its aims be foiled. From the standpoint
of Talât’s frame of mind with respect to his dealings with representatives of foreign
missions and with minorities, this document is of the utmost importance. In light of the
Ottoman archival documents, we can easily understand why Talât, in Turkish sources,
is depicted as ‘‘a liar.’’ A few examples may be adduced here. ‘‘Noted Turkish historian
and chronicler Danis! mend described Talaat as a man whose special reputation as a
liar . . . kept growing progressively (bilhassa yalancılık s! öhreti genis! lemis! tir).’’121
The editor of the Turkish newspaper Sabah wrote that ‘‘Talaat lied like a machine.’’122
Following Talât’s escape from Istanbul, Süleyman Nazıf, a famous writer, publicist,
and governor of several provinces, described him as follows: ‘‘He, Talât, had no other
talent than just being tricky.123
It should not be surprising, then, that even Talât’s friends did not hesitate to refer
to him as a liar. His closest friend, Hüseyin Cahit, remarked that Talât ‘‘would lie in
both state and political matters.’’124 According to Falih Rıfkı Atay, Talât’s private
secretary, Talât was a person ‘‘who did not view lies or cruelty as immoral.’’ Atay
relates that the issuance of a second coded telegram nullifying whatever order Talât
had just sent by official telegram was an ordinary occurrence.125 We learn from the
memoirs of Henry Morgenthau and Halil Mentes! e that Talât, a former telegrapher,
had a special private telegraphic line run to his house from which he ran his
communications.126 Rescinding a previously sent order through a subsequent one was
a method to which Ottoman authorities often resorted. Hans Von Seeckt, chief of
general staff of the Ottoman Armed Forces, reported that the practice of implying that
certain earlier official orders and secret decisions were to be disregarded was a
common occurance.127 Furthermore, the memoirs of Captain Selahattin reveal that
Enver, having dispatched some telegrams through official channels in order to placate
the Germans, subsequently cancelled them through the use of a telegraphic
contraption installed in his home.128 In light of all this, we can see the fallacy of
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fashioning a historical analysis based on a few dubious documents shrewdly framed by
Talât and proffered to appease German diplomats.

Conclusion
In his preface, Lewy states, ‘‘Unlike most of those who have written on the subject of
the Armenian massacres and who are partisans of one side or the other, I have no
special ax to grind’’ (x), He claims, further, that his ‘‘aim has been to deal with this
emotion-laden subject without political preconceptions’’ (x). Because his premises,
assessments, and conclusions are based on an incomplete study of the material, and
because he is not in command of the subject matter, we can expect, if we take him at
his word, that he is ready to revise his position. To make mistakes is normal in our
profession, and to admit one’s mistakes is a virtue.
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Dündar, ‘‘İttihat ve Terakki’nin Etnisite Aras! tırmaları,’’ Toplumsal Tarih 16, no. 91 (2001):
43–51.
Although his general views on Gökalp are such as to reach beyond the confines of this
study, I concur with Lewy’s criticism of those who accuse Gökalp of racism.
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Takvim-i Vekâyi, no. 3543, 8 May 1919, transcript of second trial session, 4 May 1919.
Takvim-i Vekâyi, no. 3549, 15 May 1919, transcript of fourth trial session, 8 May 1919.
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Hakları, 226–27.
Talât Pasha’s cables dated 3 March 1915 and 20 February 1916 appear in Andonian,
Memoirs of Naim Bey, 16, 57.
Alemdar, 27 March 1919.
Renaissance, 6 May 1919; Hadisat, 7 May 1919.
Cipher dated 14 February 1916, signed by Talât, Public Security Office (Ministry of the
Interior) to the authorities of Aleppo and Adana provinces.

140

Review Essay: Guenter Lewy’s The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey

43.

44.
45.

46.
47.

Hilmar Kaiser, ‘‘The Baghdad Railway and the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1916,’’
Remembrance and Denial. The Case of the Armenian Genocide, ed. Richard G.
Hovannisian, 67–112 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999), 108 n78.
Andonian, Memoirs of Naim Bey, 10.
The IAMM was established at the beginning of 1913 within the Ministry of the Interior and
was transformed by new legislation on 14 March 1916. The new office had expanded
authority, comprising many sub-offices, and would grow in power and influence as the
years wore on. This new office was called the Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants
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S! inasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca, Ermenilerce Talat Pas! a’ya Atfedilen Telgrafların Gerçek
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Talât’s cipher see Osmanlı Belgelerinde, doc. no. 71, 69. Perhaps equally important as the
document itself is the fact that it is not registered in the catalog of the Prime Ministerial
143

Genocide Studies and Prevention 3:1 April 2008

100.
101.
102.
103.

104.

105.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

114.
115.
116.

117.
118.
119.

120.
121.

Archives. The document’s catalog number is 54/406; in the catalog itself, however, the
sequential numbering jumps from 545/405 to 54/407, thus skipping the identification of
this particular document. Had the document not appeared in the Osmanlı Belgelerinde
Ermeniler, no one would be aware of its existence. Whether this document was deliberately
omitted from the archive catalog remains a matter of serious concern.
BOA/DH/S! FR, /54-A/248, telegram, Public Security Office to the provincial authorities of
Diyarbekir, 2 August 1915.
BOA/DH/S! FR, /56/315, telegram marked ‘‘for your eyes only,’’ Public Security Office
(Ministry of the Interior) to Diyarbekir province, 6 October 1915.
Hadisat, 8 February 1919.
BOA/DH/S! FR, 54/87, telegram, Public Security Office (Ministry of the Interior) to the
provinces of Trabzon, Mamretül-Aziz, Sivas, and Diyarbekir and the district of Canik,
20 June 1915.
BOA/DH/S! FR, 54-A/252, telegram, Interior Minister Talât to the provinces of Erzurum,
Adana, Ankara, Bitlis, Aleppo, Diyarbekir, Sivas, Trabzon, Mamüretül-Aziz, and Van and
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Student, Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo
This paper was presented at the Seventh Biennial Meeting of the International
Association of Genocide Scholars, held in Sarajevo from 9–13 July 2007.

Introduction
During the aggression on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, many volunteers
from Orthodox countries fought in the army of the Republika Srpska (VRS). Among
them were Ukrainians, Romanians, Greeks, and Russians, to name the most obvious.
However, the most interesting are the Greeks:1 first, Greek fighters took part in the
genocide in Srebrenica; second, the Greek government and a large part of the public
supported and approved their actions. Orthodox Christian foreign fighters in the VRS
are often called ‘‘mercenaries,’’ which is inaccurate, since they fought for ideology and
not for money. While this topic is important, it is controversial and has been little
investigated so far. This research note aims to explore the role of Greece and Greeks in
the aggression and genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

‘‘We moved in and ‘cleaned up’ the place!’’
The first Greek volunteers arrived in Bosnia in 1993.2 In March 1995, at the request of
General Ratko Mladić, the Greek Volunteer Guard (GVG) was formed, with its base in
Vlasenica.3 It was fully integrated into the Drina Corps of the army of the VRS and was
closely connected to Greek intelligence agencies; its activities were closely monitored by
the Greek embassy in Belgrade.4 The unit had its own insignia, a double-headed eagle
on a black background. We now know that it took part in the VRS offensive on the UN
enclave of Srebrenica. Greek volunteers were also spotted in the Konjic area.5 A large
number of the GVG’s members were also members of Hrisi Avgi, a neo-Nazi
organization in Greece, but overall the members represented mainstream Greek
opinion.6 To support the connection between the GVG and Hrisi Avgi, there exists a
picture of a few GVG members in Srebrenica saluting in the Nazi style. After the fall of
Srebrenica, Serb and Greek soldiers raised four flags on the Orthodox Church in
Srebrenica: the Serbian, the Greek, the Byzantine, and the flag of Vergina (the disputed
‘‘Greek Macedonian’’ flag).7 It is also reported that video footage was shot of this event
for propaganda purposes.8 The Greeks celebrated all night with their Serb fellow
soldiers and sang the Greek and Serbian national anthems.9 The same day Srebrenica
fell, the Greek national television station, MEGA, conducted a telephone interview with
a Greek volunteer from Srebrenica, who said with excitement, ‘‘After the artillery
stopped its bombardment we moved in and ‘cleaned up’ the place!’’10
The primary reason for the Greek presence in Bosnia was ideology. When asked his
motives for fighting, one Greek volunteer answered, ‘‘I am an Orthodox and I must help
my Serb brethren against the Muslims.’’11 Another had greater visions: ‘‘We are fighting
for a Greater Greece in a Europe free from Muslims and Zionists.’’12 Yet another said,
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‘‘The Vatican, the Zionists, the Germans and the Americans conspire against the
Orthodox nations. Their next target after Serbia will be Greece.’’13 Four members of the
GVG were awarded the White Eagle medal by Radovan Karadžić himself. The Greek
volunteers maintained two offices in Greece, one in Athens and the other in Solun,
which were used for recruitment.14

‘‘God and the Greeks’’
The Greek government, the Greek Orthodox Church, and the majority of the Greek
public openly supported the Milosević and Karadžić governments during the aggression
on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The roots of Serb–Greek relations run deep.
As the famous Greek lawyer Alexandros Lykourezos has put it, Greece’s relationship
with Serbia ‘‘stems from Greece’s hostile relationship with Turkey, which is also often
hard for outsiders to fathom.’’15 During the Yugoslav wars, the socialist Panhellenic
Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the right-wing New Democracy sided with the Serbs.
The socialists sided with the Serbs because of their anti-Americanism, which also
explains why Muammar Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein supported Milošević, while New
Democracy sided with the Serbs as fellow members of the Orthodox faith. Despite their
differences, these two political rivals readily agreed on Serb policies in the Yugoslav
wars. One such point of agreement was Radovan Karadžić. Karadžic visited Greece on
two occasions, first in the summer of 1993 and second in January 1994.16 Both times he
received the highest state honors. In 1993 he met with high-ranking Greek officials,
including Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, PASOK leader Andreas Papandreou,
and Archbishop Serapheim of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Greek–Serb Friendship
was also helpful in bringing Karadžić to Greece.17 This organization was formed in 1992
and is still active today, promoting Serb interests in Greece. Its president, Aris
Mousionis, was seen together with Karadžić during the latter’s visit to Greece; he
personally shared with Serb general Ratko Mladić NATO military secrets concerning
the air strikes initiated against Bosnian Serb forces in August 1995.18 The importance of
this organization is shown by the fact that during the war Karadžić awarded the Greek–
Serb Friendship the Njegoš medal (Orden Njegoša).19 The Greek Orthodox Church
organized a open-air mass meeting honoring Karadžić at Piraeus Stadium, where
among those present were, besides Greek Church officials, Greek politicians Kostas
Karamanlis20 and Akis Tsochatyopoulos, then minister of defense. It was here that
Karadžić made the now-famous remark, ‘‘We have with us God and the Greeks.’’21 He
next visited Greece in January 1994, when he arrived in Athens to attend a medical
conference titled ‘‘The Effects of the Embargo and the War on the Health of the Serb
People.’’22 Even today, Karadžić is still considered a hero and a defender of the Orthodox
faith by a large number of Greeks. Recently there have been many reports that Karadžić
is hiding in Greece; both Bosnian and foreign intelligence officers claim that he
occasionally hides in the Hilandar monastery on Mt. Athos.23 It is important to note that
the Greek Orthodox Church has appointed Karadžić ‘‘to the 900-year-old ‘Knights’
Order of the first rank of Saint Dionysius of Xanthe,’’ declaring him ‘‘one of the most
prominent sons of our Lord Jesus Christ working for peace.’’24
The Greek Church, besides supporting Karadžić personally, supported the military
actions of the VRS. In December 1993, Greek Orthodox priests visited the ethnically
cleansed Bosnian town of Zvornik and conducted a liturgy in the church of Saint
Nikolas, the protector of Zvornik.25 In February 1995, a delegation led by Archimandrite
Ignatios of the Diocese of Piraeus visited the Serb-occupied part of Sarajevo and gave
blessings to the Serb soldiers who were constantly shelling the city. Numerous reports
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show that the Milošević regime had bank accounts in Greek and Cypriot banks.
According to the testimony of Radomir Marković, head of the Serbian State Security
Service from November 1998 to 2000, the regime used these bank accounts to purchase
military equipment from abroad for the needs of the Republika Srpska and the
Republika Srpska Krajina.26 Via these banks, more than E770 million was spent by
Serbia to buy arms from Russia and Israel.27 Greece, probably in return, was allowed to
draw large quantities of electricity each day from Bosnia, and the Greek state energy
company paid $20,000 a month to Belgrade for the use of these power lines.28 The issue
of secret bank accounts from the Milošević era is still active, and there is no doubt that it
played a role in shaping Greek foreign policy; but, compared to Greek sympathy for
Serbs, the economic motive was a minor one. Perhaps one of the most important things
Greece did for Serbia was to supply it with much-needed fuel, without which the
Bosnian Serb Army could not have mounted their military operations. Greece smuggled
fuel to Serbia by recruiting Serb criminals such as Vladimir Bokan, who smuggled fuel
on behalf of Greece while in return the Greek government provided him with Greek
citizenship and turned a blind eye to his private profit-making activities.29 In 2000,
Bokan agreed to tell his story to Greek journalist Takis Michas. He later agreed to
another meeting during which he would provide Michas with the names of Greek
politicians and businessmen with whom he had worked and who had also helped break
the embargo. A few days after their first meeting, however, Bokan was assassinated by
unidentified persons. Other experts, such as Dutch professor Cees Wiebes, who worked
on the report of the Netherlands War Documentation Institute (NWDI), claim that in
1994 and 1995 Greece supplied the Bosnian Serbs with weapons and ammunition,
which were shipped from Piraeus to Bar, Montenegro.30 Another way in which the
Greek state supported the Bosnian Serbs was by giving NATO military secrets to the
VRS. Greece, as a member of NATO, had access to information about planned NATO
targets during the 1995 air strikes; this information was leaked to the VRS through Aris
Mousionis, president of the Greek–Serb Friendship Association. Once NATO discovered
the leak, Greece was no longer allowed access to this information.31

The Post-Srebrenica Period
In June 2005, after images of executions of boys and men from Srebrenica by Serb
special forces (Škorpioni) were shown around the world, a Greek member of parliament,
Andreas Andrianopoulous, requested that an investigation be opened into whether
Greeks took part in the genocide. No results have been published so far, and it is not
even known at what stage the investigation is today.32 The report published by the
NWDI in 2002, which led the entire Dutch government to resign, confirmed that Greek
volunteers took part in military operations in Srebrenica and that Greece violated the
embargo by supplying the Serbs with fuel and other materials.33 The Greek government
has continued either to deny any Greek involvement in Srebrenica or to state that it is
not interested in the matter. In June 2005, a Greek official, Jorgos Kumucakos, said that
the Ministry of Justice would cooperate with the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in The Hague ‘‘if it was requested by them.’’34 At the same time, the minister
of justice, Anastasios Papaliguras, said that it ‘‘is possible that Greek citizens took part
in the massacre of civilians in Srebrenica.’’35 There are also unconfirmed reports that
Carla Del Ponte gave a list of Greek citizens who were volunteers in Bosnia to a Greek
diplomat, Jorgos Papandreu, in April 2003. Unfortunately, Greek officials have not
shown the willpower to arrest those suspected of crimes, even when there is strong
evidence. One such case occurred in 2003, when police, in an operation to bust an illegal
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steroids network, searched the house of a thirty-six-year-old in Athens. While searching
for steroids they came up with ‘‘something much more horrific[:] 80 photos of
slaughtered Muslim civilians in Bosnia.’’36 This man was at first a member of Arkan’s
Tigers, then later joined the GVG, but he also served as a trainer for Fikret Abdić’s forces
in Krajina. Despite these photographs, he was charged only with selling illegal drugs.
Even though Greece is financing major reconstruction projects in Bosnia and
helping Bosnia on its path to membership in the European Union, evidence has shown
that some indicted war criminals may be hiding in Greece. In November 2006, Dnevni
avaz, a leading daily in Bosnia-Herzegovina, published a picture of Stojan Župljanin in
the Hilandar monastery in northern Greece.37 He is shown dressed casually, standing
under a cross and inscription relating to Serbia’s fourteenth-century emperor Dušan.
This is the most sacred shrine of the Serbian people and is a place where Serbian monks
reside—the same place where, in March 1991, Milošević declared that ‘‘the spirit that
united us during the period of the Turkish rule’’ once again united the Greeks and
Serbs.38 In June 2007, a former member of the GVG, Kirakos Katharios, published a
book titled The Journey of a Volunteer, in which he writes about the heroic actions of
Greek volunteers in Bosnia and states, among other things, that Srebrenica is a ‘‘lie’’ and
that the Greeks did not participate in any crimes: ‘‘If they had, the Moslem government
of Bosnia would have raised the issue.’’39

Conclusion
It can be concluded that the war in Bosnia was pursued with Greek support for
Serbian forces. Some believe that this reflects a Greek fear of being surrounded by three
‘‘Islamic states.’’ Greece has shown this attitude on numerous occasions, especially
when it banned Turkish flights over Greece which would have helped enforce UN no-fly
zones in Bosnia.40 Most Greeks feel that Turks, Zionists, Germans, and Americans
endanger their religion. The reason that most Greeks are so anti-American has to do
with the United States’ support of the Greek junta in the 1970s and its support of
Turkey. Major Greek institutions manipulated the Greek public into supporting the
Serb aggression against Bosnian Muslims. It is enough to say that the Greek state
media had correspondents in Pale, Serb-occupied Sarajevo, and other places, but rarely
in territories controlled by the Bosnian government.41 In addition, Slobodan Milošević
went on his last holiday to the Greek island of Hydra in 1998, long after he was indicted
by the ICTY; he was protected by Serb and Greek bodyguards provided by the Greek
government. Alexander Likourezos, a major Greek lawyer, acted as General Mladić’s
adviser and has said that he would defend Mladić if he were arrested and brought to The
Hague.42 Although Greece has shown progress, from fully supporting Serb crimes, to
denying any knowledge of them, to finally admitting that ‘‘it is possible that Greek
citizens took part in the massacre of civilians in Srebrenica,’’ much more remains to be
done by the Greek government and the Greek Orthodox Church.43 Financing the
reconstruction of the Serb-destroyed parliament building in Sarajevo will not heal the
broken hearts of the mothers of Srebrenica.
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New studies of genocide continue to materialize at a modest but regular pace. Of
course, there is nothing like the Holocaust publishing phenomenon, with a small flood
of books and articles appearing month after month. A long lifetime devoted to nothing
but reading about the Holocaust would barely begin to scratch the surface of the
available studies. But it is gratifying, if obviously frustrating, to report that it is now
quite impossible to keep up with all the literature on other genocides and on genocide
as such.
Nonetheless, the universe of those one Israeli on the fringes affectionately calls
‘‘genocide freaks’’ remains distinctly small. It is no fluke that I know, at least as
acquaintances if not as dear friends, two of the three authors under review. This leads
to the situation that always prevails when a field is so small and intimate—the
difficulty of candor and criticism in reviewing the work of peers, if only because there is
at least a reasonable possibility that they may one day be called on to review one of
your efforts. It is easier to pretend that this is not an issue, but it is. And all we can do
is disclose this implicit conflict of interest.
As it happens, I have problems with all three books under review. The author I do
not know at all is Andrew Wallis, identified on the jacket flap as a journalist and a
researcher in the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University. Wallis’s book is
the most timely of the three, and probably the most important, but it is also the most
disappointing. The role of France in the Rwandan Genocide remains a blur to many in
the English-speaking world. The division in the field of genocide studies between
monolingual French and English speakers is almost scandalously unbridged; the two
simply do not share the same universe of information. Nowhere is this more true than
in books and articles on Rwanda, where—with notable exceptions, such as Linda
Melvern—two solitudes can be said to exist. There is a good deal of writing related
to the genocide by francophone Rwandan academics and other francophone
writers, including the indispensable Belgian journalist Colette Braeckman, that
remains a blank slate to most Anglophones. (Braeckman feels so divorced from the
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agenda-setting Anglophone world, she told me, that she will never again write a book
that is not translated into English.)
Wallis’s signal contribution is to pull together the most important work extant in
both English and French on France’s role in the genocide, from the many reports
of Human Rights Watch (HRW) to the writings of Patrick de St. Exupery and FrançoisXavier Verschave. Noting that the usual criticism of the ‘‘international community’’ is
that it has failed to intervene to stop atrocities perpetrated by Africans against each
other, he reminds us of the real truth: ‘‘genocide often occurs because of too much, not
too little, Western interference’’ (x). Following the lead of HRW, he asks exactly the
right question: Would the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi have happened at all without
French President François Mitterrand’s consistent support for Rwanda’s Hutu
extremists and his attempts to undermine the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
before, during and after the genocide? Unfortunately, Silent Accomplice addresses
events only up to and shortly after the genocide was ended by the RPF victory, and, as
a result, Wallis fails to pose the next logical question: Would the terrible conflicts that
have devastated the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for the past decade have
happened if the French military had not allowed so many leading ge´nocidaires to flee
Rwanda for the DRC in the dying days of the genocide?
The RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda on 1 October 1990. Mitterrand responded
to Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana’s plea for support immediately.
From that moment on, there was no aspect of Rwandan life in which France did not
intervene—from supplying weapons to training elite soldiers and youth militias to
providing intelligence to providing financial support to devising military strategy to
acting as international spin doctors to leading the Rwandan armed forces to manning
roadblocks and asking for the notorious ID cards that revealed citizens’ ethnic origin.
Almost no authority believes that the Rwandan army could have held off the rebels for
three years without French support, and if the Habyarimana gang had been
overthrown, there would have been no genocide.
French politicians, French diplomats, and French soldiers blatantly lied about
everything that was happening in Rwanda. George Orwell never had more faithful
disciples in turning the truth completely on its head. They said they were in Rwanda
only to protect French citizens. They said they were there only as a humanitarian
service to Rwandans. They said they were there to protect victims of the genocide.
They said the RPF disemboweled children. They said that each pogrom against
the Tutsi from 1991 to April 1994 was the responsibility of the RPF. They said that the
only obstacle to peace was the RPF.
After the genocide, Mitterrand called Habyarimana a true democrat. He said it
was the United Nations, not his government, that had restored the power of a flailing
Mobutu Sese Seko. France also did all it could to withhold European Union funds from
the new RPF-led government after the genocide. The 1998 inquiry by the French
National Assembly documented France’s myriad sins in Rwanda and concluded that
the chief culprit was the United States. Mitterrand liked talking about ‘‘genocides,’’ in
the plural, blaming the RPF as much as the ge´nocidaires. As late as 2003, then foreign
minister Dominique de Villepin spoke of the ‘‘Rwandan genocides.’’ To this day, the
French government continues to hide accused ge´nocidaires and to embraces denier
of the genocide.
All this adds up to a deep, vast sickness. France has long seen francophone Africa
as its backyard, its pre´ carre´, just as the United States saw Latin America as its
natural neocolonial turf. Without the support of its former African colonies, under any
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number of tyrants and sadists, any pretense of France to be even a second-tier
world power would evaporate. That is why language and culture obsess the
French establishment so profoundly. But nothing remotely rational quite explains
the pathological depths of French hostility to the RPF, or the complicity and villainy
that characterize its role in the Rwandan Genocide. In a just world, French officials
would be among the very first defendants before the International Criminal Court.
So, while Wallis’s book fills a large gap, it is inadequate in too many ways. There
are all the obvious errors: Stephen Lewis was not UN Envoy to Africa but Envoy for
AIDS in Africa; former chief prosecutor Jean de Dieux Mucyo is not Mueyo. There was
no OAU report on the genocide; there was a report by an independent panel appointed
by the OAU. A death site is a charnel house, not a carnal house, for heaven’s sake!
Several references have no relation to the item being referenced, and some key points
are supported by no references at all. There is an unacceptable reliance on RPF
officials as a source of negative information on France; material relating to 2005
is sourced to a 1994 newspaper story. The writing is often sophomorically heavyhanded and childishly ironic. Foolish liberties are taken to hammer home obvious
points—French politicians are said to have been so surprised by a Mitterrand
maneuver, for example, that they ‘‘no doubt spluttered in their Perrier water’’ (122).
Where have all the editors gone?
Among the slanders French officials heaped on the RPF was the label ‘‘Khmer
Noir’’—the African equivalent of the genocidal Khmer Rouge. The slur offers one
connection to Cambodia. So does Wallis’s statement that ‘‘genocide often occurs
because of too much, not too little, Western interference’’ (x). Note his deliberate choice
of the word ‘‘often.’’ He is not speaking only of the French in Rwanda. Just look at
the secret bombing of Cambodia launched illegally by Richard Nixon and
Henry Kissinger, another of their crimes against humanity. It was the destabilization
of Cambodia that enabled Pol Pot’s troops to take over the country so easily and to
impose its demented, deadly ideology.
Academically, too, there is a curious parallel to the Francophone–Anglophone split
over Rwanda: by and large, with important exceptions, those who concentrate on
either Rwanda or Cambodia usually are not well versed in the other. All the more
reason to welcome a collection like Susan Cook’s, which explicitly deals with both.
Most edited collections are uneven, but Cook’s (Genocide in Cambodia and
Rwanda: New Perspectives) is more uneven than many. That said, I found most of the
contributions more or less worthwhile and informative. But the volume is less than the
sum of its parts, when it should be more. Cook claims to be offering a ‘‘comparative
study of genocide,’’ but, in fact, many of the essays are entirely stand-alone pieces,
lending themselves to no particular comparisons at all. The problem is that they
emerged from research done for the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University,
and, while all the authors may have asked similar questions of different genocidal
episodes, as Cook maintains, there was apparently only a limited attempt to compare
specific aspects of the two experiences systematically. Cook herself has published
comparative articles on the role of ethnicity in each case, but they are not reproduced
in this volume.
A real flaw is the absence of any conceptual comparisons of the two as genocides at
all, which surely would have been the place to begin a comparative study of
two ‘‘genocides.’’ In fact, because the Khmer Rouge were exactly like those they
murdered so blithely, while Tutsi and Hutu were distinguished by ethnicity and
modern history, many scholars of genocide question whether the Khmer Rouge in fact
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perpetrated a genocide. Some argue that the real genocide in Cambodia was by the
Khmer of several small ethnic and religious minorities, not the massive slaughter of
the killing fields. For Rwanda, only a minority of outright deniers and their French
allies doubt what every authority who has studied the subject agrees: Rwanda’s Tutsi
stand with the Herero, the Armenians, and the Jews of Europe as one of the purest
Genocide Convention genocides in modern history. This book would have been far
more valuable had it taken on this defining issue.
Two of the chapters on Cambodia (Dmitry Mosyakov’s ‘‘The Khmer Rouge and the
Vietnamese Communists’’ and Puangthong Rungswasdisab’s ‘‘Thailand’s Response to
the Cambodian Genocide’’) shed light on the Khmer Rouge’s relationships with the
Vietnamese Communists and with neighboring Thailand, both of which significantly
influenced the course of events in the region. Here is where a real comparative study
would have made an important contribution, by examining Habyarimana’s relations
with other African states and with the rich world, apart from France, before his
assassination in 1994 ignited the genocide. In the Cambodian case, two American
administrations claimed to fear the ‘‘domino effect’’ in Southeast Asia of a Viet Cong
victory in South Vietnam, and perhaps the CIA had, as usual, proffered false
intelligence. In fact, Hanoi and the Khmer Rouge enjoyed a poisonous relationship, as
did the USSR and China, and, since Russia was Hanoi’s ally, China backed the Khmer
Rouge. None of these positions had anything at all to do with the bestial nature of
the Khmer Rouge government.
What was the Rwandan equivalent? Why did the OAU refuse to condemn the
genocide, instead taking the same neutral line as the UN and demanding that both
sides cease the fighting? What was Mobutu’s role as Habyarimana’s mentor? The
francophone African dictators showed the expected solidarity. Why did Kenya’s Daniel
Arap Moi at first refuse to hand over accused ge´nocidaires hiding in his country? The
makings of a genuinely comparative and revealing study lie in these questions.
Anyone studying the Rwandan Genocide emerges shell-shocked from the behavior
of the international community throughout. I have written often about twenty-five
things the powers-that-be were responsible for, during those few years, that even today
are almost impossible to believe. But nothing that happened to Rwanda can trump the
support and recognition given by the West and China to the Khmer Rouge after its
ouster by the Vietnamese Communists in 1979. Kelvin Rowley’s essay on the subject,
‘‘Second Life, Second Death: The Khmer Rouge after 1978,’’ reminds us that there are
no apparent limits on the depths to which states will sink in the pursuit of their own
self-interest, even if it means embracing one of the most psychopathic gangs of mass
murderers the world has ever seen.
On a different but significant editorial note, I must state that to publish such a
book with no maps is frustrating and beyond forgiveness.
In the end, Cook’s book, like Wallis’s on France, reinforces the harsh reality that
the struggle to prevent genocide and to find even a modicum of justice in this world will
always be a Sisyphean one.
Justice and mass murderers are also among the themes of Nigel Eltringham’s
short work on Rwanda, Accounting for Horror. Eltringham offers a good deal of useful
information and a considerable number of insights. But intellectual honesty compels
me to confess immediately that I did not understand much of this book. Very likely
that reflects my own intellectual limitations. But, as I read through, I often did
not know what Eltringham was getting at, became confused when I tried to figure out
why he was discussing certain topics and not discussing others, and, to the end, never
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grasped how the various issues he deals with hang together. Perhaps there is a special
skill to deciphering the jargon and style of anthropologists these days that I have
not yet mastered. I was also thunderstruck to find that, like the Cook volume, this one
had no map, making the discussion almost impossible to follow in some places. Maybe
publishers no longer employ editors.
Accounting for Horror was published in 2004 but is based on interviews with
Rwandans in Rwanda in 1998 and in Europe in 1999. Since that is about the same time
my own work in Rwanda began, I know how very long ago, in relative terms, it was—
less than five years after the genocide. In many ways, a different Rwanda exists today
than existed seven or eight years ago, and Eltringham’s book suffers accordingly. Still,
some of the debates that he examines remain both pertinent and highly controversial.
He analyzes in great and convincing detail allegations of atrocities and human-rights
abuses against the RPF before, during, and after the genocide, finding that they
escalated from relatively few to massive. Although the RPF government has long
denied any culpability for the crimes against humanity that were committed in the
forests of Zaire/DRC, Eltringham goes a long way toward confirming what many of us
have feared to be true. But he makes no effort to explain why he spends twenty-five
pages dissecting the years between 1995 and 1997 and only one paragraph on the
violent, rapacious years from 1998 to 2001. During this period, in the name of fighting
the ge´nocidaires, Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers plundered the valuable mineral
resources of the DRC for the enrichment of their own ruling elites, which the latter
naturally denied completely. In the process, as Ugandans and Rwandans engaged in
open warfare against each other on Congolese soil, millions of Congolese civilians were
displaced or died from violence, illness, or starvation.
Eltringham also deals at some length with the deeply divisive politics of Rwandan
history. Official histories are always tendentious, and in Rwanda their purpose proved
fatal. Clashing Hutu and Tutsi versions of the past, often based on the work of white
missionaries and colonialists, were invoked repeatedly in the past century to justify
the most appalling of atrocities, culminating in the genocide itself. Eltringham is at his
analytic best in deconstructing the debate over these conflicting interpretations and
the malevolent uses to which they were put.
These debates, as well as others, will not soon fade, either in Cambodia or in
Rwanda. With a long-awaited tribunal to judge the Khmer Rouge finally about to begin
work in Cambodia, with the government of Paul Kagame imposing its own very precise
view of Rwanda’s past, with the wretched French still attempting to bring down
Kagame over the plane crash that killed his predecessor and triggered the genocide,
with denial of the Rwandan Genocide rife as ever in France and Belgium, genocide
scholars and genocide preventionists will find a rich abundance of material to work on
for decades to come.
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In her book, Rachel Kerr presents, through the operation of the International Criminal
Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an integrated study of law and
international politics in the maintenance of international peace and security.
Although the tribunal was established as a tool of politics, it has administered justice
in an apolitical fashion. Kerr’s empirical examination explores the necessity of the
ICTY’s political status for the performance of its judicial function as an independent
court.
After delineating the philosophy that led to the unique convergence of legal,
political, and diplomatic dynamics, Kerr takes the reader along three distinctive paths:
the UN Security Council’s role in the areas of international peace and security, the
development of international criminal justice through 1993, and the response of the
international community to ongoing systematic violations of international humanitarian law—particularly those involving ethnic cleansing.
The ICTY has had to independently manipulate the political context in which it
operates in order to fulfill its judicial mandate; hence the need to generate its own
momentum. Kerr carefully charts the process of creating this innovative tribunal: its
seat, its legal status and personality, its funding, its basic framework, and the transfer
and detention of the accused. The core aspects of the ICTY’s jurisdiction are explained.
Questions answered here are whether the method of establishing this tribunal satisfies
the requirement that it be ‘‘established by law’’ (62) and on what basis it is competent
to exercise jurisdiction. A discussion of the primacy of the ICTY over national courts,
as political or legally motivated, follows. As expected, Kerr assesses the topics of
territorial, temporal, and subject-matter jurisdiction issues. She also covers a range of
issues not directly pertinent to the operation of the tribunal but still related to its
overall success, such as the dissolution of the Socialist Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia and the growth of international humanitarian law. She highlights the
consequences of legal decisions in the political arena. She also analyzes the ICTY’s
rules of procedure and evidence in relation to their impact on politics and on law.
Specifically, issues of admissibility and disclosure of evidence and political considerations concerning victims and witnesses are amplified. Kerr’s conclusion is that the
‘‘administration of justice was fair, impartial and expeditious’’ (113) but that this result
was brought about by certain trade-offs.
To function effectively, the ICTY needed support from the states in the region,
from other states, and from both intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Kerr sets out the legal framework for investigations and for international
cooperation and judicial assistance at trial and explores the various levels of
cooperation in practice to show the influence of politics and diplomacy at various
stages. Interestingly, the examples of non-compliance by states and non-cooperation
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by certain government leaders did not ultimately prevent the ICTY from achieving its
successes. Politics and logistics apparently play a significant role in obtaining custody
of an accused. Relying on national police authorities to make arrests, using
international forces to effect detention, and encouraging voluntary surrender are all
necessary for the tribunal to perform its functions. This balancing act is adroitly
manifest in the role and function of the prosecutor, with a positive result (213).
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is critical to the successful operation of the
ICTY. Accordingly, this study discusses the relative styles of three chief prosecutors—
Richard Goldstone, Louise Arbour, and Carla Del Ponte—and their interpretations of
how their office was to function in terms of law and politics.
In the short term, Kerr argues, the ICTY has brought justice for both perpetrators
and victims; it has accomplished both justice and peace. She also asserts that its
activity has fostered reconciliation, but states that the latter aim has ‘‘not been fulfilled
to the extent desired’’ (217). The long-term impact of the tribunal’s operations cannot
be measured until more time has passed after the completion of its principal task.
While the ICTY has performed admirably, it has been unable to apprehend and
prosecute two of the primary perpetrators of the atrocities. As long as Radovan
Karadžić and Ratko Mladić remain at large, the tribunal will have failed to provide
justice.
There is a considerable literature on the ICTY, but Rachel Kerr’s treatment of the
subject is innovative, insightful, and definitely worth the read.
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Akçam has since lectured and published extensively on the Armenian Genocide; his
eleven books and numerous articles in English, French, German, and Turkish include
Armenien und die Völkermord (2nd ed. 2005); Dialogue across an International Divide:
Essays Towards a Turkish–Armenian Dialogue (2001); From Empire to Republic:
Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide (2004); and the forthcoming
A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and Turkish Responsibility. He is currently
working on a book with Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Protocols of the Istanbul Military
Tribunals on the Investigation of the Armenian Genocide.
Gerry Caplan is an independent scholar and activist who focuses mainly on genocide
and African underdevelopment. He has undertaken a series of assignments for the
African Union and several UN agencies dealing with the well-being of African
children; he was senior adviser to the former UN Special Envoy for AIDS in Africa and
chair of the International Advisory Board of the University of Toronto’s Special
Initiative on AIDS in Africa. He is the author of Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide
(2000), the comprehensive report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities
appointed by the Organization of African Unity to investigate the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda. He has just completed a book titled The Conspiracy against Africa, which will
be published in 2008 by Groundwood Press.
Vahakn N. Dadrian received his undergraduate education in Europe studying
philosophy, mathematics, and international law at the Universities of Vienna, Berlin,
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Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović, and is currently working on a manuscript dealing
with Ante Pavelić.
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